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TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE**

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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS**

Özgür Öztürk DAKAM YAYINLARI

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# POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF FOOD SECURITY IN CRISIS-AFFECTED AREAS

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## ABSTRACT

The United Nations' Millennium Development Goals launched at the turn of the millennium and the Sustainable Development Goals of 2015 have given priority to the radical reduction of extreme poverty including hunger and food insecurity. According to the latest available data of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, today 815 million people worldwide do not have access to proper quantity and quality of food, 498 million of which live in war-torn areas. Nearly 124 million people are threatened by serious levels of food insecurity, requiring immediate intervention and international humanitarian assistance (FAO *et al*, 2017). These figures have been increasing compared to recent years: effects of climate change, the rising number of crisis areas, unresolved and escalating armed conflicts all resulted in a higher number of severe acute and chronic food crises.

The primary aim of the presentation and paper is to introduce possible interpretations of food security in crisis-affected areas with a particular focus on contemporary warzones. Beyond the basic concepts of food security, the correlation between hunger and conflict will be also discussed. Furthermore, the paper is going to review the different segments of food security existing in contemporary conflict zones. The examination is mainly based on the analysis of relevant reports of international organizations dealing with the concerned issue.

Keywords: food security, war zones, undernutrition

Word count: 4017

## 1. FOOD SECURITY: DIMENSIONS, DETERMINATIONS

Before discussing the certain segments of food insecurity, it is appropriate that we briefly clarify what we mean by food security. Hence food insecurity is one of the most significant global challenges nowadays, the term food security is regularly defined by the international organizations dealing with the developing regions' difficulties and developmental aids (FAO, 2003). At the World Food Summit of 1996, an action plan was confirmed, at it includes the first description that — on the contrary to the former definitions — takes into consideration not only the importance of sufficient food, but it highlights individual preferences and needs, as well as the significance of safe and nutritious food and the economical and physical

requirements of accessing food. The action plan also emphasizes that food security must be interpreted and examined at individual, household, national, regional and global level alike (FAO, 1996). In FAO's report from 2001 concerning food insecurity, the requirements of food security mentioned in the World Food Summit's action plan were accompanied by social reference (FAO, 2002). Due to the definition(s) outlined above, four pillars can be used for the analysis of food security:

- availability: the physical availability of food in a certain region, including home production, food import, food reserves and food aid;
- access: the ability of households to access and acquire food, either by home production, hunting, fishing, purchasing, trading or supports/aids;
- utilization: the distribution, method and measure of the available and accessible food's utilization in each household (usage, storage, hygiene conditions etc.);
- stability: food security; the maintenance of the former three pillars with minimalizing the risk factors leading to food shortage (by improving reactions to economic and political instability, military conflicts, unfavorable weather conditions) (WFP, 2009 p. 22-24).




Figure 1: The four pillars of food-security

Source: World Food Programme, 2009, edited by the author

We can draw the conclusion that the lack of one or more pillars may lead to food insecurity, food crisis, even to famine in more critical cases (FSIN, 2018 p. 11). We have to differentiate the types of food insecurities based on their content and intensity, as each of them may have different causes. Moreover, food insecurities of different duration and measure require different reactions and helping methods (Devereux, 2006).

Long-term or chronic food insecurity is usually related to long periods of poverty, impoverishment, the lack of income opportunities (Devereux, 2006). During the time of chronic food insecurity, the affected population is struck by long lasting lack of food, which is the most noticeable in the increased child mortality and the high rate of malnutrition or undernutrition (Crow, 2000 p. 51-53).

The short-term transitory food insecurity is usually formed by short-term blows (economic crises, political instability, armed force, military conflicts, extreme weather conditions etc.), the fluctuation of food availability and accessibility, or the recurring volatility of food prices or production, or the instability of income (Sen, 1999 p. 252).

The term used in international literature and international organizations dealing with food supplies for sudden, temporary lack of food is acute food insecurity, which shows the critical nature of the problem affecting a part of the population. A five-level scale was created to determine the different measures of acute lack of food (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, IPC<sup>1</sup> for short), with which the intensity of food insecurity can be measured in both acute and chronic cases in the examined regions.<sup>2</sup>Besides these, IPC contributes to the more effective decision-making related to food aid and the more targeted aid allocation. It can be clearly observed from the detailed description of the five-level scale of acute lack of food which properties characterize each level. It can also be seen that the different levels require different counteractions: at the first two levels of acute food insecurity, the focus is on the prevention of the escalation of food shortage, as well as on the hindering the increasing in the numbers and rates of the population affected by the lack of food. Meanwhile, in the case of acute food crises of level 3 or above, charity tasks, alleviation of the hunger affecting the population and elimination of factors causing famine play the vital role.

Table 1: Levels of acute food insecurity

Level	Description/Determination	Reactions, goals
1 - Minimal	At least four out of five households have access to the proper quantity of food and non-food products without requiring atypical, non-sustainable ways of procuring food or income (e.g. humanitarian assistances).	establishment of resilience, reduction of hazard of disaster
2 - Stressed	Despite the presence of humanitarian assistance, at least one out of five households suffer from the following: food consumption is minimal; the access to basic non-food products is obstructed without outside help.	establishment of resilience, reduction of hazard of disaster, protection of subsistence opportunities.
3 - Crisis	Despite the presence of humanitarian assistance, at least one out of five households suffer from the following: unsystematic food consumption accompanied by acute undernutrition; OR minimal access to food by the exploitation of possessions and reserves.	immediate intervention is needed: to reduce the gaps in food consumption and acute undernutrition; to protect the opportunities of subsistence
4 - Emergency	Despite the presence of humanitarian assistance, at least one out of five households suffer from the following: unsystematic food consumption resulting in undernutrition and death; OR the extreme exploitation and loss of possessions, reserves.	immediate intervention is needed: to protect the opportunities of subsistence and prevent deaths related to undernutrition
5 - Catastrophe/ Famine	Despite the presence of humanitarian assistance, at least one out of five households suffer from the following: the constant and extreme lack of food and other basic needs, resulting in obvious and detectable famine, deaths and poverty.	immediate intervention is needed: to prevent high death rate to prevent the total erosion of livability

Source: Food Security Information Network: Global Report on Food Crises 2018.

The most severe form of acute food insecurity — as it can be seen from the table above — is famine, which is often caused by long lasting military conflicts. However, it is important to note that certain “requirements” have to be met in order to declare a certain territory as struck by famine: According to the report of Food Security Information Network, we may talk about famine if at least 20% of the area’s population is affected by the critical lack of food; if 30% of the children under five years suffer from acute undernutrition; and if the number of death cases per day doubles (FSIN, 2018 p. 17).

## 2. FOOD CRISES AS CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY CONFLICTS

The severe lack of food and the critical food crises, famines are the most obvious and mostly clearly visible consequences of military conflicts. A war disables the biological and economic conditions of the production and distribution of food, as well as the social and human infrastructure (de Waal, 2015 p. 23-25). It thus

hinders the availability of food, reduces the opportunities of their utilization, and greatly obstructs their accessibility (Saswati et al, 2010 p. 7-8). A military conflict has significant negative consequences on the population's food supplies and food security in the affected country/region, both short-term and long-term.

### **2.1. Acute food insecurity**

The various types of warfare naturally result in food insecurity, causing the affected population deprivation of food, famine, and diseases and deaths originating from these. One of the most obvious short-term effects of military conflicts regarding food security is warfare based on starvation, a tool of forcing the enemy to surrender, which is mostly carried out in the form of confiscating food aids from the population and blocking food import routes (de Waal, 2015). A classic example of depriving the population from food is siege. However, this type of warfare does not consist only of merely starving the enemy, as a siege may involve the destruction of food production areas (livestock, crop farms and other means of producing food) in several cases (Messer *et al*, 1998 p. 6).

Moreover, military conflicts may cause the affected region's population to flee, which renders that refugees are threatened by acute (and chronic) lack of food (FAO et al, 2017 p. 30). As a result of emigration the refugees — both within and beyond the country's borders — depend on temporary food aids at least until they find a new shelter, as neither food production nor income is feasible within the crowded refugee camps (Messer *et al*, 1998 p. 7). As the result of a military conflict, agricultural production may decrease radically not only due to the devastation of production areas: the number of employees working on fields and in agriculture can also fall rapidly due to conscription, deaths closely related to the war (armed assaults and clashes, undernutrition, infections etc.) or mass emigration. Besides these, the lack of food can be caused by the agricultural territories turning into minefields or the poisoning of wells, which can also obstruct agricultural production and endanger the safety and predictability of food supplies (Messer et al, 1998 p. 7).

### **2.2. Chronic, long-term food insecurity**

It is also important to note that the destruction of agricultural territories may cause not only acute, but even chronic, long-term lack of food, as agricultural production and other economic activities may suffer significant backlash.

The long-term consequences of military conflicts, which may have an impact on people's lives long after the end of the armed clashes, are less visible but more complex and transparent.

Both the economic setback caused by the war and the abortion of market processes mean a limited accessibility to certain resources (FSIN, 2018 p. 32). Poverty and poverty-related hunger is closely connected to the destruction of industrial and agricultural production areas (e.g. by bombings) and the devastation of infrastructure. Such consequences of military conflicts highly contribute to a critical unemployment rate, eliminate labor migration, and these circumstances greatly deprives the civilian population from income opportunities in numerous regions of the affected state. An armed conflict or civil war lasting for decades brings lack of education, unemployment and poverty upon multiple generations.


The era of war strips the younger generation from participating in public education and professional training, not to mention the basic opportunities of socialization. The time of a prolonged conflict hinders the employable age groups from acquiring the proper and useful knowledge with which the liquidation of unemployment — and the poverty and food insecurity related to it — could begin right after the end of the war (Messer, 2009 p. 15). Moreover, the significantly increasing costs on defense deepen social insecurity further, resulting in the severe cutting of social expenses (Messer, 2009 p. 16).

### 3. FOOD SECURITY IN THE CURRENT CRISIS ZONES

In 2017, 51 countries were affected by food crises, 18 of which had food insecurity among the population due to military conflicts or civil wars (FSIN, 2018 p. 31). In these 18 states, about 74 million people were affected by such food insecurity that is labeled as level 3 or higher by the definition of IPC. In the following map (Map 1) we can observe the countries in which acute food crisis appeared: however, it is important to note that the map displays not only the food crises caused by military conflicts, but also the countries that struggle with acute food insecurity due to other social, economic or environmental reasons. The most affected countries include (due to war or other reasons) the countries of East and South Africa, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Haiti: in these states, more than 25% of the population is affected by severe acute food insecurity and needs immediate food aids.

Still, it is important to point out that despite military conflicts are considered as the number one causes of the acute food insecurity in the warzones (Table 2), the lack of food is enhanced by phenomena like climate change, extreme weather conditions (floods, droughts), skyrocketing food prices and/or the high rate of rural popularity living in extreme poverty (FSIN 2018 p. 31).

Map 1: Countries affected by level 3 or higher acute food insecurity



Source: Food Security Information Network: Global Report on Food Crises, Rome, 2018.

Based on the table below, we can draw the conclusion that — considering

the rate of the total population — the countries suffering the most critical food insecurity include South Sudan, the Chad Basin, the Central African Republic and Somalia in Africa; and Yemen, Syria, the Palestinian Autonomous Territories and Afghanistan in the Middle East. Eastern Ukraine is the only region in the continent of Europe that is affected by food crisis due to a conflict lasting for four years so far (Table 2).

We can also see from the table that the highest number and rate of people struck by acute food crisis can be found in Yemen. Throughout the four-year-long civil war, the air strikes, armed battles and assaults against the civilian infrastructure resulted in the most severe food crisis and cholera epidemic in today's world. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs claims that half of Yemen's population lives in areas where the fighting parties regularly attack each other and violate several articles of the international humanitarian law (especially in Yemen's western governorates: Ta'izz, Al Bayda', Al Hudaydah, Sana'a, Shabwah, Al Mahwit etc.) (UNOCHA, 2017 p. 5-6). Despite the food aids provided through humanitarian assistance operations, the population's 53%, about 15.9 million people are affected by level 3 or above acute food crisis: 10.8 million of them are in food crisis; 4.9 million are in emergency; and 63,500 people are suffering from the most critical category of food insecurity: famine (IPC, 2018).

According to the report of Famine Early Warning System — which is a system examining areas suffering from food crises and predicting famine early on — South Sudan and the northeastern region of Nigeria are also threatened by famine. The probability of a critical situation mostly depends on the securely delivered and properly targeted humanitarian food aids (FEWS NET/USAID, 2018). In South Sudan, due to the humanitarian crisis caused by the civil war that has been going on for five years, almost 7 million people required support by the end of 2018, and more than 2 million people were forced to leave their home and find shelter in the neighboring countries due to the conflict (UNOCHA, 2018 p. 2-10). FAO, the World Food Programme and UNICEF declared the province named Unity in South Sudan's Bahr el Ghazal's region in February 2017 as an area struck by famine, but this title was revoked in May the same year (UNICEF/IPC, 2017). As the result of the lasting conflict, the high food prices, the critically poor state of economy and the lack of income opportunities, the areas affected the most severely by the food crisis and threatened the most by famine in South Sudan include — besides Unity mentioned above — Joglei and Eastern Equatoria in the East, and Western Bahr el Ghazal in the West (FEWS NET, 2018). Though the country officially does not have territories struck by famine right now, about 40,000 people are affected by level 5 food insecurity despite the humanitarian assistances (FSIN, 2018).

It is important to note that in the areas and countries affected by conflict, the risk of severe food insecurity is further increased by the high rate of the rural population existentially depending on agriculture, which is typical especially for Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Yemen and Afghanistan (Table 2). The food crisis may be further enhanced by the armed assaults against humanitarian convoys and the employees of aid agencies, as military, paramilitary and terrorist forces intentionally hinder the aids (including food aids) to reach their target and the people in need. In 2016, the highest number of these attacks occurred in Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen — so mostly in those

warzones where the humanitarian crisis and the rate of the population affected by the lack of food is the highest (Stoddard *et al*, 2017).

Table 2: The number and rate of populations affected by level 3 or higher acute food insecurity in crisis zones

Country/Area	Population affected (million)	Total population rate	Division of rural (1) and urban (2) population (%)	
Afghanistan	7.6	26%	73	27
Burundi	2.6	26%	88	12
Chad Basin (Northeast Nigeria)	7 (5.2)	33% (34%)	-	-
South Sudan	6.1	50%	81	19
Iraq	2	5%	30	70
Yemen	17	60%	65	35
Democratic Republic of the Congo	7.7	11%	57	43
Central African Republic	1.1	30%	60	40
Palestinian Autonomous Territories	1.6	32%	25	75
Syria	6.5	33%	42	58
Somalia	3.3	27%	60	40
Sudan	3.8	9%	66	34
Ukraine (Donetsk and Luhansk)	1.2	20%	30	70

Source: Food Security Information Network, 2018. edited by the author

#### 4. CONCLUSION

In this study, I have concluded the correlation between military conflicts and food security. I have also demonstrated what impact the current armed conflicts have on the affected states and their regions' status of food security. Despite the fact that acute food crises are among the greatest challenges of the described warzones, we still have to mention that the lasting, unresolved conflicts and civil wars lead to long-term, chronic food insecurities. The main reason for this is that wars demand not only a large number of human lives, but they also greatly hamper economic production, market mechanisms, and the previous efforts for economic and social development. Besides these, they also demolish housings, public institutions and areas of food production, forcing poverty, constant unemployment and the various forms of short-term and long-term food insecurity upon the survivors of the conflicts. It is worth to highlight that, despite the outside help (humanitarian assistance, international development aid, the weakening states struck by war do not have the proper means to protect the most vulnerable civilian population<sup>3</sup>; to provide appropriate education and healthcare; to eliminate and impeach military organizations recruiting and arming children; to deal with the masses of refugees

moving within the national borders; to treat epidemics; and to reduce poverty and famine related to the war.

### Endnotes

1 The execution of IPC is conducted by thirteen intergovernmental and civilian organizations dealing with the topic, including UNICEF, FAO, World Food Programme, Food Security Cluster, Oxfam, CARE International and Save the Children.

2 A four-level scale is used for measuring chronic lack of food, divided into *minimal* (1), *mild* (2), *moderate* (3) and *severe* (4) classes. Source: IPC Online, Analysis Portal

3 These include the prevention of armed assaults against populated areas, schools, hospitals and other public institutions, ethnical cleansings and genocides.

### NOTES



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**CAPTION OF VISUAL MATERIALS**

Figure 1: The four pillars of food-security

Map 1: Countries affected by level 3 or higher acute food insecurity

Table 1: Levels of acute food insecurity

Table 2: The number and rate of populations affected by level 3 or higher acute food insecurity in crisis zones

**ABBREVIATIONS**

FAO – Food And Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FEWS NET – Famine Early Warning System Network

FSIN – Food Security Information Network

IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFPRI – International Food Policy Research Institute

IPC – Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

UNICEF – United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

WFP – World Food Programme

WHO – World Health Organization



## GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST DAESH – ITS SO FAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ITS FUTURE CHALLENGES

**EWA FRONCZAK**

The Global Coalition Against Daesh was formed in September, 2014 under the leadership of the United States, and now it consists of 79 members, including individual countries from across the world and such institutions as the Arab League, NATO, Interpol and European Union. As its main five goals the Coalition lists: stabilising liberated terrains, countering Daesh's propaganda, military progress, preventing the movement of foreign fighters, and tackling Daesh's funding and financing. The author's findings are derived from a critical literature and online sources review. Basing for example on the official website of the Coalition the author presents the available statistics, tables and updated information on the Coalition's so far accomplishments in the above mentioned areas. But, she also underlines the fact that there is no official information concerning an equally important issue – what is the future strategy or Coalition's plan of actions in the face of a current situation in Iraq and Syria? Another question which is arising here refers to a present threat posed by Daesh in its next and incredibly quickly thriving theatre of action – Africa. Thus, the article focuses not only on presenting the Global Coalition's timeline achievements, but, most of all, it sheds the light on the future, potential, but very realistic challenges in the fight with Islamic terrorism. And what is more, those challenges do not concern the African land only, as many seem to think, but they are likely to influence the geopolitics of the whole world.



# **TERRORISM AND CONTAGION THEORY: EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF ISIS ON BOKO HARAM (2012-2014)**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Terrorism is not novel and has become ubiquitous in the present global dispensation. It has also become communicable and contagious in recent years. To assess this phenomenon, two very active terrorist groups operating in different geographical locations, Boko Haram (BH) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), were examined. Identifying the influence and communicable effects of terrorism from the latter on the former is a predominant factor in this paper. The existence of BH is recognised as a result of economic poverty, mass unemployment, religious ideology and marginalisation (relative deprivation). This paper tries to examine the similarities that exist between BH and ISIS with a bid to understand if the insurgency of BH in Nigeria is as a result of just these socio-economic and political factors prevalent in the country or as a result of imitation from other terrorist groups (contagion/copycat terrorism) vis a vis ISIS. Qualitative analysis of transcripts from both terrorist groups' public statements and online magazines with computer-aided analysis software is undertaken. A careful comparison of both terrorist groups shows that both groups have similar aims and objectives which include the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate run by Islamic laws. Preliminary studies conclude that terrorism is communicable as though BH started off as and may have been established as a non-violent group based on the socio-political, economic and security situations (internal factors) existent in Nigeria. The group later began to morph and imitate the activities, actions and rhetoric of ISIS, culminating in the group taking up the mantle of the deadliest terrorist group in the world as of 2014.

**KEYWORDS:** Terrorism, Contagion, Boko Haram, ISIS, Nvivo Software, Content analysis. Word Count: 6739

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has been given many definitions and with various hypothetical explications from the psychosomatic to the collective perspectives (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). To some, it is the use of violence against individuals, groups and property as a way to coerce individuals and governments for various objectives such as political, social and religious reasons (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). From the various definitions and theories available, one pertinent theory of terrorism is the theory of contagion which involves *“the exploration of media coverage of terrorist incidents, methods, and most importantly, ideologies as a vector of terrorist infection”* (Nacos, 2009:4). Contagion theory, suggests that the coverage of terrorist activities by means of mass media such as television, internet and newspaper among others is a source for the imitation and repetition of violence for groups prone to violence (Bjørge 1997; Weimann & Brosius 1988; Midlarsky et al 1980). Moreover, Nacos (2009) declares that it is plausible for terrorist groups in different countries to perpetrate acts of terror by simply paying attention to other terrorist group activities in other countries through the media and in turn, seek to dominate the media space to encourage others prone to violence to do the same. As such, Grant (2014), proposes that terrorist groups take prompts from each other in more ways than one.

Several theories have been employed to explain the phenomenon of BH in Nigeria, including the psycho-sociological theory, which comprises relative deprivation and contagion theory (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). Relative deprivation, argues that radical behaviours, such as terrorist behaviours are usually as a result of frustration, due to a denial of the attainment of particular goals (Borum, 2004). The theory has been cited when viewing the internal structures of states as the main reason for the increase in terrorist attacks (Agbibo, 2013; Dzuverovic, 2013; Pichette, 2015). In fact, Galtung (1964) argues that a state of disequilibrium from several social and political aspects of life as a result of unmet expectations can induce aggressive behaviours from individuals, while Gurr (2005) recognises that structural inequity in countries result in breeding ground for radical movements, violence and terrorism. Similarly Eveslage (2013) applies the theory of relative deprivation to the rise of BH, arguing that BH is as a result of the dilapidated political, economic and social construction of the country following the end of colonial era and unmet expectations. However, the number of people who do not employ violence to address their grievances are not taken into account by this theory which renders it to an extent, not germane for the study of attitudes and behaviours of terrorist groups (Adegbulu, 2013).

Therefore, while it is essential to look into the internal conditions and structures of states which give rise to fragments of violence to address grievances rather than through dialogue as suggested by the above scholars, (Patrick, 2006; Zumve et al, 2013), It has become increasingly necessary to explore the idea and theory that opines that supposedly successful terrorist activities in one country can lead to the orchestration of similar terrorist activities in another country. In line with contagion theory, Campbell in his article, ‘Nigeria: Five Reasons why Boko Haram’s video Matters [sic]’ published in 2014 insists that the videos produced by BH were of a higher quality, which suggests a collaboration with its former splinter group, Ansaru, and other more sophisticated terrorist groups, the likes of ISIS (Campbell,

2014). What is pertinent here is that the author also suggests that Shekau, the head of BH made use of the terminology “Islamic State” to refer to BH’s captured territories (‘Caliphate’), making reference to the terrorist group, ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), as they sometimes refer to themselves as ‘Islamic State’ as well.

More so, in 2015, BH reportedly kidnapped some 238 Chibok schoolgirls, using the name, ‘the Islamic State West African Province’ (ISWAP) after claiming Gwoza, in Borno State in Northern Nigeria, as its ‘Caliphate’ in August 2014 (Grant, 2014). This move was also undertaken by IS earlier in the same year, (June 2014) over swathes of land across Iraq and Syria (Grant, 2014). Tran and Weaver (2014), also cite similarities between the groups, suggesting the imitation of techniques and strategies which are made popular by mainstream media. It is, therefore, this researcher’s aim to delve deep into the media performance, most notably the YouTube propaganda videos produced by these terrorist groups in order to apply thematic content analysis to fully understand the extent of the similarities and influence. Thematic content analysis is a commonly used qualitative analytic technique which involves the search for themes or patterns that exist within several entities, in this case, texts and transcripts of terrorist communications (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This will be achieved by applying the benefits of computer based qualitative analysis tool, NVivo, to select a number of propaganda/ public speeches uploaded on YouTube and their transcripts as well as group produced manuals and magazines to determine key words, phrases, repetitions and jihadi rhetoric. It is based on the foregoing that the research objective is unearthed.

### **1.1 Research Objective**

- To understand the contagion that exists between Boko Haram and ISIS.

### **1.2 Methodology**

In order to answer the RO as itemised above, the research methodology is essential which is referred to as the technique through which a research is undertaken and how knowledge is acquired (Brown, 2006). It is secondary research making use of case-study approach and employing content analysis qualitative method (White et al. 2002; Gerring et al., 2008; Bennett and Elman, 2007). Secondary research, in this instance, involves the utilisation of the media sources to assess terrorist groups’ public statement as well as analyses done by scholars in journals, books and articles (Lamont, 2015). While Case study research design has been chosen as it is useful for the testing and application of theories in reality as it provides an in-depth examination of a particular phenomenon as opposed to a large study (Lamont, 2015; Shuttleworth, 2008). It also helps to bring about a specific yet researchable field of a large phenomenon (Shuttleworth, 2008).

Content analysis applies qualitative approaches (Berg, 2001; Downe-Wambolt, 1992; Krippendorff, 2004), in either an inductive or a deductive way (Bengtsson, 2016; Downe-Wambolt, 1992). It involves the study of an extensive variety of ‘texts’ from transcripts of videos, interviews, written works and discussions (Neuendorf, 2002). Neuendorf (2002: 9) identifies content analysis as “the primary message-centred methodology” as it can be used to explicate properly hidden content within messages and communications, which makes it useful in order to understand

the content of generated communications from BH and ISIS. As such, qualitative analysis is used as the focus of this paper because it produces data most especially textual data in the way of transcripts.

Transcripts from propaganda videos from BH's leader Abubakar Shekau and ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi will be analysed from 2012 to 2014. More so, ISIS's online publication Dabiq will also be analysed for the year 2014 and though BH had no known online periodicals during the period based on initial research, yet the group's video transcript will suffice for analysis using the NVIVO software.

The units of analysis chosen as earlier stated are public statements; videos and publications which represent the means of communication through which prospective members and the rest of the world are sensitized on the activities and ideologies of terrorist groups (Eveslage, 2013).

The Coding and categorisation system will be inductive (Bengtsson, 2016; Mayring, 2000) will others codes will be unearthed as the study and analysis continue (Ghajar-Khosravi, 2016) by the process of abduction. Abductive reasoning refers to the "theoretical re-description," whereby data is redefined based on theoretical perceptions (Fletcher, 2017: 188). Interpretation of data can be done through a given set of thoughts and models for which there is also a perfect understanding of a theory. As such, through the theory of contagion, several other themes were unearthed aside from those developed from Celso (2015).

Following from this, the areas of similarities and imitation (contagion) which have been itemised and coded were developed from "Celso 5<sup>th</sup> wave jihadist terrorist group" (as shown in Table 1), in which he places BH and ISIS. Celso developed the idea from Jeffrey Kaplan's Khmer Rouge 5<sup>th</sup> wave prototype, a concept re-evaluated from David Rapoport's four-wave theory of modern terrorism (Celso, 2015). Itemising similarities, Celso suggested the tendencies of 5<sup>th</sup> wave jihadist terrorist groups to uphold '*takfiri jihadism*' based on Kaplan's fifth wave evolution (Celso, 2015). '*Takfir*' is an Arabic word which is used to describe a non-believer or infidel (Takar & Zahid, 2016), while '*Takfiri*' refers to the Sunni Muslims who accuse other Muslims of apostasy or conversion to another religion (Takar, & Zahid, 2016), whilst upholding holy war (jihad) against them (Engelkes, 2016). The key components of Jihadist 5th Wave Groups which will be coded in this paper and used to answer the imitation of ISIS by BH as developed from Jeffrey Kaplan's work and enunciated by Celso (2015: 257) include the following,

1. Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order: That the Muslim community is inherently in a place of '*Jahiliyyah*' (ignorance), which is exacerbated by apostate governments and systems. This therefore, necessitates a rebellion and withdrawal from the current society.
2. Idealisation of a Mythic Past: This requires the need for the reestablishment of Muhammad's Medina Communal areas and '*Khilfalah*' and desired good from the society.
3. Brutalisation of Women and Children: Attacks on women such as those who are unveiled, restrictions on female education and work engagement, as well as enticing women to marry jihadi fighters. Children are also enticed to join jihadist groups.
4. Unrestrained Violence: The idea of '*Takfir*' promotes the killing of so-called unbelievers including fellow Sunnis. Continuous military crusade ranging

from IEDs, VBIEDs and ambush of police officers, the military and civilians (Celso, 2015).

In order to look into these areas of similarities between BH and ISIS, an understanding of the background of BH in Nigeria and IS Iraq and Syria is imperative.

## 2.0 BACKGROUND OF BH

Boko Haram is an Islamic militant terrorist group with origins in Nigeria. Etymologically, Boko Haram (BH) in Hausa language (Nigeria) is interpreted as '*Boko*' meaning 'Book' referring to 'western culture' and '*Haram*,' meaning 'forbidden' 'ungodly', relating to 'the rejection of western culture or education' (Adesoji, 2010: 100; Agbiboa, 2013; Danjibo, 2009: 7; Malasowe, 2016; Marchal, 2012; Walker, 2012). BH is the media devised nomenclature for the Islamic terrorist group, '*Jama'atu Ahlis Sunni Lidda' Awati Wal Jihadi*', meaning 'People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad' (Ajayi, 2012, BBC, 2016; Campbell, 2014; Chothia, 2012; Pham, 2016). The group operates in the principally Muslim North-eastern part of Nigeria and in neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, while engaging the military in several battles in Niger, Chad and Benin (Adibe, 2014; Alozieuwa, 2015; Maiangwa, 2014; Mantzikos, 2014; Mamone & Moki, 2015).

Established in 2002 by Islamist Mohammed Yusuf, scholars such as Danjibo (2009) and Ajayi (2012) suggest the group existed since 1995, having transformed from a Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation at the University of Maiduguri, Borno state with Abubakar Lawan as its leader (Shola, 2015). The group remained non-militarised until Yusuf took over as leader in 1999 following Lawan's departure to Saudi Arabia for further studies (Shola, 2015). Becoming radicalised following Lawan's departure, in July 2009, BH engaged with the Nigerian army and police, after the group attacked a police HQ in Potiskum, Yobe state which led to the death of a few BH members and the extra-judicial public execution of its then leader, Yusuf (Ahokegh, 2012; Ajah, 2011; Ajayi, 2012). The group went underground, only to resurface to become deadlier orchestrating attacks against the Nigerian populace with Abubakar Shekau as its new leader (Ajayi, 2012; Campbell, 2014; Chothia, 2012; Marchal, 2012; Walker, 2012). BH became even more radicalised with global jihadist rhetoric: the rejection of the tenets of democracy, distaste for western education vis-a-vis western culture and government's institutions perceived as corrupt (Ajayi, 2012; Celso, 2015; Murtada, 2013). The group believes Nigeria is in a state of corruption and the only way out of this kind of situation is an outright revolution of the present day society and the instilment of Islamic laws and code of conduct (Celso, 2015). This idea was supported by Mohammed Yusuf's BBC interview in 2009 when he mentioned that, western education was entangled with Islamic matters (Boyle, 2009).

As of 2012, BH orchestrated several attacks involving the use of motorbikes, drive-by shooting, attacks against police stations and freeing captured members, kidnapping and killing of politicians and even Muslim cleric with opposing views (BBC, 2016; Cook, 2014). The year 2011 saw a rise of suicide attacks by BH culminating in the eventual bombing of the UN building in Abuja which Gourley (2012) perceived as signifying an international strategic trajectory and a global outlook taking off the 'clothes' of a local outlook of the destruction of local media houses and national infrastructures. By the year 2013, BH terrorist attacks had

escalated from the North-eastern Nigeria to other parts of the country while the year 2014 saw a rise in the deployment of female suicide bombers (Cook, 2014) mostly from the 238 school girls captured from Chibok, Borno State Nigeria on 14 April, 2014 (The Guardian, 2011). Moreover, the apparent poor security system across the Nigerian borders has resulted in the ease in the group's transportation of small and light weapons, profiting from such exchange and business among other sources of revenue including kidnapping for ransom (Onuoha, 2013).

Within this time frame, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged from al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) following its clash with Assad supporters in Syria under its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2010 (BBC, 2015). Some scholars such as Gourley have attempted to identify similarities and collaboration between BH and other terrorist groups, trying to understand how they interact with each other (Gourley, 2012). This is where this paper comes in, to identify how BH and ISIS relate with each other, most especially the imitation of the activities of the latter by the former. As such, it is beneficial to provide a background on ISIS at this juncture.

### 2.1 Background of ISIS

The name 'ISIS' is an acronym for the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' or '*Daesh*' (a derogatory term), which refers to a terrorist group which has perpetrated acts of terrorism across the globe (Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017; Khan, 2016). The term '*Daesh*' is transcribed from the Arabic language to mean 'one who crushes something underfoot' or 'one who sows discord' and carries pejorative connotations (Irshaid, 2015; Oakley & Chakrabarti, 2017; Khan, 2016). As a salafist jihadist group, ISIS garnered recognition in 2014 as it annexed swathes of land in Syria and Iraq and dubbed it a Caliphate, while being involved in mass casualty bombings, killings and beheadings (BBC, 2015b). Caliphate represents an Islamic or Sharia law governed territory headed by a Caliph (Islamic leader), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for ISIS (BBC, 2015b). The group has an international outlook as it has requested other terrorist groups to pledge allegiance to it and migrate to its controlled territories (Gambhir, 2014; BBC, 2015a). ISIS accepted BH's formal pledging of allegiance in the group's 2015 video (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasy, 2015; Elbagir et al, 2015; Osley, 2015). Laccino (2015) views the allegiance video by BH as a move by BH to distance itself from the increased news of successful anti-terrorism efforts and victories by the regional task force in Nigeria intended to limit its activities.

The group, ISIS lends its origin to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who pledged his allegiance to Osama Bin Laden, the late al Qaeda leader, following the Iraqi invasion by the US in 2003 (BBC, 2015b; Laub and Masters, 2014; Kemp, 2016). This resulted in the formation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) for which 'Islamic State of Iraq' (ISI) was birthed in 2006 with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader, who was later killed in 2010 (Kfir, 2015). Subsequently, a former US detainee, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi became the new leader in the same year (Kfir, 2015). From 2011 through 2013, ISI became militarily more active in Iraq, forming the Jabhat al-Nusra Front with Abu Muhammad al Jawlani as its head (Abubakar, 2016), while gaining grounds in Syria and eventually joining in the uprising and rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad's regime (Abubakar, 2016; BBC, 2015b). Leadership preferences and differences led to a falling out between the al-Nusrah front and the ISI (Abubakar, 2016), and in 2013, Baghdadi created the 'Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL)

through the unification of Iraqi and Syrian forces. ISIL/ISIS eventually focused its attention on Iraq, taking control of Fallujah, a central Iraqi city and the 'Caliphate' was created. Following the annexation of the Northern city of Mosul and other towns and cities, a change of name was made to 'Islamic State' in June, 2014 (BBC, 2015b, Fishman, 2014).

The group, ISIS prides itself as against the Shi'ite led Iraqi government accusing the government of being too westernised and corrupt (Abubakar, 2016). Furthermore, the terrorist group pushed against the Iraqi and Syrian territorial boundaries which it perceives as a clandestine plan to impose the Alawites, a minority group as a ruling class in Syria with a weakened Sunni presence (Burke, 2013; Kfir, 2015; Polk, 2013; Wood, 2015). Other factors have given credence to the rise of ISIS as articulated by Hashim (2014) ranging from the administration of ISIS by Al-Baghdadi to the Syrian conflict and the eventual break away from al Qaeda. The group has continued to amass territories and wreak havoc across the globe while claiming responsibilities for suicide bombings and attacks as they occur (Asfura-heim and Macquaid, 2015). Moving in the similar styles and tactics towed by BH, ISIS is geared towards the use of religion, violence and 'territorial acquisition' as an avenue for political transformation unlike former terrorist groups such as al Qaeda (Abubakar, 2016; Asfura-heim and Macquaid, 2015).

Additionally, territories under ISIS control have been faced with strict interpretation of Sharia law, with women having to be fully covered, and executions becoming the lifestyle of the territories (BBC, 2015b). Non-Muslims are expected to pay special tax, netting the group almost US\$8 million monthly (Laub and Masters, 2014), or face risk of death (BBC, 2015b; Kemp, 2016; Wood, 2015). ISIS trails the line of al-Zarqawi, which emphasises the glorification of harsh and stringent Islamic laws and the recruitment of young fighters based on the idea of the liberation of Sunnis being persecuted in Syria and Iraq (Kemp, 2016; Kfir, 2015; Wood, 2015). ISIS has continued to seek the outpouring of different cadre and professionals to its Caliphate and the pledging of allegiance from various other Islamic groups and sects (BBC, 2016; Gambhir, 2014; Pham, 2016; The Bay'ah from West Africa, n.d). In order to accurately apply the theory of contagion, an understanding of the theory is imperative at this juncture.

### **3.0 CONTAGION THEORY**

A theory is a set of ideas used to clarify, forecast, and appreciate phenomena (Abend, 2008), which can also be used to contest and increase current knowledge regarding the boundaries of critical norms and the rationale for the existence of the problem under investigation (Abend, 2008; Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016; Swanson, 2013). Based on the foregoing and bearing in mind that several theories have been espoused to elucidate the phenomenon of terrorism in Nigeria and existence of BH, such as the relative deprivation theory (frustration-aggression) among others, the contagion theory is employed to look into the external influences on the terrorist group in Nigeria.

Essentially the theory being applied and tested in this paper, contagion theory suggests that the use of terrorist tactics in one country leads to and inspires the use of terrorism in a similar or different country (Katja and Brynjar, 2004). While looking at it from a terrorist group perspective, it suggests that terrorist groups tend

to imitate the activities of one another (or other more successful terrorist groups). Therefore, terrorism is perceived as a behaviour that can transcend borders to affect violence-prone individual to pick up arms and fight for the cause of other similar or dissimilar groups, whose point of views are being shared across the world on various media platforms (Weimann & Brosius 1988; Redlick 1979; Midlarsky et al 1980). This is believed to be exacerbated by globalisation which is the practice by which the world is becoming predominantly interconnected owing to improved trade and cultural interchange and transfer (BBC n.d). To this end, the mass media which is the means by which people are sensitised and furnished with information about happenings through mediums, such as the internet, radio, newspapers and smartphones (Mass media, 2000), as Martin (2013: 370) suggests, is *“a weapon of war”* in the hands of terrorists as they make use of this tool (mass media) in a lucrative manner as an addition to their weaponry. He advocates that images and symbols are relatively manipulated to influence governments and societies.

Furthermore, Hoffman (1998) reiterated that the rise of innovative communication technologies, which makes it easier for news dissemination to be carried out rapidly, in line with the constant rivalry among news outlet, has been capitalised on by terrorist groups to their advantage as they seek media airtime for the promotion of their cause.

For example, BH has used different means to convey its messages out to the public such as being involved in *“directly speaking to the press or (having) pre-recorded videos (which) have been the most common messaging types”* (Mahmood, 2017: 4). Additionally, various newspapers have covered the group's messages to different levels even having frequent reporters for certain newspaper outlets such as the Daily Trust (Mahmood, 2017). Also, Crenshaw (1990) adds that as more and more people get used to the effect of terrorism, there is always a need to go over and beyond on the part of terrorist groups to shock their already increasing audience in order to seek more international credit or be regarded as 'the best in the game', resulting in more deadly attacks and mass casualty. A case in point was in the year 2014, BH surpassed ISIS as the most deadly terrorist group in the globe, responsible for 6,644 deaths when compared to ISIS which is believed to have killed 6,073 people in the same time frame (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).

Likewise, researchers such as Ajayi (2012) and Akinwalere (2013) agree that the media plays a pivotal role in sensitising their audiences on the ills of terrorism to society rather than gratifying or abruptly dismissing the actions of any select group of people while still understanding that there are various limitations to the efforts of the media outlets in the achievement of this feat. In addition, Kennedy Moorhead captured the effect of communication between terrorist groups when he enunciated that certain groups, *“find ways to communicate and bond ... to the extent that there is little hope for amelioration of (the) situation, [hence] terrorism on a wider scale becomes increasingly possible in the next century”* (Kennedy, 1998: 190), while Crenshaw (1983) sustained the viewpoint that ideas that encourage terrorism are transmitted beyond borders of countries via telecommunication technologies. It is based on the theory of contagion and the need to identify the similarities between BH and ISIS that informs the research objective. The various units of analysis were collated and analysed through the Nvivo software.

#### 4.0 ANALYSIS AND FINDING

After collation and analysis of the units of analysis from both terrorist groups, BH and ISIS, following from the scope and time bound research, five of BH's videos were found to have been transcribed online in 2012, one in 2013 and five in 2014, with no online publication from the group. For ISIS, there were only two transcripts available in the year 2014 and five online publications (Dabiq) for which the first five were analysed and coded. The following information is represented in table 1.

Table 1: Units of analysis for BH and ISIS from 2012-2014

Year	BH # of transcripts	BH Online Publication	ISIS # of transcripts	ISIS Online Publication (Dabiq)
2012	5	-	-	-
2013	1	-	-	-
2014	5	-	2	5

#### 4.1 Illustrations of Units of Analysis by NVivo Software analysis

##### 4.1.1 Coding Analysis for the Rejection of Existing Social-Political Order

The theme, rejection of existing social-political order which refers to the idea that the Muslim community is void of morality and is fundamentally in a state of ignorance (*Jahiliyyah*) and should be separate from the society (Celso, 2015), as illustrated in Figure 1, was coded along all the transcripts from BH to ISIS and Dabiq online publications. This is the largest similarity between BH and ISIS as of 2014. The idea of contagion which exists as imitating the actions of ISIS, BH's leader, Shekau in 2014 citing his status and the need for the rejection of the existing socio-political system in Nigeria is quoted as saying:

*"This is from Allah on the need for us to break down infidels, practitioners of democracy, and constitutionalism, voodoo and those that are doing Western education in which they are practicing paganism.*

*"If you say, 'I pledge to Nigeria my country,' it is wrong and act of paganism. For me, I pledge to Allah my God, to be faithful to my Allah and you to your country. I to my Allah, I pledge to my Allah to be faithful, loyal and honest to serve Allah. Are you saying what? To serve Nigeria? To Serve Allah? Loyal and honest to serve Allah? That is what I will say; this is what you are saying in your reading of Western education. With all your strength you said you will worship a land, this is what you people said."* (Abubakar Shekau, 2014: Nigerian Bulletin, 2014).

Here, Shekau blatantly rejects the tenets of democracy, as a sign of patriotism and the constitution of the country for which the Nigerian constitution remains the binding '*grand norm*' of the country (Sahara Reporters, 2010). He mocks Nigeria's National Pledge which reiterates the need to serve the country (fatherland), referring to the constitution and its tenets as the source of all paganism vis-a-vis infidelity from western education. Similarly, ISIS in its August 2014 Dabiq publication, titled '*A Call to Hijrah (emigration)*,' also called for the disruption of (western education) by Muslims when it wrote that,

*"As for the Muslim students who use this ... pretense [sic] now to continue*

*abandoning the obligation of the era, then they should know that their hijrah (emigration) from dārul-kufr to dārul-Islām and jihād are more obligatory and urgent than [sic] spending an unknown number of years studying while exposed to doubts and desires that will destroy their religion and thus end for themselves any possible future of jihād"* (Dabiq August 2014: 26).

A different trajectory is also seen in BH's version 3.0 of 2014 as encapsulated by Pham (2016) following foreign links with terrorist groups such as ISIS which saw a more lethal terrorist group from version 1.0, which was largely about peaceful protests and riots and trying to make the world understand their stand (Friedman, 2014). This is buttressed in BH transcript from 2012 in which Shekau tries to explain his group's stance while dictating that the group is solely against security service agents such as the police following the execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, and its women as well as the rejection of death or attacks ascribed to the group (Ahokegh, 2012; Walker, 2012). Shekau claimed in a 2012 speech that:

*"We have stopped everything apart from saying we should stay on the path of truth and peace and live right in the sight of God. There, we will have peace and that is what we have been preaching and [because] of that they said we should be killed and our mosques destroyed. We decided to defend ourselves and God has said if (you) follow him, he will give you strength... Our objective is not to kill or humiliate or steal... However, responsibility for the killing of 150 people was denied as made up by the Nigerian [government]. We never kill ordinary people, rather we protect them. It is the army that rushed to the press to say we are the ones killing civilians. We are not fighting civilians. We only kill soldiers, police and other security agencies,"* (Abubakar Shekau, 2012: Mark, 2012; Oboh, 2012)

#### 4.1.2 Coding Analysis for the Idealisation of a Mythic Past

The next theme, coded refers to 'The Idealisation of Mythical Past' as illustrated in Figure 2 denotes the restoration of Muhammad's Medina Community and the caliphate (Celso, 2015) and it was largely existent in BH transcripts from 2012 and 2014, ISIS 2014 transcript and Dabiq online transcripts published in July, October and November, 2014. This is evident as when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, while calling for a global 'hijrah' (emigration) in 2014 posited that:

*"The State is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory."* (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 2014: Gambhir, 2014; Jihadist News, 2014).

Here, al Baghdadi sees the swathes of acquired territory as 'Medina' attributed to Prophet Muhammad in the year 622 (BBC, 2011, PBS, 2002). It is compelling as a contagion that this sort of rhetoric was imitated by BH leading to the pledging of allegiance by BH to ISIS in a video in March 2015 and the latter reportedly accepted the allegiance (Akbar, 2015; Alkhshali and Almasy, 2015; Elbagir et al, 2015; Osley, 2015). Moreover, the creation of the Caliphate by ISIS in June 2014 over swathes of land spanning across Iraq and Syria was also undertaken by BH in August 2014 when the group annexed Gwoza in Borno State in North-eastern Nigeria as its Caliphate (Grant, 2014). BH officially dubbed itself 'the Islamic State West African Province' (ISWAP) after the annexation of its Caliphate (Pham, 2016). The contagion between both groups can also be found in their reactions to and treatment of women.

#### 4.1.3 Coding Analysis for Kidnapping and Brutalization of Women and Children

Regarding BH and ISIS treatment of women, the 'kidnapping and brutalisation of women and children' as depicted in Figure 3, has been a recurring decimal in the activities of BH and ISIS (Pham, 2016). The theme was coded in the years 2012 and 2013, but more pronounced in 2014 of the BH transcripts as well as July and October editions of 2014 ISIS Dabiq publications. BH has been involved in the sale of girls and women into slavery (BBC, 2014) as well as the recruitment of youths into their ranks for which ISIS made reference to BH regarding the group treatment of Chibok girls (Gambhir, 2014).

Before 2012, as earlier noted, BH was more about reporting to news agencies what their actions were for not targeting civilians and just attacking security personnel. However, in 2014 following the declaration of the activities of the IS in Iraq and Syria, BH became full-fledged and out rightly declared the sale of women (Pham, 2016). In ISIS October 2014 Dabiq publication, the group made mention of BH kidnapped Chibok girls of April 2014 as synonymous with its (ISIS) exploitation and sexual assault of Iraqi Yazidi women (Pham, 2016). The group also spoke about the BH's allegiance where it stated that most Christians in the area were being subjected and subjugated to the terrorist group's rule (The Bay'ah from West Africa, n.d; Pham, 2016). ISIS makes this clear in its fourth Dabiq publication when it explains that:

*"This large-scale enslavement of mushrik families is probably the first since the abandonment of this Shari'ah law. The only other known case – albeit much smaller – is that of the enslavement of Christian women and children in ... Nigeria by the mujāhidīn there" pertaining to BH (Dabiq October 2014: 15).*

This can also be related to the level of violence which was orchestrated by BH, which saw a drastic change from 2012 to 2014 (Pham, 2016). This will be explained in the next coding analysis.

#### 4.1.4 Coding Analysis for Unrestrained Violence

The theme of 'Unrestrained violence' as depicted in Figure 4 was relevant to the change in tactic of BH and imitation of the works of ISIS as the year 2014 saw BH become the most deadliest group grossing a total of 5,049 more kills than in 2013 totalling up to 6,644 deaths with ISIL/ISIS falling behind with 4,672 more kills than the previous year and having a total of 6,073 deaths in 2014 (IEP, 2015: 38, 41). There was unrestrained violence involving attacks against military formations, suicide bombings against soldiers and civilians alike and fellow Muslims with a different non-extremist approach or ideology and even fellow un-yielding Sunnis (Celso, 2015). The theme was coded in four of the Dabiq publications in 2014 as well as the 2014 ISIS transcript. BH transcripts for the year 2012 were found to have the theme of unrestrained violence but it was more pronounced in the year 2014. ISIS began a campaign for the use of destruction and unrestrained violence throughout 2014 as stipulated and advertised in its Dabiq publications and speeches (Gambhir, 2014). BH also proclaimed unrestrained violence against all and sundry including Muslims opposed their doctrine and way of Islamic interpretation (Pham, 2016; Walker, 2012). Here, Shekau in a speech is quoted as saying:

*"All those clerics are to be killed for following democracy, all of them are infidels.*

*I will tell Muslims what Allah wants them to do. We are anti-Christians, and those that deviated from Islam, they are forming basis with prayers but infidels”* (CKN, 2014; Peace, 2014).

Additionally, codes such as the increased need for BH to claim responsibility for attacks are also coded in the research. That notwithstanding, such other codes were not discussed or included for brevity and could be employed for further research on the topic.

## CONCLUSION

BH has been known by Nigerians since 2002, but the group started its military campaign in 2009 following the death of its then founder, Mohammed Yusuf in the hands of police officers in July 2009 (Ahokegh, 2012; Ajah, 2011; Ajayi, 2012). Using the theory of relative deprivation, Agbiboa (2013) and Idahosa (2015) suggest that the rise of Boko Haram is as a result of the poor socio-economic conditions of North-eastern Nigeria, further exacerbated by the inability of the government to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants of the region. However, the expansion of ISIS in 2014 was employed to explain the sustenance of BH in Nigeria through the application of Contagion theory. Under Contagion theory, according to Katja and Brynjar (2004), an increase in terrorist attacks in a particular area and era is usually shadowed by an increase in terrorist attacks in the following era and other areas suggesting that the need to orchestrate attacks is as a result of attacks in other geographical areas which surpasses political and socio-economic structures as explained by relative deprivation.

However, it could be suggested that just like Muzan (2017) advocated that though BH might have started off based on ethnocentric debates and fighting for the struggles of Northern Nigeria, but later departed sharply to the subsequent need for the creation of an Islamic Caliphate and extremist views similar to that of ISIS, which Pham (2016) referred to as BH 4.0 with discernible consequences.

In similar terms, while the emergence of BH can be attributed to the failed internal structures as well as the poor socio-economic conditions of North-eastern Nigeria, as surmised by scholars such as Agbiboa, Dzuverovic and Pichette by applying the theory of relative deprivation (Agbiboa, 2013; Dzuverovic, 2013; Pichette, 2015), the sustenance and increase in violence orchestrated by BH can be attributed to the group's contagion and imitation of the activities of ISIS. As such, the sustenance of terrorism by BH in Nigeria can be traced to ISIS following from Celso's (2015) description of 5<sup>th</sup> wave jihadist groups, which include the rejection of existing social-political order as was seen in the constant calling for the rejection of western education, the idealisation of a mythic past, as BH created its Caliphate in North-eastern Nigeria in August 2014, few months after ISIS established its Caliphate in June 2014 over swathes of land spanning across Iraq and Syria. This is further exacerbated by BH officially dubbing itself 'the Islamic State West African Province' (ISWAP), for which the group split into two factions of BH and ISWAP with a change in leadership (Zenn, 2018).

However, the extent of ISIS' influence of BH will continually be needed to be researched to understand the Nigerian group's sustenance. Moreover, the brutalisation of women and children and unrestrained violence can also be perceived from BH as ISIS also continues to speak about BH in Nigeria and praises its efforts

and activities even comparing its treatment of the Chibok girls and commenting on selling them, to their treatment of Yazidi women (Pham, 2016; The Bay'ah from West Africa, n.d). Additionally, the continued sustenance of violence on the part of BH and imitation of the activities of ISIS led to the former becoming the most deadly terrorist group in the year 2014 with 6,644 deaths, and ISIS recording a total of 6,073 deaths in 2014 (IEP, 2015: 38, 41).

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# FACTORS THAT CAUSE THE DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE U.S OVER YPG

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## **Abstract**

After sixty years of strategic alliance between Turkey and the U.S, the shift of Turkey's foreign policies and the recent developments in the Middle East have started to cause serious tension between the two countries. Today, Ankara and Washington are going their separate ways on many critical issues in the region, one of which is YPG, the Kurdish militia in northern Syria.

The main divergence of the views between Turkey and the U.S is about how they define the Kurdish militants, the YPG, in Syria. For the U.S, they are different from the Kurdish militants of Turkey and that they protect the Kurdish areas in Syria against the Islamic State. Turkey, on the other hand, believes that they share the same goals of PKK and expect the U.S to regard them as terrorists.

The Kurdish Militia in northern Syria (YPG) is considered to be the armed wing of PYD (The Democratic Union Party) and it is at the core of the disputes between Turkey and the U.S. Turkey is concerned that it might pose a territorial threat in the long run. While the U.S calls PKK a terrorist group, it avoids defining YPG, which is closely related to PKK, as terrorist.

The Democratic Union Party (PYD) Kurds of northern Syria was founded in 2003 by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) gained de facto autonomy across the border from Turkey since July 19, 2012. The important point is that PKK is considered to be a terrorist group by both Turkey and the U.S.A (Gunter, 2015). However; the close association of PKK with PYD causes tension and controversy in Turkish foreign policy and affects the relations with the U.S.A unfavorably. Since PYD has proved itself to be an effective allies of the U.S.A. in the Middle East against the Islamic State, the U.S.A views PYD positively unlike Turkey. Turkey is concerned that the northern part of Syria could become a base for the separatist PKK, which Turkey has been fighting

for almost thirty years and is now finally at peace negotiations (Kaya, 2014).

Middle East is composed of states, which were formed after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the World War I. The Republic of Turkey, which was founded in 1923, is the successor of the Ottoman Empire and therefore regards itself as an important player in the region. The U.S., on the other hand, has been concerned with the Middle Eastern oil and preserving the security of the region and the flow of oil since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Following the War in Syria, the map and the power balances in the Middle East have changed drastically. The escalating tension between Turkey and the U.S may be traced back to the Kurds, who are an ethnic group spread through Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Turkey has been seriously concerned with the aspiration of autonomy of the Kurds and has been dealing with the Kurdish insurgency, led by the Kurdish Workers` Party (PKK) for over 30 years.

**Keywords:** political divergence, YPG, PKK, Turkish-American politics

### **Background of the Turkish-Kurdish Tension**

The Middle East has been the most strategic element in Turkish-American relations since the end of the Second World War. Since Turkey began to develop more interest in the Middle East in the past ten years, conflicts between Turkey and The U.S. began to occur more often and the two allies got into bargaining processes (Altunisik, 2013).

The Turkish Grand National Assembly voted against the U.S request to open a northern front against Iraq in 2003.(Walker, 2007).

Since the beginning of its rule in 2002, JDP has cultivated close ties with its neighbors in the Middle East; Iran and Syria, both of which has had troubled and antagonistic relations with the USA. Another serious dispute between the two countries arose from the fact that Turkey became one of the leading critics of Israel in the world under the rule of JDP (Sayari, 2013). As for the Kurdish problem, any U.S. policy that supported Kurdish administration has been presented as part of a strategic scheme to weaken Turkey as any entity in northern Iraq that resemble a Kurdish state could jeopardize Turkish territorial integrity (Kirisci, 1998). The start of the war in Syria in March 2011 changed the power dynamics in the region. Turkey held an anti-Assad government position by supporting Syrian rebels and accepting thousands of refugees that escaped from the war in Syria (Karakoc&Dogruel, 2015).

In November 2014, the armed non-state group Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) gained control of a large portion of a territory which included the major cities of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. ISIS`s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, self-declared caliphate called The Islamic State. It transformed itself from a small terrorist group into an arms land force that defeated Syrian and Iraqi government armed forces (Layton, 2015).

The tension between the two countries peaked as of February 2016 when the U.S ambassador in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, was summoned to the Turkish foreign ministry over the issue of the refusal of Washington to distance itself from PYD, which has been only effective allies of the U.S. against Islamic State (Bachard, 2016).

Turkey has a geopolitical position against the Islamic State since it controls a

780-mile border with Syria and Iraq. Analysts and officials of both Turkey and the U.S acknowledge that stability cannot be maintained in the region without the cooperation of Turkey (Sly, 2014).

Turkish perception of YPG/PYD is an offshoot of over a hundred years of conflict and mistrust between Turkey and the Kurds living in Turkey. It is crucial to understand the background of this tension thoroughly to make sense of the current political issues.

### **Kurds in Turkey: The Ethnical Structure and Population in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey**

The majority of Kurds live in Turkey and they make up the 18 percent of the total population of Turkey (CIA Factbook, 2016). The Kurdish population is estimated to be around 14 million. Kurds live in all regions of Turkey, however; they densely populate the Eastern and Southeastern part of Turkey. Because of the migration to urban regions in the 1980s, many Kurds live in large industrial cities of Turkey as well.

### **The Roots of Turkish and Kurdish Conflict**

The Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I and had to sign the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, prepared by the triumphant allies. The treaty made a provision for a Kurdish state. However, the Turkish War of Independence changed the dynamics and the Kurdish hopes were ruined. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. However, the new treaty did not have any provisions for a Kurdish state. This development not only left the Kurds without a homeland, but also kept them under minority status (BBC, 2016).

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 and pursued a secularist and nationalist policy. The founding elite of the state adopted Turkishness as the basis of the state. The article 88 of the Turkish Constitution of 1924 officially introduced Turkishness.

Kurdish ethnic group was attempted to be changed by reforms and coercion. Kurdish identity radicalized and politicized because of these policies of the Turkish national state (Yavuz, 2001). Secularization movements during the late Ottoman period had already caused tension among some Kurdish religious and local elites even before the reforms of the new republic (Jawideh, 2006).

The new nation passed from ummah system to the nation state system. While the ummah system aims to unify the community with Islam as the common religion and through disregarding all heterogeneous elements like language and ethnicity, the nation state system aims to homogenize the population. A year before the first Kurdish rebellion, the public use and teaching of Kurdish was banned. Influential Kurdish tribal chiefs and landowners were forced to settle down in the west of the country (Zürchter, 2004). The Kurdish Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925 was the first movement against the new republic. After the rebellion, the Turkish state used drastic policies (Orhan, 2012).

### **The 1930-1930 Dersim Massacres**

The Dersim region, which was inhabited by a Kurdish Alevi population, stood out as a place for conflict groups and Kurdish nationalism starting from the

1930s. Dersim was both geographically and socio-culturally different in that the population of the region were Alevis, unlike the Sunni Kurds of the Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. The language spoken in the region was Zazaki.

The Kurdish Alevi tribes resisted the military operations carried out by the state. However, Turkish Air Forces bombed the area between 1937 and 1938. Official reports show that almost 15,000 people had to flee from the region and 13,800 people were killed in military operations (Efe&Forchtner, 2011).

Since Kurds led the three major rebellions against the state, it got established in the minds of the Turks that Kurds were the schemers of the main confrontation to the independence of the state (Robins, 1993).

### **Turkish governmental Policies toward Kurds and the Political Representation of the Kurds**

After the first military coup that occurred in Turkey in 1960, many Kurds sought asylum in Continental Europe due to the oppressive policies of the Turkish state. By 1990s, it was estimated that 500,000 Turkish Kurds were living in Western Europe, mainly in Germany, France and Sweden (Robins, 1993).

Two years later after the coup of 1980, a new constitution was prepared under the supervision of the nationalist military junta. The article 66 of the constitution stated that "Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk." Since the Kurds were not willing to accept this dictate, their reaction came with a vengeance when the PKK started a guerilla war (Akyol, 2013).

The use of Kurdish language was implicitly banned with a law that got into effect in 1983. Furthermore, Kurdish population in Southeastern Turkey was aimed to be controlled by permanently stationing two of Turkey's four armies in the region (Robins, 1993). Kurds have been represented in the Parliament since the 1980s, but because of the 10 percent electoral threshold, the extent of their representation has been limited. Individual bans and party closures affected their full representation unfavorably as well (Efe&Forchtner, 2011).

In the 1980s, the government sought to provide a system to secure the southeastern villages and the village guard system was created. However, it did not prove to be successful. Therefore, a state of emergency was imposed in 1987 by the government and it lasted until 2012. 378,335 Kurds were forced to leave their village during this period.

From the late 1980s through the 1990s, short-lived coalition governments could not develop or sustain stable policies toward the Kurds because of the political instability. In 1993, Abdullah Ocalan declared a unilateral cease-fire but it did not initiate tangible results. During the time of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (June 1996-June 1997), his party, The Welfare Party, included Kurds and Turks in its proposed 'Islamic nation' and supporting the lifting of emergency rule in the southeast (Hatem & Dohrmann, 2013).

Turkey's aspirations for accession to the EU prompted a series of democratic changes to be completed. Due to these developments, education and broadcasting in Kurdish became legal. In addition to these, capital punishment was abolished. This development led to Abdullah Ocalan's death sentence to be commuted to life imprisonment in 2002 (Kirisci, 2000).

In the national elections of June 2015, the HDP, a political party, which had been

operating as the political wing of PKK, gained big success. The party had rebranded itself as a liberal, democratic party that aimed to represent all Turkish citizens against the increasing authoritarianism of JDP (Justice and Development Party).

HDP's political achievement, along with the military success and international reputation of the PKK-linked Kurdish forces in Syria created an environment in which the Turkish government perceived a peace deal could weaken its hand. PKK was concerned that the government was taking advantage of the group's withdrawal to construct new military bases. The Turkish government held the PKK accountable for hoarding weapons and setting up explosives on roads in the region.

The two sides gave up negotiations and afterwards a new combat broke out between the PKK and the Turkish government in the summer of 2015. Some nationalistic Turkish voters had the sentiment that Erdogan was wrong in the first place to start peace negotiations. The HDP ended both sides to stop the fight. However, the new Turkish supporters of HDP were resentful because it was not critical enough toward the PKK. In the end, both parties returned to their original hostile positions (Danford, 2016).

Apart from the Kurds living in homeland, Turkey has had to deal with Syrian Kurds from time to time throughout its history. Turkey has a 780-mile border with Syria and Iraq and Syrian Kurds have always played an important role in Turkish foreign policies.

### **Syrian Kurds: The Ethnical Structure and Population in Northern Syria**

Kurds are the second largest language group living in Syria.). It is claimed that they make up 10 percent of the Syrian population with their population of 1.8 million but these figures are not accurate (Gambill, 2004). According to some other sources, they make up 8 percent of the total population with their population of 1.5 million (Dahlman, 2002).

Syrian Kurdish population inhabits in scattered regions. Around 30 percent of the Syrian Kurds lives in the northwest of Aleppo (Kurd Dag). Approximately 10 percent of the Kurds lives in the Kobani region and 40 percent lives in the northeastern half of the Jazeera governorate. The rest of the Kurdish population lives in the urban neighborhoods. The majority of the Kurds in Jazeera are the descendants of the refugees who escaped from Turkey in the 1920s (Gambill, 2004).

### **Syria, Turkey and PKK Triangle**

The former president of Syria, Hafez al-Assad, started to support PKK in the late 1970s until 1998 by providing financial and logistic aid to use the terrorist group as a trump card against Turkey due to the issues between the two countries. PKK, which was led by Abdullah Ocalan, began to get organized in the mid-1970s and proclaimed its founding in November 1978. The aim of the terrorist group was to establish an independent Kurdish state in Southeastern Anatolia through guerrilla wars, in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Ocalan moved to Syria with his team in summer 1979 because of the turmoil and rumors of a military coup in Turkey (Ozkaya, 2007).

The main reason for Hafez al-Assad to support PKK was the water issue stemming from the River Euphrates. Turkey argued that the Euphrates was a river that originated from Turkey and therefore, the right to use its waters solely belonged to

Turkey. On the other hand, Syria argued that the river was an international water resource since it passed through Syria and Iraq as well and wanted clarity as of the sharing of the river's waters under a triple agreement (Kushner, 1999).

In addition, Turkey started a big project called GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project) in 1960s, which aimed to build dams on the Euphrates and the Tigris in order to generate electricity and irrigate the lands. These developments increased Syria's concerns about the water issue and played an important role in its support to PKK (Olson, 2005).

The second reason for Syria to support PKK was the fact that it regarded the city of Hatay as its own land and could not accept its annexation to Turkey with the 1939 referendum (Ozkan&Sogangoz,2006).

The third reason was the close relations, as well as the security and cooperation agreements between Turkey and Israel. Not recognizing Israel and being at war with it, Syria used PKK against Turkey in 1990s as a reaction to its alliance with Israel (Kurubas,2011).

Syria located PKK in Bekaa Valley of Lebanon and enabled PKK to open a training camp there (Erciyes, 2004). Apart from providing PKK with a camp, the Damask government provided PKK with aid on almost all issues, including providing shelter for members of the organization, and providing money, arms, ammunition, fake identity cards and passports for them. PKK recruited Syrian Kurds and apart from this, the Syrian government exempted the Kurds joining PKK from military service (Ozcan, 1999).

While banning the cultural and political activities of Kurds in Syria in line with the ideology of the state. Hafez Al-Assad supported PKK that aimed to establish an independent Kurdish State. Although this might seem controversial on the surface, the main area of activities of PKK was Turkey and if PKK had made promises to Kurds in Syria, it might have threatened the existence of the organization in the country. For this reason, PKK did not pursue a Kurdish nationalistic propaganda in Syria.

Furthermore, Al-Assad encouraged Kurds in Syria to join PKK or at least shut his eyes to it. By this way, he managed to undermine the already fragmented and banned political activities in Syria (Yavuz,2005).

The apparent PKK problem enabled Turkey to regard the Kurdish issue as terrorism. The state framed the issue as an economic problem of underdevelopment in the southeastern Anatolia. Rather than calling the issue as an ethnic one ('The Kurdish issue'), it was referred to as a regional one ('The southeast issue') (Satana, 2012).

This serious PKK issue changed in the late 1990s, when Turkey started to threaten Syria with war. PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, had been in Syria for the past 19 years and he had to escape to Kenya in 1998 and soon he was arrested by the agents of Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT).

Following this critical development, Turkey and Syria signed a mutual security agreement in October 1998 in Adana, Turkey. In line with this pact, Syrian government proclaimed PKK as a terrorist group and agreed to cooperate with Turkey to defeat it and drew back all its support for it. PKK was coerced to leave its bases in Syria in the face of these events.

### **Kurds in Bashar al-Assad Period from 2000 onwards**

After Hafez al-Assad died in summer of 2000, his son Bashar-al Assad came to power. Bashar al-Assad was in favor of reforms and transparency. When the 9/11 attacks happened in 2001, the U.S. started to threaten all anti-democratic regimes in the Middle East. Backed by international support, the U.S. pressurized Syria and Iran. These developments caused the relatively relaxed period to come to an end and the old suppressions and limitations stroke back on the Kurds in Syria (Ozkaya, 2007).

The Democratic Union Party (PYD) Kurds of Northern Syria was founded in 2003 by the PKK. The war in Syria started in 2011 and changed the power dynamics in the region. The grip of the Assad regime was loosened. Syrian Kurds took control of the regions where the Kurds formed the majority of the population. PYD gained de facto autonomy across the border from Turkey since July 19, 2012.

In the late 2014, Kurdish controlled areas in Syria were the only parts on Syria that maintained relative stability. The Kurdish-led autonomous government not only proves to be an effective force against the Islamic State, but also presents a political alternative to the oppressive Assad regime.

### **Differences and Similarities between PKK and PYD**

Neither PYD, nor its armed wing YPG has been listed as a terrorist organization unlike PKK, which is the biggest difference. When the PKK's affiliation with Syria came to an end, Syrian Kurds were influenced by Abdullah Ocalan's ideas, and they established their own party, the PYD, based on his writings. Therefore, there is an ideological similarity between the two organizations. Many members of the PYD were also close to, or were members of, the PKK. However, PYD's agenda has never been a separatist one. The party supported the idea of 'democratic confederalism' and did not question the territorial integrity of Syria (Paasche, 2015).

The external relations commissioner of YPG, EbuRavan, in one of his interviews stated that YPG is an entirely a regional group that was formed by Syrian Kurds and that they had a training camp in Afrin, and they did all military training in that camp. He added that they had no fighters that had been trained in PKK camps, and they got no external support. He also said that they only got by with the help from the Kurdish people (YPG: PKK'dan Farkliyiz [YPG: We are Different from PKK], 2015).

### **The Escalation of the Tension between Turkey and the U.S over YPG.**

On January 30, 2016 Brett McGurk, who was appointed by the U.S. President Obama as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, visited Kobani and met several PYD authorities.

On February 7, 2016 President Erdogan stated in his declarations that PYD and YPG are terrorist organizations and PYD is what PKK is. He also reacted to McGurk's visit of Kobani and said "Is it me who is your partner, or the terrorists in Kobani?"

On February 8, 2016 John Kirby, the spokesperson for the United States Department of State said "We don't define PYD as a terrorist organization" and added that they would continue their talks with Turkey about this issue.

On February 9, 2016 The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, John Bass, was summoned to the Turkish foreign ministry over the statements of Kirby concerning PYD.

On February 10, President Erdogan said "Both PYD and PYG are apparently

terrorist organizations. Just like PKK, they are terrorists groups". Addressing to the U.S, he said "Hey America! How many times have I told you before? Are you on our side or are you on the side of PYD and YPG?"

On the night of the same day, U.S. Deputy Spokesman, Mark Toner stated that there was a difference between PKK and YPG and the PKK was a terrorist group but they were not in agreement with Turkey over YPG.

On February 11, President Erdogan said "Our NATO ally states that it is in alliance with PYD. What happened to the fight against terrorism in the World? How could this be the fight against terrorism? We see those whose eyes are so shut that they cannot differentiate between PKK and PYD. He (McGurk) visits Kobani at the time of the Geneva talks and is awarded a plaque by a so-called YPG general?" (Arslan, 2016).

On February 16, a suicide bomb attack took place in the capital of Turkey, Ankara. Although the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) claimed responsibility for the attack, for the Turkish government they all amounted to the same PKK. Therefore, Turkey accused YPG-PKK for this gory attack.

### **Recent Analysis Concerning the Future of Turkish and American Relations**

The President of the Middle East Forum and a columnist in *The Washington Times* Daniel Pipes stated in his analysis of Turkish-American alliance that the 60-year-old strategic partnership had come to an end. Daniel urged the U.S. government to approach the Republic of Turkey very differently from the past, with suspicion and self-defense.

He also stated his doubt that Turkey and the U.S. would find common ground as of U.S. continuing its operations in Syria together with the PYD. He added that even if the two parties found common ground, it would take the form of a compromise where the U.S. government supports Turkish goals in Syria and the Turkish government helps with American goals in Syria.

Pipes also said that he would be surprised if the relations between Turkey and the U.S. will ever return to the warmth and trust of the pre-JDP era and that the relations will be more business-like and correct without the enthusiastic spirit (Terzi, 2015).

Turkish Heritage Advisory Board Member and Secretary-General of the EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC), Dr. Michael Gunter analyzed the future of Turkish – American relations. Professor Dr. Gunter stated that Syria continues to be the major divergence between the U.S. and Turkey and the U.S. is doing wrong by using the Kurds in the Middle East region against ISIS. Dr. Gunter argued that PYD and KRG are not mercenaries and should not be treated as such. Instead, U.S. should refrain from criticizing Russian involvement in the region and seek cooperation with all regional powers to stop the civil war in Syria (Turk of America, 19 November 2015).

Professor of International Relations and head of Yildiz Technical University, Nursin Atesoglu Guney stated that the disagreements may continue or the two parties may find a common ground. The key issue will be the Syrian issue. However, there are other issues that the two parties need to cooperate such as commerce and struggle against DAESH (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) (Atesoglu Guney, 2016).

### Consequences of the Dispute between Turkey and the U.S

Turkish armed forces have been attacking YPG positions in Syria despite the objections of the U.S. The Turkish government intensified the pressure on the U.S. by accusing YPG of responsibility for the bombing in Ankara on March 13, 2016, which killed 28 people. The Turkish President Erdogan has stated that the U.S. must make a choice of loyalties, which implies that further divergence is very likely.

The Kurdish conflict between Turkey and the U.S. might also have reflections on the Syrian war. It could complicate and extend the conflict between Bashar al-Assad and his rebel enemies. The friction between Turkey and the U.S. may indirectly benefit Assad regime and his allies; Russia and Iran (Gladstone, 2016).

PYD leader Salih Muslim welcomed the Russian deployment in October, 2015, and Moscow motivated the YPG to unite the Kobane and Afrin cantons. If the PYD, and by connection the PKK, become Russian's clients, the Turkish negotiations with Kurds to resolve the problems will come to an end. Therefore, Turkey has to get the upper hand by building better relations with PYD. Turkish-Kurdish peace at home will be the best solution to weaken Russia (Cagatay&Tabler, 2015).

Fellow senior at EUROPA Centre for European Strategy, Adam Baker stated that after the Turkish air force hit a Russian jet in November 2015, relations between Turkey and Russia deteriorated at a critical level. It is very likely for Russia to play the Kurdish card. Turkey will be directly affected, but also the tensions between Turkey and the U.S. may also escalate (New Eastern Europe, 2016).

Turkey states that the bombardment will continue as long as it perceives threat from Syrian Kurds. On the other hand, the YPG is likely to overlook Turkey's threats and continue to take control of more areas, just as it captured the strategic town of Tal Abadin spite of Turkey's threats in July 2015.

Selahattin Demirtas, the leader of the People's Democratic Party, or HDP, stated that by summer 2016, the tension between the PKK and government could escalate and this could trigger an ethnic war. Demirtas called for a ceasefire and peace talks to prevent further escalation. "We have urged the PKK to drop their guns and return to negotiations," he said. He urged the U.S. or some other outside power to help broker such talks.

"We see it in everyone's interest to end the violence and return to political dialogue," a senior Obama administration official said in an interview late Thursday, when asked about Demirtas's call for U.S. mediation. The U.S. is exploring ways to encourage this dialogue (Ignatious, 2016).

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# OCTOBER CRISIS AS AN EXAMPLE OF INTERNAL TERRORISM

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## **Abstract**

Back in the 1960s and early 1970s Canadian province Québec had to face the attacks made by separatist terrorist group Le Front de libération du Québec. The goal of this national liberation movement was to achieve Québec independence. Since the beginning of European settlement there have been some problems between people of Anglophone and Francophone origin, who do not agree with their position in Canadian federation and with the policy of federal government. The most important activity is known as October crisis which resulted in death of a hostage and imposing of War Measures Act.

**Keywords:** Canada, Québec, Le Front de libération du Québec, October Crisis, separatism

## **Introduction**

Canada is perceived as a stable democracy and one of the safest countries in the world. Politically, Canada is a federation consisting of ten provinces and three territories. Canada is a very multinational and multicultural country. It is said to be a „country of immigrants“ because the only small minority of today's inhabitants is created by Canadian aboriginal people (by Canadian First Nations). The majority of today's Canadian inhabitants are descendants of European immigrants who came to Canada between the 17th and 20th century. Today, the largest part of people living in Canada identify themselves as „Canadian.“ But the structure of total Canadian inhabitants has changed in the last decades because of the increasing flood of non-European immigrants. People who identify themselves as Anglophone and Francophone origin still create the largest groups (Central Intelligence Agency, 2019).

At first sight, it may act that the situation and relation among all components

of the Canadian population are peaceful and calm, but it is not true. Since the beginning of European settlement in Canada, there have been disputes and problems between people of Anglophone and Francophone origin. Francophone Canadians, who predominantly live in the province of Québec, have not agreed with their position in Canadian federation and with the policy of the central federal government.

Separatist tendencies in Québec used to be very strong. Separatist agenda was presented not only by generally known political parties Bloc Québécois and Parti Québécois, but also by terrorist group Le Front de libération du Québec/ Québec Liberation Front.

The aim of this paper is to present Le Front de libération du Québec and their activities with the focus on the October Crisis and the response from the authorities. This essay is a case study of one special terrorist group which conducted one particular terrorist attack. Le Front de libération du Québec was dissolved after the end of the October Crisis, so the text would be predominantly a historical analysis.

### **Historical and political background until 1970**

The roots for the problems in the relationship between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians we have to look back to the distant past. Canada was discovered by British navigator John Cabot in 1497. But the first nation, which established the first permanent European settlement in that area, were French with their leader Jacques Cartier. It happened in 1534 (Rovná – Jindra, 2012, pp. 25).

During the 17th century, more European people left Europe and started to live in Canada. Most of them came from France and Great Britain. The first problems between these two nationalities emerged almost immediately. The situation in North America was nearly identical to the situation at the European continent where the war between Great Britain and France. This war lasted between the years 1756 and 1763. The winner of the war, Great Britain, gained all the territories in North America which had belonged to France (Rovná – Jindra, 2012, pp. 35-38; Labrie, 2006, pp. 1045).

The whole territory of North America became a part of the British Empire. In Canada, the French majority found itself under the rule of the British minority. The efforts to anglicize the French-speaking people started almost immediately and they started to pursue the recognition of their identity and distinctiveness (Bourque, 1995, pp. 200). The increasing influx of immigrants from the British Islands to Canada caused that the Francophone inhabitants became there a minority soon. The situation between these two nations was getting worse so the British government decided to issue some laws and acts that were supposed to arrange the relations and rules between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians (Rovná – Jindra, 2012, pp. 46-56; 110-117). Those documents were Québec Act of 1774 (which made three reforms: it recognized French civil law and seigneurial system and tolerated Catholic Church), Constitutional Act 1791 (which created two units with their own assembly chamber: Upper Canada – present-day Ontario, and Lower Canada – present-day Québec), Act of Union of 1840 (which meant again unification of Upper and Lower Canada) and the most important one, British North America Act of 1867 (Bourque, 1995, pp. 200-202).

British North America Act established Canadian federation with the official title Dominion of Canada. Dominion of Canada consisted of four provinces: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Québec. All parts of the new federation were equal (Rovná – Jindra, 2012, pp. 117-119). The English language and French language were also made equal (Gough, 2011, pp. 20).

Francophone Canadians in Québec regarded this federal arrangement of Canada as was the best way how to coexist with the rest of Anglophone provinces and best way how to preserve the uniqueness and difference of province Québec with a comparison to the rest of federation (Banfield, 1965, pp. 44).

As Canada expanded to its today's territory, the federal government had to solve some problems connected with the functioning of the federation, especially with the question of economy, tax collecting and subsequent tax redistribution among the parts of the federation. Québec was constantly unsatisfied with the status quo. In the 1950s there existed even two tax systems in Canada. The first of them was used in Anglophone provinces. The other one was applied only in Québec (Rovná – Jindra, 2012, pp. 226; 239-240).

The central government was very afraid of the increasing separatist tendencies in Québec. Many reforms were introduced and many competencies in education, health system or in infrastructure were granted strengthened for Québec in the early 1960s. But it was still not enough for the Québécois. The conflicts between Québec and the federal government increased (Johnson, 1968, pp. 23)

### **Quiet Revolution**

Sixties were very difficult for Canada. Many authors even say that at this time Canada had to face the largest internal-politics crisis in its history. This crisis was caused by the Quiet Revolution which played out between 1960 and 1966 in Québec. Although Quiet Revolution was not the typical revolution with violence, it was a period of many changes and reforms which were achieved (Banfield, 1965, pp. 44).

Actually, Quiet Revolution can be connected with other significant events that played out during the sixties. We can mention the Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War and the sexual revolution (Labrie, 2006, pp. 1038).

The Quiet Revolution is the title for the events following the death of former Québec's prime-minister Maurice Duplessis in 1959. During his reign, Québec was under the strong influence of traditional conservative noble families and under Catholic church, which controlled all health, social service, and educational institutions in the province (Labrie, 2006, pp. 1038). The corruption was everywhere. The changes and reforms began in 1960 with the victory of Liberal party with leader Jean Lesage in the provincial election. The liberal party refused the idea of separatism and independence, they just wanted to improve the relations between federal and provincial level and to achieve some reforms regarding the redistribution of finance, natural resources and social covering (Banfield, 1965, pp. 45; Smiley, 1977, pp. 200).

The existing elites of Québec, consisting of members of noble families, priests, lawyers or doctors, were replaced by so-called "a new middle class" (Labrie, 2006, pp. 1041). This new middle class consisted of educated people having deep knowledge not only about Canada but also about the whole world. These new elites

of Québec consisted of journalists, economists, engineers, university professors and students (Banfield, 1965, pp. 45; Smiley, 1977, pp. 200-201).

Modern Québec wanted independence and emancipation in culture, economy, politics and social questions. Many reforms in the areas of education, social security, and natural resource management were made. The Catholic church lost its privileged position in society of Québec. It was not the most important institution anymore (Kwavnick, 1965, pp. 512-517; Banfield, 1965, pp. 46).

Many changes were visible also in the economic area. Ruling Liberal Party transformed the economy of Québec into the economy of a welfare state. Reforms in the economy, industrialization, urbanization, and changes in society gave birth to the new nationalism in Québec (Bourque, 1995, pp. 207).

In that time, Francophone Canadians constituted 28 percent of the total population of Canada and almost 80 percent of the population of the province of Québec. All the classical characteristics of a nation could and still can be found at Francophone Canadians or Québécois. They share a common language, culture, history, and geographic entity where they live and which is their home. Especially the relation to the land/ homeland was essential for the nationalist sentiment of Francophone people in Québec. Province Québec has possessed its own provincial government for several hundred years. Not only because of all these characteristics the Québécois have considered themselves a nation and have had very strong national consciousness. They strongly disagreed with the language policy which Works at the beginning of the 1960s. The main language of Canada was English. English had to be used in the offices, authorities, stores, governmental institutions. It had changed during Quiet revolution but many Québécois perceived the language policy in Québec during the 1960s as a profound form of discrimination and oppression (Bourque, 1995, pp. 208; Cohen-Almagor, 2000).

### **Le Front de libération du Québec/ Québec Liberation Front**

Despite the generally accepted rejection of Québec's independence in Canadian federation two separatist movements and groups emerged in the 1960s. The first of them was Parti Québécois. This group is said to be a political platform of Quiet revolution. Parti Québécois was established in 1968 as a defender of the interests of Québec on the provincial level (Rovná – Jindra, 2012, pp. 268). It also wanted to achieve some socio-democratic reforms. Their approach was not revolutionary, they wanted to achieve their goals through a legal and democratic system. Despite many opinions, complete separation and independence from Canada have never been a goal of Parti Québécois. The agenda and political program were promoting the independence of Québec paired with an economic union with the rest of Canada (Smiley, 1977, pp. 203; Crouch, 2009, pp. 51, HistoriCa 2014).

The other group was Le Front de libération du Québec. This national liberation movement was founded in 1963 by George Schoeters, Gabriel Hudon and Raymond Villeneuve (Ross, 1995, pp. 291). Their goal was to achieve Québec independence. Supporters of Le Front de libération du Québec were prepared to use violence and terrorism, if necessary (Griffiths, 2010). Le Front de libération du Québec was active between the years 1963 and 1972. Their activities killed seven people and injured many others. It is necessary to mention also criminal activities made by this group as property damages or stealing of bombs, especially dynamite (Ross, 1995,

pp. 285).

The main source of finance for the running of the organization and for conducting their activities was due to many bank robberies (Canadian Soldiers, n. d.).

Le Front de libération du Québec was formed according to the ideas of Carlos Marighella. Marighella recommended as the best way the formation of small groups (cells) that would consist of no more than four or five persons. This division and decentralization should have helped to reduce to a minimum the risks of penetration and betrayal (Cohen-Almagor, 2000).

The most famous and visible personalities in Le Front de libération du Québec were Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon. Both men loudly denounced the situation in Québec and lately, they were arrested and imprisoned (Virtual Museum of Canada, n.d.). This group had a socialist background and was influenced by events like the Cuban Revolution, US student activism against the Vietnam War and Algeria's War of Independence. Canadian War Museum historian Andrew Burtch explained that: "The FLQ claimed to be fighting against a capitalist system, which they characterized as English-dominated, foreign-owned - the FLQ seemingly wanted to smash that system" (Griffiths, 2010). The inspiration and ideological background of Le Front de libération du Québec we can also see in the independence movements, which had been operating in the world since the end of the Second World War. Through these movements, people fought against all forms of subjection, namely against political domination, economic exploitation or social and cultural oppression (Ferretti, 2000).

The close connection between separatists and socialism could be seen in the fact that capitalist activities were held mostly by Canadian upper-middle class. This class owned the majority of the natural, financial and industrial resources of Québec and was in control of its economic development and its political organization. On the other hand, the rate of unemployment was very high in Québec during the fifties and sixties. In rural areas, unemployment reached a value of about 50 percent. In comparison, in the metropolitan areas, it was only about 18 percent. The average income was also lower in Québec than in Anglophone provinces. Many people saw separation and independence as a solution to a cure for all the problems in Québec. The activities of Le Front de libération du Québec were aimed not only against Canadian federation but also against the establishment and governing class of Canada and Québec itself (Ferretti, 2000; Cohen-Almagor, 2000). It is not surprising that the biggest supporters of separatism in Québec and both political platforms were workers and students (Ross, 1995, pp. 288).

In the first years of its existence, particularly in 1968 and 1969, Le Front de libération du Québec was responsible for several bombing attempts which caused few casualties (Freeman, 2003, pp. 19). The terrorists who perpetrated these attacks were arrested and imprisoned in many cases but they were again released a few years later (Canada History, 2013). These activities were supposed to support striking workers (Ross, 1995, pp. 287).

The attacks of Le Front de libération du Québec took place usually in or around Montréal, especially in English-speaking neighborhoods around this city. The largest attack which Le Front de libération du Québec had undertaken, was bombing the Montreal Stock Exchange in February 1969. The terrorists set off a large bomb which injured 27 people. In September that year, Le Front de libération du Québec

bombed a house of the Montreal's mayor Jean Drapeau (Griffiths, 2010; Canada History, 2013). Actually, the total number of victims between 1963 and 1969 were six (Canadian Soldiers, n. d.).

Le Front de libération du Québec and the idea of separatism met large support not only from many constituencies. Separatists were supported both domestically and internationally. The most significant support and even aid for Québécois separatists came from Cuban and Algerian governments. Also, other separatist and terrorist groups supported separatists in Québec. Later, many people managed to avoid accusing of terrorism and membership in Le Front de libération du Québec by fleeing to Cuba and Algeria (Ross, 1995, pp. 288).

The general population, although condemned the using of violence, supported the idea of bigger independence and rejoiced in the political effect which seemed to be on the use of the French language in business and industry, and on the sharing of power and responsibilities between Québec and Ottawa (Cohen-Almagor, 2000).

Before the emergence of Le Front de libération du Québec nationalist terrorism had been unknown in Québec (Ross, 1995, pp. 294). But Le Front de libération du Québec was not a typical terrorist group, which we know today. Their activities were closely connected with the historical and political background in Québec. Their activities reacted on the relations between Anglophone majority and Francophone minority or Québec provincial government and Canadian federal governments, which have been problematic since the beginning of European settlement in Canada. Le Front de libération du Québec fulfilled both general criteria of terrorism - a violent action or set of actions aimed at promoting a political objective and definition for internal terrorism. According to Meinardus, *„national (or internal) terrorism may be defined as politically motivated violence by terrorists inside the confines of one state, where victims and perpetrators have the same nationality.”* Internal terrorism is an older type than international terrorism. It is connected with various anti-colonial struggles and separatist movements very often. Generally known representatives of this kind of terrorist groups are ETA in Spain or IRA in Northern Ireland. Most of these groups were active in the past, but not today anymore. The governments and authorities managed to neutralize them (Meinardus, n. d.). Today, international terrorism is more visible and meets more interest than internal terrorism.

According to the ideological background, Le Front de libération du Québec fits the category of secular terrorism. Secular terrorist groups want to achieve a specific political aim. They often try to keep casualties at the minimum level. Targets selected by these groups often reflect motivations and ideologies. The targets are representatives of governments, banks, justice, international corporations, policemen, soldiers or other public figures (Terrorism research, n. d.; Meinardus, n. d.).

Terrorism and terrorist acts can be considered also like means of communication (Jongmann – Schmid, 1988, pp. 21). Terrorist attacks are intensively monitored and followed by media. Media coverage usually means the increasing interest in the topics, which the terrorists fight and call for. Terrorists, both individuals, and terrorist groups want to be heard and understood. They hope that the breaking of laws and norms will point out the public and politician representatives about their affairs (Combs – Slann, 2009, pp. 106-107). As we will see later, this explanation is

also suitable for Le Front de libération du Québec and their activities that caused psychological impact and shock.

### October Crisis

The most important attack, or, more precisely, the activity made by Le Front de libération du Québec, broke out in October 1970. The following events are known worldwide as for the October Crisis. The official date of the outbreak of the October Crisis was October 5, 1970. Group of armed men kidnapped James Cross, British Trade Commissioner in Montreal. This group called itself the Liberation Cell of the Le Front de libération du Québec (Cohen-Almagor, 2000). Ross assumes that terrorists from Le Front de libération du Québec were inspired by guerilla groups in Latin America because of their success with kidnapping (Ross, 1995, pp. 288).

The kidnapping happened at 8:15 am. Later in the afternoon that day, Le Front de libération du Québec published a list of demands for the safe release of kidnapped James Cross. A time limit for fulfilling these demands was 48 hours (Bélanger, 2000a; Cohen-Almagor, 2000).

Originally, the demands were:

1. end of police search;
2. publication of an FLQ manifesto;
3. rehiring of the Lapalme employees;
4. liberation of all political prisoners (23 FLQ members);
5. denunciation of the informer who had led the police to the capture of a cell of the FLQ in June of 1970;
6. \$500 000 in gold;
7. safe-conducts out of the country to Cuba or Algeria (Bélanger, 2000a).

In the first hours of crisis, the situation did not seem to be so serious. Québec got used to experience activities made by Le Front de libération du Québec. Then Prime minister of Québec Robert Bourassa even left Québec and took a pre-planned trip to New York to seek out American investments for Québec (Bélanger, 2000b).

A reaction of the federal government appeared one day later, on October 6. Federal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced that any decision and steps regarding the demands of the Le Front de libération du Québec would follow a joint decision taken by the federal government and the government of Québec. Some newspapers, especially in Québec, published the FQL Manifesto this day. Anglophone press published just parts of the Manifesto. Allegedly, the federal government tried to prevent its publication (Bélanger, 2000a).

On October 7, the first point from the list of demands was fulfilled. Radio station CKAC broadcasted a complete text of the Manifesto live. Then the federal government and CBC had to decide whether the Manifesto would be broadcasted also on the Canadian national radio. In the end, the Manifesto with demands was read and broadcasted on October 8 on Radio-Canada and was also published in newspapers (Cohen-Almagor, 2000; Kalbfleisch, 2017).

The first counteractivity started on October 7 and approximately thirty people were arrested. Neither federal nor provincial governments wanted to fulfill the demands of terrorists, especially the releasing of the „political prisoners.“ René Lévesque, former leader of the Parti Québécois, appealed to the kidnappers to

abandon violence (Bélanger, 2000a).

But Le Front de libération du Québec met certain support for its agenda from Québécois. There were some demonstrations supporting Le Front de libération du Québec, university students from Montreal put their signature on FLQ Manifesto and there was a petition asking for negotiation with Le Front de libération du Québec. This petition was signed also by prominent citizens including intellectuals or politicians (Murphy, 2016).

On October 10 the crisis escalated. Robert Bourassa announced, that the Québec government refused to fulfill the remaining demands from the list of Le Front de libération du Québec. As a reaction for the rejection of the Canadian and Québec governments to negotiate, Chénier cell of Le Front de libération du Québec kidnapped another person. Pierre Laporte, provincial Minister of Labour and Immigration, was kidnapped at his house half an hour later the official announcement by Bourassa (Kalbfleisch, 2017).

Everything had changed after this act. Many letters and communiqué threatening by Laporte's death were published. Le Front de libération du Québec insisted on the above mentioned seven demands, especially on the releasing of 23 political prisoners and on a provision of safe conduct out of the country for them (Bélanger, 2000a). The provincial government of Québec refused to do it but was willing to negotiate with Le Front de libération du Québec. Some negotiation took place between October 11 and October 13 but they ended with failure for the government. On October 15, the government offered to release a group of five so-called political prisoners and was willing to release also some FLQ kidnappers, if the hostages were safely returned. The terrorist did not react (CBC, 2010).

On October 12, federal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau decided to send soldiers to the capital city Ottawa. Those soldiers were supposed to protect politicians and federal buildings (Murphy, 2016). Three days later, on October 15, troops were deployed to Québec after the request of Premier Bourassa. The provincial government of Québec formally asked for other help of the Canadian Armed Force. Federal government reacted later that night and issued a proclamation that a state of war existed in Québec (CBC, 2010).

Next day, on October 16, the War Measures Act was issued and adopted by federal Parliament at the request of Québec's premier Robert Bourassa and Montreal's mayor Jean Drapeau. In history, it has happened just three times, in 1914, 1939 and 1970. In 1970 it happened for the first time that the War Measures Act was invoked during peacetime. According to this special act, the federal government can use emergency powers when there is a real or another kidnapping, suspected threat of war, invasion or insurrection (Bélanger, 2004; Valpy, 2018).

In the time of validity of the War Measures Act, the civil rights and liberties were limited. People might have been imprisoned without a warrant, their movement might have been controlled or their houses might have been searched. Le Front de libération du Québec was declared as an illegal group (CBC, 2010).

The reaction of Le Front de libération du Québec was tragic - Pierre Laporte was assassinated the next day, on October 17. The other cell keeping James Cross announced postponing of his execution (Canadian Soldiers, n. d.).

Many of suspected terrorists and people suspected from their activities in Le Front de libération du Québec were arrested and detained without charge in the first

few hours after the announcement the emergency. The arrested people belonged to the union leaders, artists, scholars, students and other political activists (Valpy, 2018).

All activities and arrests done because of the War Measures Act were made according to law, safely, effectively and almost without the mistakes. Only a few hundreds of innocent people were arrested and again released very soon. Canadian public, both French- and English-speaking, generally supported these activities because it prevented the Le Front de libération du Québec from another kidnapping (Freeman, 2003, pp. 19). Despite this general support, invoking of the War Measures Act damaged a reputation of Prime Minister Trudeau who had been seen as an advocate of democracy and civil liberties (Valpy, 2018). Trudeau wanted to preserve Canadian integrity at any cost. He even put the parti Québécois in association with terrorism, although they refused to use violence to achieve their goals (Ferretti, 2000).

On November 6 police managed to find the Chenier cell of Le Front de libération du Québec which was responsible for the murder of Pierre Laporte. His killers were jailed but all of them left the prison in the 1980s (Griffiths, 2010). The crisis finished in December 1970. James Cross was released on December 3 after negotiation between FLQ Liberation cell terrorists and police in exchange for Cuban exile for his kidnappers. They preferred to go to Cuba rather than face trial in Québec (Canadian Soldiers, n.d.). The Canadian Army left Québec in early January 1971, but War Measure Act was in effect until April 30 that year (Bélanger, 2000a; CBC, 2010).

In February 1971 the total numbers of people who had been affected by the War Measures Act were announced. 497 persons were arrested and 62 of them were charged. Those remaining 435 persons had already been released at that time. 32 of those who were charged, were accused of very serious crimes (Canadian Soldiers, n. d.)

### **Conclusion**

In this essay, I tried to present probably the most important terrorist attack in Canadian history. Francophone population in Québec has been unsatisfied with the establishment and with the relations between Québec provincial and Canadian federal government. Québec, the only Francophone province, has felt to be oppressed by the Anglophone majority. There always have been some voices calling for independence and separation from Canada.

In the 1960s two separatist groups appeared. One of them wanted to achieve its goal, the separation, by democratic way. The other was willing to use the violence, if necessary.

Le Front de libération du Québec caused some casualties among both civilians and political representatives. They shocked the society not only in Québec but also in the rest of Canada. They highlighted some problems which really existed in the relation between Québec, the federal government and the rest of Canada. But Le Front de libération du Québec did not achieve their main goal – they did not achieve of separation of Québec and its independence. Basically, we can say that the result of the October Crisis was totally opposite. Québec asked for the help the federal government and both governments showed good, effective and successful cooperation in their actions towards the terrorists from Le Front de libération du

Québec.

In the beginning, Le Front de libération du Québec had had many supporters, but the situation and public opinion changed after the events of the October Crisis. These activities and especially the murder of Pierre Laporte caused the loss of sympathy among the population of Québec. After that, the supporters of separatism started to support Parti Québécois. This political party with non-violent attitudes became a reasonable alternative to terrorist activities (Canada History, 2013).

Two referendums about Québec independence were held, but the supporters on independence lost in both cases. The first was held in 1980. Despite the polls, 60 percent of voters voted for the staying in the Canadian federation. The other referendum took place in 1995 and in this case, the result was very tight. Almost 95 percent of the population in Québec attended this referendum. 50,6 percent of them voted for remaining in the federation, 49,4 percent of voters wanted the independence (Rovná – Jindra, 2012, pp. 289, 295; Cameron – Jacqueline, 2008, pp. 393).

Canadian federal government has adopted many reforms and laws to enhance the autonomy of Québec. At the same time, the Clarity Act was adopted in 2000. This document has made the separation of not only Québec but also of other Canadian provinces, almost impossible (Aronovitch, 2006, pp. 542, 545). According to the Clarity Act, a secession of the province would require an amendment to the Constitution of Canada. This process would require approval from both the governments of all provinces and from the Government of Canada (Government of Canada, 2019).

Current situation in Québec is different. Québécois still want to preserve their culture and language, but their „enemy“ are not Anglophone Canadians and English language anymore. They want to preserve their culture against newcomming immigrants who do neither want to integrate into society nor learn French to be able to communicate (Pellerin, 2018). According to the survey taken by Angus Reid Institute in 2016, 82 percent of respondents in Québec and 73 percent of Francophone Québécois approved the statement, that Québec should stay a part of Canada (CBC News, 2018). This attitude was visible during provincial election campaign last year. Sovereignty and all connected questions were not a topic for the election campaign after more than forty years (Perreux, 2018).

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# TERRORIST THREATS IN EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF EVENTS IN THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND UKRAINE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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## **Abstract**

From the beginning of the 21st century, terrorism evolves and takes the form of various acts of violence committed by terrorists. It is characterized by close relation to history and the political situation in the world. The evolving terrorist typology began to take its shape after the 2001 attacks in the United States. Later there were attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), which reassured the security services and public opinion in the belief that terrorism is used as a weapon, a form of intimidation and gaining an advantage. Nowadays, religious fanaticism which is the basis for most terrorist activities dominates. It is connected with the so-called home grown terrorism, which includes people with citizenship, families and enterprises from a country where terrorist attacks take place. The development of security research in the 21st century in Europe clearly states that security is an independent research discipline whose main goal is to obtain a multi-faceted, profound and synthetic image of reality, perspectives and threats. Currently, the French Republic and Ukraine are struggling the most with intra-state terrorism. Its effects lead to the destabilization of national integrity and threaten social security. This situation is also important for neighboring countries and international organizations to which they belong, such as the European Union or NATO.

The French Republic is one of the countries that has assumed the greatest responsibility in the context of providing conditions for arriving migrants from Africa and the Middle East. It is also associated with attacks that were committed, among others, by migrants from the Maghreb (former French colonies). However, in addition to long-distance migration (from continent to continent), close migration (between neighboring countries) the context of research is very important. Ukraine is such an example, where armed struggles continue and terrorists actively operate,

both on the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian sides. The assassinations are classified according to the scale of importance and place of occurrence, thus we forget that they may occur in the future in a country where they have not been before.

The number of terrorist organizations and minor groups that fight for domination, money and territory is constantly changing. They compete with each other, absorbing each other (often in a brutal way) or connecting in the name of achieving a higher goal, for example, through joint assaults. Terrorist attacks in the French Republic and Ukraine, in addition to the continuous migration within the continent, may in the future take place in other European countries. Terrorism as a phenomenon, and at the same time a form of weapon for the growing number of its supporters, requires immediate interest. The complexity of this phenomenon requires the intensification of the actions of state organs, in order to understand it and identify ways to counteract and prevent its occurrence in the future.

**Key words:** terrorism, threats, France, Ukraine, prediction, attacks

### 1. Introduction

Bearing in mind the contemporary threats to internal and national security, it is important to determine the phenomenon we are forced to struggle with. Terrorism is a form of fighting which has been used for more than 2000 years and which is characterized by a sudden action aimed at causing destabilization of the attacked entity. Its evolution, transformation and development have caused it to be the greatest threat to state security today. It has a significant impact on the functioning of governments, organizations and societies, causing global disintegration, which currently cannot be stopped or controlled by any of the entities appointed for that purpose. Despite the fact that almost all the countries in the world struggle with terrorism in various forms and with varying intensity, the actual and rational method of stopping it and eliminating its expansion to other countries has not been found yet. Terrorism continues to develop and evolve (Byman, 2006, pp. 69-72).

The scientific community is not fully aware yet of why terrorism takes place and what forms it will ultimately take. Both the causes and consequences are incapable of being satisfactorily explained. Nevertheless, finding the appropriate method, policy, strategy or concept for combating terrorism is a fundamental goal at both national and international levels. An objective assessment of the evolution of this phenomenon is closely related to the development and co-ordination of anti-terrorism policy and the raising of human awareness. The nature of terrorist threats determines the actions and the formulation of laws which constitute the response of the government to such threats. It is necessary for the developing stereotypes and misunderstandings concerning terrorism to be replaced by in-depth analyses and insightful processes, aimed at recognizing it as the overriding threat to state security, due to its diversity depending on the territory in which it occurs. Terrorism can take different forms in France, Poland, Turkey and Ukraine.

The development of terrorism in Europe has become, according to the opinion of many researchers, such as the authors of the study entitled *Civil Liability in Europe for Terrorism-Related Risk*, "enterprise-threatening" or an activity in a wide sense of the word which constitutes a permanent threat to global security. Terrorism is developing and it functions as an entity which has an organizational structure, with hierarchical responsibility, as well as a system of rewards and punishments

for actions taken, including the fulfilment of duties. The expansiveness of terrorist groups determines their potential, and the number of their members determined their strength. The greater the number of supporters of actions undertaken by the terrorist organization, the easier it is to raise funds for the maintenance of the group. Contemporary struggles of states with terrorist organizations constitute a war with international entities which have great logistic potential and financial resources (Bergkamp and Herbatschek, 2015, p. 288).

The position of the French Republic with reference to the intensification of terrorism is closely related to its own activities which were reflected by the enactment of the anti-terrorism law in 2017 (*LOI n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme*) (Laffargue, 2017). The law is still the latest normative act in the world regarding the war against terrorism. It encompasses guidelines for the government and security forces to be followed in the fight with assassins. Its enactment and application is an example for other European countries which may implement their own - similar laws in the future. The fundamental rule of its application is continuous control, with simultaneous respect for the rights and freedoms of citizens. It also defines the threats connected with the continuous influence of terrorism on the functioning of the state (*LOI n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme*(1), *JORF n°0255 du 31 octobre 2017 texte n° 1*).

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 changed the perception of terrorism. An anthropologist, Scott Atran (2001, p. 14) pointed out that: "probably never in the history of human conflicts, has such a small number of people, with such small possibilities and means frightened so many". The phenomenon of terrorism requires states to remain vigilant on a regular basis and involve many entities. Such entities must constantly co-operate with one another to maintain national security.

## **2. An Analysis of a Notion of Terrorism**

The characterization of terrorism, which takes a different form and is perceived in a different way in each country, is important for the conducted of the analysis. Nowadays, there are about 300 (and possibly even more - in each state, there may be at least 2-3 definitions of terrorism used; in Poland, we also do not have a single, official definition), definitions of terrorism in operation, and therefore there is no uniform, definite description of this phenomenon. The definitions differ from one another, depending on the region where terrorist attacks occur and the legislation which characterizes them in the light of the law applicable in a given country. The definition of this negative phenomenon is different in the French Republic, in the Republic of Poland, in the USA and in Ukraine. However, it also happens that discrepancies occur in the characteristics and description of terrorism as part of activities undertaken in the same country. Terrorism is defined differently in the US Department and in the documents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Jongman and Schmid, 1988).

One of the first international definitions of terrorism was included in the League of Nations Convention of 1937, which defined "terrorism" as criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public. Events and acts of terrorism caused the evolution of this concept and in 1992 the United Nations

defined terrorism as: peacetime equivalents of war crimes (acts including elements of war). Then, in 1999, the UN Security Council (in Resolution 1269) determined that all acts, methods and practices, wherever and whenever committed, in particular those which could threaten international peace and security, as acts of terrorism. Again, in 2018, *United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime* (UNODC) described terrorism as using coercive methods or threats to violence and aggression in order to spread fear and thereby achieve political or ideological goals (UNODC, 2018, p. 1).

If we refer to contemporary or uniform French definitions of terrorism, we will find definitions of crimes against human life and health in violation of law (national or international). This means a distinction between: attacks on civilians and military men (by definition, victims of terrorism can only be civilians), the place of attack (the region where the war is taking place or, for example, a European country which is not involved in an armed conflict) and a political objective (the intention is to influence the state policy or change it by terrorizing the civilian population) (Derrida, 2004, p. 16).

Terrorism also means the use of violence by some political organizations to achieve their goals, such as: putting pressure on the government, forcing people to obey, forcing money grants, promoting their ideologies. Terrorism can take a form of assassinations, murders, kidnapping, sabotage, blackmail, acts, threats, etc. In addition to direct victims, who often are civilians, terrorism tries to influence the public opinion to frighten and create the atmosphere of terror and fear (Bauer and Soulez, 2014).

In his work, S. Zelinsky (2000, vol. 19, pp. 160-165) tries to determine the essence of contemporary terrorism by drawing attention to the fact that throughout the history of the existence of this social phenomenon, its contents and form of manifestation have undergone significant changes. Although the essence has remained the same - the use of extreme violence or threats of violence to achieve political, religious or ideological goals, the main motive for terrorism is the criminal, international intimidation of state authorities, general public or minorities.

International terrorism was defined by L. Modzorian, who stressed that it occurs only when one of the following four conditions is met:

- a. The terrorist or his victims must come from different states or be in the territory of a third state.
- b. A terrorist attack is carried out against persons who are protected under international law.
- c. Preparations for a terrorist attack is carried out in one state, and the attack itself is committed in another state.
- d. After the terrorist attack, the perpetrator hides in another state than the state where he committed the attack (the border is crossed) (Tymkiv, 2009, p. 63).

The way of defining terrorism by Russia seems extremely important from the point of view of terrorism in Ukraine and the interference on the part of Russia. According to the Russian definition, terrorism means a threat or an act of violence against individuals and organizations, committed by means of destruction (including damage) of property or assets, as well as by means of activities which may cause death.

The Russian government has also stated that organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah are not terrorist organizations, due to the fact that:

- They do not conduct activities which is aimed at changing the constitutional state system, through the use of terrorist methods.
- They have no connection with extremist organizations from the North Caucasus (Wojciechowski, 2009, pp. 56-57).

The only common feature which can put them at the same level as Al-Qaeda (according to the Russian definition, this is a terrorist organization) is their recognition by international communities as terrorist organizations or having relations with such organizations. Nevertheless, the two organizations still do not appear in the Russian list because they do not meet the first two requirements.

### 3. Terrorism in France

According to the *Global Index of Terrorism*, in 2018, the French Republic was in the 30th place in the world (in 2017, in the 23rd position) and third in Europe, in terms of impact and terrorist activity in its territory (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018, p. 8). In 1972 - 2016, 165 terrorist attacks were carried out in France, in which 492 people were killed (Alcantara, 2017, p. 12). In 2018, in three attacks (this is how many attacks were classified as terrorist attacks by the French government), in Carcassonne, Paris and Strasbourg, 12 people were killed and 30 were injured.

In the French Republic, no-one ignores the terrorist attacks which occurred in recent years. The country located in Western Europe is now one of the main goals of the jihadist violence which broke out in the Middle East. The defeat of the French troops in Syria and Iraq with ISIS (L'État islamique) and the presence of several thousand soldiers in the territories of countries covered by the war pose an additional threat in the form of continuous maintenance of the military units on standby. The President of the Republic and the appointed government are responsible for protecting the French people, which is why they passed a new anti-terrorist act. Its regulations are the last bastion in the fight against an unspecified enemy, namely terrorists.

The war with terrorism is one of the main goals of the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, during his five-year term. In order to implement the measures, he decided to increase the budget of the Ministry of the Interior by 7% in 2018 to combat terrorism (SudOuest, 2017). The flagship action under the new law is to secure and protect the borders in order to ensure the security of citizens.

Security specialists look for the causes of terrorist attacks committed in the territory of the French Republic all over the world. The issue which is discussed most often is the actions taken by the French army in the territory of Africa (Ndiaye, 2010, pp. 95-100). There is a lot of contradictory information regarding the method of conducting the fight and co-operation with former colonies which wanted to gain independence. The government of Rwanda talks openly about the genocide, rape and hiding of war criminals by the French troops (Portal Spraw Zagranicznych, 2017). The military movements of the French in Algeria are also described negatively (*Sensacje XX wieku*, 1983).

The last 10 years in the French Republic clearly show that the security forces have been unable to cope with the growing number of acts of terror. The new law combating terrorism is supposed to be a step forward in the fight against this

unidentified enemy. The key is to investigate the causes and conditions which occurred in the context of past attacks. This should be the basis for the operational activities undertaken in the future. The radicalization of the attackers follows a similar pattern. Both in terms of their ethno-social profile and personal history (Kepel, 2017, pp. 249-253).

### **3.1. The anti-terrorist law in the French Republic**

The adoption of Act No. 2017-1510 of 30 October 2017 on the *Strengthening of internal security and combating terrorism* is a result of many years of struggle against terrorist threats in France and in the world. An analysis of the undertaken actions and failures of the security systems entailed a necessity of a strong reaction in the form of legal regulations which would define the tasks and responsibilities of individual entities. The main cause of the implication of the Act was the prolonged state of emergency which was in force since 13 November 2015 (Clavel, 2017). The new law was to form the basis for the organization of anti-terrorist activities and a certain type of a guideline to fight terrorism, both for the government and for the security forces. We can expect the effects and results of the enacted law in 2020, when the National Assembly will conduct another review of its assumptions. Currently, this is only an introduction to a long-term battle with attackers and unidentified terrorist threats.

The proper application of the provisions of the Act is crucial for the correct functioning of the security authorities which are responsible for ensuring the security of citizens. Although many of the provisions of the Act maintain the state of emergency, the latest regulations totally change the method and system of combating terrorism in the French Republic. The present functioning of the state authorities will offer a wider scope of jurisdiction over the suspects and will secure potentially sensitive points throughout the country. Measures undertaken under the Act will require increased co-operation combined with acceptance of new security conditions by various communities in the country. The most important of the provisions of *Loi antiterroriste* (the Anti-Terrorist Act):

#### **The scope of protection**

Protecting places or events which may be exposed to terrorist threats, under the supervision of prefects (defence and security personnel delegated by designated departments) who will implement measures to control and verify identity of persons entering a designated area. The necessary activities will be carried out with the help of private security agents or municipal police officers. The Act gives authority to prefects to verify the identity and filtrate people before they enter the designated area (SudOuest, 2017).

#### **Closing places of worship**

Delegated prefects (the Act authorizes the representatives of the state in this regard) (Le Monde, 2017) have the power to close the places of worship by taking administrative measures if, within the framework of spreading faith in a given location, they support acts of terrorism or terrorist propaganda. The motives of such actions will be justified on the basis of "letters", "documents", "statements", but also based on the ideas and theories which are propagated by people supervising

the temples in order to support terrorism. The Senate decided that these are “ideas and theories” referring to the concepts of “undefined outlines”.

The closure procedure will last 48 hours during which the representative of the place of worship may appeal to an administrative court which will decide the matter before the authorities undertake the right actions. The closure period may last a maximum of 6 months and the penalty for trespassing is EUR 45,000 (Rescan, 2017)

### **Individual claim - no more home-only arrest**

People whose actions are related to terrorism or its proclamation will have to stay within the commune (during the state of emergency they had to stay at home) so that they can have normal professional and family life. They will be obliged to report to the Police on a daily basis (before it was 3 times a day) and their situation will be reviewed every 3 months. Defendants must provide all the telephone numbers they use and the identifiers which they use to communicate (including social media). The inspection period is to last a minimum of 3 months, with a possibility of being extended for up to a year. In the event of a suspicion of escape or non-compliance, this form of limitation of freedom may be combined with the obligation to wear an electronic bracelet. In September 2017, 39 people were subjected to this form of arrest (France 24, 2017).

### **Searches and confiscations**

Prefects and delegated persons who obtain an order from a judge of the Supreme Court in Paris (*Tribunal de grande instance de Paris*) may search the premises, place of residence, organization or company. A person subjected to the search may be detained for 4 hours. Searches may not be carried out at the offices of lawyers, judges and journalists. Such activities are to be taken regularly until 2020 and they will be analysed by the parliament on an ongoing basis.

### **Radicalization**

The fight against radicalization, which does not exist in the state of emergency, is a novelty in the Act. An official (officer) carrying out his mission or performing his occupation connected with security and defence may be transferred or even dismissed if, as a result of an administrative inquiry, he expresses a tendency to radicalization. The procedure will also apply to military officers.

The Parliament also introduced a new sanction to punish parents who encourage their children to commit acts of terrorism or to go abroad for this purpose (Rescan, 2017). The establishment of a new offence which entails a penalty of 15 years imprisonment, a fine of EUR 225,000 for parents and the possibility of being deprived of parental rights is a precedent on a European scale (Gouvernement de la République française, 2017).

### **Passenger details**

The Anti-Terrorist Act allows security forces to use airline passengers' data and data of those travelling by sea (the data entered during registration and in the process of boarding will be directly transmitted to the security forces which will require specific information to prevent acts of terrorism).

### Monitoring techniques

The draft law sets out a new legal framework introducing wireless surveillance which was banned by the Constitutional Council on 21 October 2016. Currently, its application is extended until 2020, using IT algorithms in communication networks, the so-called black boxes (*boîtes noires*). The purpose is to detect connections which may be related to terrorist threats, by transmitting certain data and information (Compagnon, 2017).

### Border control

The Schengen Agreement allows for a six-hour identity check within the 20-kilometre zone along internal borders, as well as in ports, airports and railway and road stations open to international traffic. The new Act extends the duration of such checks to twelve hours, it extends the 20-kilometre control zone to the external border crossings and the jurisdiction of security forces in the areas of railway stations, airports and ports also to a radius of 20-kilometre (Ouest-France, 2017). It is also a measure which should prove effective in the fight against illegal immigration (Rescan, 2017).

The French Minister of the Interior expressed his view on the adoption of a new resolution: the Act strengthens the internal security and combats terrorism. Its adoption by the National Assembly was very important for the Republic. Strong measures and new tools to deal with this prevailing threat will help to offer better protection to the French people (Collomb, 2017, tweeted message).

Terrorism, as a constantly recurring phenomenon, continues to evolve. Its changes and asymmetries are unpredictable due to a number of circumstances surrounding it. The determining factor is constituted by the motivations and ideas of attackers which, due to dynamic political and economic changes, are constantly modified. Nowadays, religious fanaticism dominates, which is the basis for the majority of terrorist activities. It is connected with the so-called home-grown terrorism which involves people having citizenship, families and enterprises in a country where terrorist attacks take place (Adamska-Rękawek, 2016, p. 10). An excellent example can be the attack in France where, on 23 March 2018, in Carcassonne, in the south of the country, a terrorist killed 4 people and seriously injured another 15 people (Mareschal and Piquet, 2018), even though he had the citizenship of the Republic and lived there permanently (Reuters, 2018).

### 4. Terrorism in Ukraine

According to the *Global Terrorism Index*, in 2018, Ukraine ranked 21st in the world and the first in Europe in terms of the impact of terrorism on the functioning of the state. A year earlier it was in the 17th place. Terrorism is still developing in the country, considering the lack of prospects to stop the conflict with the Russian Federation and the continued increased migration from the Balkans and the Middle East (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018, p. 8).

In 1991-2016, in Ukraine, 202 terrorist attacks were committed, in which a total of 1,092 people were killed. The most lethal attack was shooting down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, where 298 people died. The presented number of attacks is due to the fact that only they were recognized as "terrorist" by the international community and they do not refer directly to the ongoing armed conflict with the

Russian Federation (Alcantara, 2017, p.10). The last terrorist attack was carried out by Vladislav Roslavov on 17 October 2018, using explosives and weapons on college students in Crimea. As a result, 21 people died and 78 were injured (Hodge, et al., 2018).

Ukraine is currently in a very complicated situation, between the East and the West fighting for their influence. Its main goal should be to focus on its internal policy and stabilize the situation. Only such action will allow it to efficiently implement pro-state activities and possibly prompt integration with Europe. Its choices should be focused on the highest possible security guarantee which is currently offered by the North Atlantic Alliance and orientation towards the West of Europe.

The main causes of the arising of terrorism and its development in Ukraine are not the same. Their interpretation differs between academic circles, organizations acting for the security and theoreticians (their perspectives and the purpose of their research) who undertake to tackle this subject, and depends on the way in which the concept of terrorism is defined. Based on the analysis of sources, the most appropriate approach to adopt seems to be a reference to internal factors which, for several dozens of years, have contributed to a negative situation in the state security policy, and focus on the dynamically-changing circumstances in the international environment, which currently have a significant impact on the destabilization and disintegration of Ukraine.

Sources of development of the Ukrainian terrorism (defined as terrorism occurring in the territory of Ukraine):

- Political imbalance - a crisis of the state authorities, a dysfunctional institutional and legal apparatus, the lack of equality in various types of groups (social, religious, national, oppositional), the growth of corruption, the lack of investments in culture and the lack of honesty in taking economic decisions important for the state.
- Continuous presence of military forces from another country (the Russian Federation) which strongly affects the functioning of the state and constitutes a threat to national security. Additional military operations and the lack of agreement entailed, *inter alia*, the introduction of martial law in Ukraine for a month, as announced by the Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, on 26 November 2018 at 2:00 p.m., after the Russian troops shot and seized three Ukrainian ships and detained 24 mariners in the Azov Sea (Darden and Way, 2018). Such a course of events may lead to the undertaking of terrorist attacks both by pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian terrorists. Although their goal may be to change political decisions (against Ukraine or Russia), nevertheless one of the groups may become extremist and attack another country (e.g. neighbouring Poland) or try to achieve its goals through attacks on civilians.
- The lack of adequate protection and security in the context of maintaining and development of sites of strategic importance for the state. According to experts, nuclear and water power plants, chemical and pharmaceutical industry buildings, toxin dumping sites, warehouses where the weapons of the Ministry of Defence are kept and other buildings which are important in view of the state security are not adequately protected and may be exposed to a terrorist attack in order to take over power or terrorize the

government.

- Deepening of differences and intensification of religious and ethnic conflicts. This may lead to terrorist actions by one of the groups (Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Moldovans, Russians, Belarussians or Albanians).
- Ineffective information policy throughout the country. Information which is transmitted by the media and the government does not reach all citizens, and many areas (e.g. the Internet) are exposed to misinformation. Websites are also regularly attacked by cyber-terrorists (Farmer, 2018). Disinformation activities (e.g. fake news, i.e. false stories which seem to be news, circulated on the Internet or in other media, usually created to influence political views or as a joke) may be propagated by supporters of co-operation with Eastern Europe, but, what is very important, also with Western Europe. It happens that some of the states are unjustly accused, which leads to further conflicts (Tymkiv, 2009, pp. 72-73).

According to estimates of the Ukrainian authorities, illegal armed groups in Donbas currently have about 33,000 fighters in their ranks, 60% of whom are Russian citizens. According to the government of Ukraine, they were armed and trained by Russia and were given more than 368 tanks, 940 combat armoured vehicles and 375 artillery. According to Ukrainian experts, these numbers do not include even more Russian soldiers, with full arms, who are present in Eastern Ukraine (Ukraine, 2015, statement).

On 27 January 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine - the Ukrainian parliament - adopted a decree which contains a call addressed to the UN, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, NATO, the OSCE, national parliaments and other international organizations to recognize that: the Russian Federation is an aggressor against Ukraine. The decree was adopted. At that time, Ukraine hoped that the international community would react responsibly to its call. It also called on the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (Anti-Terrorism Committee - an auxiliary United Nations structure responsible for international security, established on 28 September 2001 based on Resolution 1373, in connection with terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in the United States (UN Resolution 1373, 2001) to immediately carry out an in-depth analysis of the acts of Russian terrorist fighters which fuel the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and make recommendations on how to counteract and combat such threats through the collective effort of international organizations. Ukraine also appealed to Russia on the international forum to stop recruiting terrorist fighters and sending them to Ukraine (Ukraine, 2015, statement).

#### **4.1 Terrorism from the Balkans**

Although the phenomenon of foreign fighters is certainly not new, the recent events in Syria and Iraq have brought this issue back to the surface of the security policy pursued by the European Union. The Western Balkans region, including Ukraine, is no exception as far as this trend is concerned. The violent extremism in this region is seen through the prism of Islamic radicalization of foreign fighters and the ongoing conflict with Russia. The terrorists present in Ukraine come from ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq) or Jabhat an-Nusra (Victory Front of the People of the Levant, also Front an-Nusra in Syria), from the right-wing fractions of both Ukrainian

and Russian nationalism, and the same name is also used for pro-Russian fighters operating in the east of Ukraine (Beslin and Ignjatijeic, 2017, pp. 1-2).

With the escalation of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and then terrorism around the world, the Balkan states supported international efforts aimed to solve the problem of foreign fighters. According to the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 adopted in 2014, all Balkan states changed their criminal laws to prohibit foreign fighting. Kosovo adopted a completely new law regulating this issue, while other countries added new provisions to their existing criminal codes. Penalties vary from 6 months to 15 years in prison for the support of terrorism in a wide sense of the word: fighting in foreign wars, travelling to war zones, recruiting fighters or providing financial support to terrorist groups (Beslin and Ignjatijeic, 2017, p. 3).

Terrorism in Ukraine is a multi-faceted and complex threat which requires a comprehensive response at the regional, national and international level. The activity of international organizations making efforts to maintain security in the world, co-operation in the field of humanitarian aid for people in the areas where war and terrorist activities are carried out, and the will of the Russian Federation to act in pursuance of the cause will provide for a re-analysis of the problem and quick resolution of the conflict which currently constitutes a global threat.

### **5. Co-Operation of France with Ukraine under International Organizations**

The French Republic, as part of co-operation aimed at the prevention of intensification of the conflict in Ukraine, got involved in international activities. On 6 June 2014, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine met at the event commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Allied forces landing in Normandy. At that time, the Normandy four (EN: Normandy format, as used for the first time by Rahma Sophia Rachdi, a correspondent of the United States Press Agency, FR: Format Normandie - the first meeting was held in the French Republic, hence the French name) was brought to life, also known as the Normandy contact group. The group's working task is the diplomatic settlement of the conflict in Donbas, which is why Russia and Ukraine were associated as the two fighting parties, as well as Germany and France. *Ad hoc* actions are mainly carried out by means of telephone conferences between the leaders or, in their absence, between relevant foreign ministers. The Normandy Format sometimes extends its co-operation by working with Italy and the United Kingdom.

The United States highly appreciated the efforts of France and Germany under the Normandy Format which were aimed to implement agreements concerning the conflict in Ukraine. According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Russia continues to obstruct the peace process and prevents international talks. . The OSCE called on Russia to engage in serious talks on how to end the conflict, improve security and humanitarian conditions for the local population, as well as how to implement the arrangements agreed during the previous meetings of the group (Macris, 2018).

The actions of the French Republic in the context of the conflict in Ukraine were very limited. As an active player in NATO, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a leading country in the activities of the European Union, France has the competence to take on more decisive action. So far, its

involvement was the same as that undertaken by international organizations it belongs to. In principle, none of the Western European countries undertook any support activities towards Ukraine because this would involve opposing Russia.

The international community has witnessed numerous terrorist acts in eastern Ukraine, in particular the murdering and keeping of hostages, despite the Normandy Format agreements regarding a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Over 8,000 civilians lost their lives as a result of terrorist activities in the East of Ukraine.

## **6. Terrorist Threats for Europe**

Nowadays, the number of terrorist organizations and smaller groups that fight for a possibility of joining the biggest players is constantly changing. They compete with one another, devouring one another (often in a brutal way) or merging in the name of achieving a higher goal. Al-Qaeda, for example, has several factions, such as: Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in West Africa, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ash-Shabab operating mainly in Somalia (but also in Ethiopia and Djibouti) and recently the most active force, Jabhat an-Nusra (Victory Front of the People of the Levant), established in 2011 in Syria. Competition between terrorist organizations is a daily practice. Each next occupied city offers a chance to raise funds, appropriate new territories and recruit new people for military operations. In the fight against the authorities of the country or other countries of foreign alliances, these are invaluable assets that determine the future existence of the group. Domination may only be temporary, depending on the forces and facilities a given group has on its disposal. Often, despite similar goals, common ideology, the same fighting methods, ISIS and Al-Qaeda will compete with each other. Al-Qaeda believes that the immediate goal is to defeat the main enemy of Islam: America. Then they hope to be able to create a caliphate. ISIS needs physical, political and religious power to maintain, expand and develop its territory in order to attract new followers who will fight in Europe. This may be connected with terrorism in Ukraine, which leads to the expansion of terrorism into the territories of eastern and central Europe. Although pro-Russian militants are currently fighting for the east of Ukraine, their plans may change and focus on the countries of the European Union. Then terrorism from France will meet terrorism from Ukraine and the Balkans. Currently, the plans of the largest terrorist organizations in the world are different, but if they combine their forces, it may turn out that the whole world will struggle with a terrorist "supergroup" (Johnson, 2018).

If terrorist activities are carried out in one of the Member States of the European Union, it is obvious that they can also be undertaken in the neighbouring state. If we want effective defence to be in place within the framework of international co-operation, this will be mainly connected with additional costs and compromises. The security policies of European states are different, even if they are, to some extent, consistent with EU guidelines. Procedural solutions and competences of the judiciary form the basis for undertaking co-operation aimed at combating terrorism. Differences in the perception of problems may also constitute a barrier in operational contacts. The action procedure must be centralized and the costs and tasks must be divided evenly among the members of the community. The main reason for taking such actions is the intention to defend and maintain security. A system must be designed to establish and define co-operation for international

movement of persons, which is in force in the EU, ensuring free movement of capital, people and goods (Bergkamp, et al., 2015, pp. 325-326).

A country which is exposed to terrorism due to various reasons may be a target for extremist organizations, for example: because of participation in NATO missions, being a neighbour of an attacked country, the pursuit of the anti-migration policy by its government. An example of such a state may be the Republic of Poland, whose current policy, alliances and geographical location are conducive to terrorist activity. Due to the contemporary threats and unrestrained global development, we can distinguish potential determinants which may affect the activation of terrorist communities in Europe:

- An increase in the number of followers of religion which encourages its believers to suicide in the name of faith.
- Radicalization which takes place in prisons. Despite isolation from the society, indoctrination takes place in penitentiary institutions, carried out by other prisoners.
- Operational activity of members of terrorist organizations who have already penetrated the country.
- The lack of proper application and use of street cameras. Both in Belgium (attack on the Brussels airport), France (the attack next to the Stade de France) and the USA (Boston marathon) terrorists were captured thanks to the cameras.
- Easiness of online communication between supporters of terrorism, growing recruitment on the web, and sharing instructions on how to construct home-made bombs.
- The influence of the ideology of the largest terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda, which can boast successes (attacks) in the most developed countries in the world. In this way, they encourage others to support their philosophy.
- Threats resulting from cyber-terrorism and recurring data leaks.
- The lack of proper analysis of analogies and connections which occur between terrorist attacks in various regions of the world.
- Intensified activities aimed at recruitment to terrorist organizations, especially in poor countries with high unemployment. Members of groups are offered remuneration which guarantees them a chance to survive (get by).
- Recruitment conducted in countries which are directly attacked by their own residents who have obtained citizenship of that country. They are children of immigrants who arrived several years before. Such terrorism may now be encountered in the territory of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA and Canada.
- Infiltration to terrorist organizations from neighbouring countries.
- Invitations for terrorist training in Africa and the Middle East.
- Identifying and disseminating information about one of the powers (e.g. the USA, France or Russia), describing them as a global aggressor and the cause of escalation of international armed conflicts. The main tool of terrorists is the mass media, through which they encourage aggression and violence by means of individual attacks.




Fig. 1. Awareness in the perspective of terrorist threats (source: own study)

As rightly noticed by Kacper Rękawek in his book *Człowiek z małą bombą - o terroryźmie i terrorystach* (A Man with a Small Bomb - about Terrorism and Terrorists, 2017, pp. 181-185), Poland is used as a transit (transitional) country for terrorist activities undertaken abroad. Currently, Ukraine is the main destination. According to the information obtained by the researcher, many terrorists, for instance from Finland, Sweden and Chechnya, used Poland to get to the East of Europe. The greater the number of trips of soldiers / terrorists to Ukraine, the greater the number of returns and subsequent actions undertaken in the country of their residence in Europe. Many of the separatists participating in the Donbas conflict and their opponents, such as pro-Ukrainian soldiers from the "Azov" Regiment (Українська правда, 2018), come from France, Norway and the Middle East. From the point of view of the internal security, this is a certain type of threat which will become apparent in a few years, through the activation of the terrorist communities returning from Ukraine. The result of the war in the east will not matter in this regard. Fighters will engage in further actions (wars) in order to achieve their goals and satisfy their demands. However, this time, the activation of terrorist and nationalistic communities may take place in the territory of Central and Eastern European countries.

The contemporary co-operation of international forces in the fight against terrorism (or rather the results of this co-operation) does not put the methods

and means used to arrest terrorists in a good light. Despite the enactment of many international normative acts, security strategies and the appointment of international police-type organizations, this co-operation should still be described as inconsistent. Although it is required for the proper functioning of the security system in each of the individual states involved in the activities for the fight and stopping of terrorism, there is still a lack of a comprehensive frame of action. Today's activities are more theoretical than practical. The lack of proper co-ordination at the national level prevents the development of the security structures at the international level. This is very apparent in the present operation of the European Union in the context of maintaining security within the community. This process has not changed since 1990s, when the French analyst of terrorism, S. Vérine (1986, p. 977), described the international activity for the fight against terrorism as "chaotic".

## 7. Conclusion

Really speaking, the fight against terrorism at the international level is the "first line of defence" and a "hope for long-term success". The struggle with threats within the framework of interstate co-operation requires the development of a pragmatic approach to the definition of terrorism. The balance between commitment to anti-terrorist activities and the freedom of citizens is a huge challenge for state governments, not only in the field of national defence, but also on the international scale. The concept of security and the fight against terrorism must be transparent and firm. The use of the term "terrorist threats" in political debates or by the mass media is the avoidance of responsibility which should rest on the organizations appointed to take practical steps. Only active and prudent actions will guarantee an appropriate organizational division in the security sector. If undertaken actions are too categorical, this may cause the system in the state turn into a totalitarian regime or it may violate human rights. Security management should define forces and measures, as well as determine the potential risks and consequences in the course of undertaken actions. Bilateral co-operation which should be aimed at an increase of security in both countries, may not be imposed. It must be negotiated. Its effectiveness is based on national strength and strategy within the framework of the established anti-terrorism concept, and not on the number of officers. Therefore, good bilateral co-operation will be based on appropriate operational preparation. Undertaking joint actions will create a wall against terrorism, which will be a barrier even in the event of unexpected and extreme circumstances. Terrorism must be discredited as a method of action, but it is unreasonable to neglect its force, which is no smaller than the force of other forms of violence, such as an armed conflict.

As long as the situation in Ukraine continues and terrorists carry out their actions, this conflict will pose a serious threat to international security. Regardless of the outcome of this rivalry (between Russia and Ukraine, as well as other countries in the background), the terrorists who take part in these battles may, once they are done with them, become active in the territories of other states. Their actions may be fuelled by their own views and demands or they may be bribed to destabilize others. An analysis of the above topics may indicate that this is certainly the longest conflict in the history of international terrorism in the 21st century.

Terrorist attacks in the French Republic and Ukraine, in connection with the continuous migration within the continent, may take place in other European



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# **A HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM**

**Sulaiman Ahmed**

The recent suicide bombing and terrorist atrocities which took a place in Manchester and London have once again provoked many of the wrong kinds of questions about Islam. Muslims find themselves besieged by an increasingly emboldened right-wing media. Regretfully, many scholars did give permission for suicide bombing and this ideology can be found amongst certain elements throughout Islamic history. The ideology of the proponents of extremism will be explored and compared to the position of classical scholars who rejected the notion that terrorism was permissible. The paper will explore the Quranic position on killing civilians, then move onto the analysis of the text of hadith and the hermeneutical approach of scholars towards these texts. The Islamic position of suicide will be presented and then we will analyse classical Islamic legal texts in relation to suicide bombing, presenting those 'scholars' who supported it and those who vehemently wrote against it. Nevertheless, there are groups in current times that support terrorism, and this is not a new phenomenon, the blueprints of this ideology can be traced back throughout Islamic history, where some who held this position were relegated to the fringes of Islamic scholarship, but in other instances they were supported by those in positions of influence whether this was political or religious influence.



# PERCEPTIONS OF 9/11 AMONG COLLEGE AGED STUDENTS; 2017-2019

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## **Abstract**

As Millennials have aged out of experiencing 9/11 in the US and having tangible memories of the attack, a natural skepticism has grown surrounding the details of the event. The purpose of this survey was to understand perceptions of young adults (N=297) as they comprehend or remember the events of 9/11. This survey seeks to understand Millennials' current perceptions of the events as they occurred. Independent variables include: members of family in the military, citizenship, education, and age at time of event. Dependent variables explore perceptions of why the event occurred, who perpetrated the event, the involvement of the U.S. government, and truth and trust of media reporting. This is the first two years of a ten year study. All survey respondents were between the ages of 20 and 22 at the time the survey was administered. Preliminary results indicate that a majority of respondents have inaccurate perceptions of the event and exhibit high distrust of the US Governments' role in 9/11.

## **Distrust of Institutions**

Current literature and research reveals that Millennials express low levels of confidence in nearly every American institution (Economic Innovation Group, 2016). Millennials are born between the years of 1981 and 1996, with the youngest Millennials currently in their teen years, and the oldest in their early 30's. (Mitchell, 2015).

Specifically, the report finds, “Corporate America, Governors, and the news media inspire the lowest levels of confidence, with only one-fifth of Millennials placing a lot or a great deal of stock in them.” Of the 1200 Millennials polled, they responded as having the least amount of confidence (defined as “some or “very little”) in: *the Federal Government* (72%), *News Media* (73%), *Governors* (72%) and *Corporate America* (72%) (Economic Innovation Group, 2016). Interestingly, colleges, universities and the military are the only institutions that garner the confidence of the majority of Millennials (Economic Innovation Group, 2016). Millennials distrust of US government is shown in a Harvard study that asked young Americans (18-29 years old) how confident they were in the US judicial system (Politics, 2016). Distrust in the US judicial system was at 49%; more specially, 35% said they had “*not much confidence*” and 14% reported they had “*no confidence*” whatsoever.

### **Influence of Social Media**

One of the most striking differences between Millennials and older generations is that Millennials officially get more news from social media than watching or reading actual news outlets. A Pew Research Center study noted that 61% of respondents receive their news from Facebook and only 37% receive their news from traditional news sources such as television programming and online newspapers (Mitchell, 2015). This is in stark contrast to previous generations who utilize social media significantly less, with only 39% of Baby Boomers (those born after World War II) utilizing Facebook as a news source (Miller, 2015).

This use of social media as a primary source for information can be fraught with problems including low accountability of journalists and publications, a lack of fact based relevance, and possible influence peddling (Shearer, 2017). Social media is conversely aware of the influence it can have on its audience. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, the top three social media platforms have experienced a 15% increase in market influence between 2016 and 2017 (Shearer, 2017).

Research also indicates Millennials are expressing unprecedented levels of social distrust. When asked, “*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people,*” only 19% of Millennials say most people can be trusted, compared with 40% of Baby-Boomers (Foundation, 2014). Millennials comfort with disbelief of facts related to the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 can be partially explained by distrust in government and mainstream media reporting, combined with an increased acceptance of conspiracy theories.

### **Conspiracy Theories**

Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) define conspiracy theories as, “an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role”. Similarly, Uscinski and Parent define a conspiracy as a “secret arrangement between two or more actors to usurp political or economic power, violate established rights, hoard vital secrets, or unlawfully alter government institutions . . . A key point is that conspiracies speak to actual events that have occurred or are occurring” (Uscinski, 2014).

Recent polls show that conspiratorial beliefs are not only common, but that most Americans believe in one conspiracy theory or another (Miller, 2015).

Conspiracy theories surrounding 9/11 are prevalent, and, "... given the advances in information technology and social media, as well as individuals' tendencies to sort themselves into attitude-consistent silos, even ideas with little basis in fact have the potential to quickly spread unchecked" (Miller, 2015). Uscinski writes, "Many scholars have suggested that beliefs in specific conspiracy theories are the product of an underlying predisposition toward viewing events and circumstances as the product of conspiracy" (Uscinski, 2016).

Of note, "Those who subscribe to conspiracy theories may create serious risks, including risks of violence" and the "existence of such theories raises significant challenges for policy and law" (Sunstein, 2009) Perceptions of 9/11 events, and the prevalence of alternate theories, could influence future security environments.

### **Hypothesis**

The researchers in this study are embedded in a millennial rich environment while working on a large University campus with a diverse student population. The lead research is a terrorism expert with over 20 years of teaching in the field. Although it has been almost 20 years since the attacks, researchers, writers, filmmakers, and students seem to have taken more interest in the events that took place. This past year, was the first year that students who turned 18 had not been alive for 9/11 and the researchers considered how this could impact the perception of those events.

The following hypotheses were formulated from the current literature and the lead researchers' expertise in the field and guided the design of the study:

H1: A majority of college age students believe the US government was involved in the 9/11 attacks in some way

H2: College age students that have served in the military will believe the US government had no knowledge of the 9/11 attacks

H3: Male students are more likely to distrust current facts surrounding the events of 9/11

H4: Female Students will be more likely to pick the number of deaths as reported

H5: Over time, age is going to influence the perceived role of the US government

H6: Over time, age is going to influence perception of perpetrators

### **Methodology**

The "Perceptions of 9/11" survey is administered anonymously on the first day of a large seminar class titled "Introduction to Terrorism". Approximately 100 students each semester will complete the survey over the course of 10 years. The results in this paper are from the first year and a half years, or three semesters, of data, with N=297.

### **Independent Variables**

#### *Ethnicity*

The independent variables were meant to provide a baseline, but also attempted to distinguish differences in a relatively homogenous population. In any given semester, minorities (any ethnicity other than Caucasian) present as less than 5% of the entire class. While ethnocentricities are not currently surveyed in the independent variables, this is a possible modification for future studies and is

important to note before presenting results.

#### *Age of Respondents*

This longitudinal survey captures the age of the respondent at the time of the survey, and the age of the respondent during 9/11, resulting in will provide both stagnant and variable data. Age at time of survey will likely remain constant over time as most college age students are between 18-22 years of age. Currently the average age of all respondents is 21 year of age at the time of the survey.

Eventually, age at time of 9/11 will move from a positive to a null number. In a few years, college age students will not yet have been born when the 9/11 event occurred. The average age of the respondents during the 9/11 event is 4.5 years of age, suggesting a limited observational ability. It can be reasonably assumed age 4.5 was too young to have full situational awareness during the 9/11 event.

#### *Gender of Respondents*

Gender was coded in as male, female, and other. Of the N=297 respondents 140 identified as male, 152 identified as female, 1 identified as other, and 4 declined to answer the questions. Of the respondents who chose to identify their gender in a binary manner (either male or female) 48% were male and 52% were female, representing a balanced split.

#### *College Level of Students*

This survey was administered to an upper level undergraduate course, coded at the 4000 level, the highest level in the undergraduate suite of classes. Florida State University, when the class and survey were administered, is a very large, public university in the southeastern United States. Total undergraduate enrollment as of Spring 2019 at FSU is 31,257. The independent variable that asked for years in college yielded a range of answers from 0.5 to 5, with the average years in college calculated at 2.9. Since this survey was administered in an upper division course this average seems appropriately reflective of the experience of the respondents.

#### **Dependent variables**

The survey tool allowed the respondents to mark multiple answers, allowing them to pick more than one chose in each of the dependent variable areas. The first category of dependent variable asked the respondents about who they believed perpetrated 9/11. They were able to choose multiple options including "Terrorists", "The US Government", "Foreign Governments", or "Other". These variables were coded as 9/11 Perp-Ter, 9/11 Perp-US Gov, 9/11 Perp-Foreign Gov, 9/11 Perp-Other.

The second category of dependent variable examined the reason 9/11 happened. Respondents were allowed to select multiple options including "Terrorists wanted to Target America", "the President Needed an Excuse to go to war", "The president wanted to re-elected", and "Other". These variables were coded as 9/11 Due to: Terrorists, 9/11 Due to: War Excuse, 9/11 Due to: Reelection, 9/11 Due to: Other.

The third category of dependent variables sought to examine perceptions of deaths in 9/11. The respondents were asked if they believed the deaths were "As was reported by the US government", "Higher than was reported", "Lower than was

reported", "Zero Deaths", or "Other". These variables were coded as 9/11 Deaths: Reported-USGovt, 9/11 Deaths: Higher, 9/11 Deaths: Lower, 9/11 Deaths: Zero, 9/11 Deaths: Other.

The fourth category of dependent variables sought to understand the role the US government played in 9/11, as understood by the respondents. The survey asked if the US Government had, "No prior knowledge", "Some prior knowledge", "Some prior knowledge, but did nothing", "Some prior knowledge and encouraged it", "The US Government perpetrated 9/11", and "Not sure". These variables were coded as, U.S. Govt- No Prior Knowledge, U.S. Govt- Some Prior Knowledge, U.S. Govt-Prior Knowledge/Did Nothing, U.S. Govt-Prior Knowledge/Encouraged It, U.S. Govt-Did 9/11, U.S. Govt-Not Sure

### Results

The first question that truly gets at the heart of any 9/11 conspiracy belief is: "Who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks?" By asking the respondents who was culpable the plan was to identify schisms in perceptions of responsibility.

Table 1 - "I believe the 9/11 event was perpetrated by"

	Perpetrated by terrorists	Perpetrated by US Government	Perpetrated by Foreign Governments	Perpetrated by Other
N=Yes	281	31	37	9
N=No	15	266	260	288
Percentage Yes	94.6%	10.5%	12.45%	3%
Percentage No	5.4%	89.5%	87.55%	97%

(Where N=297 some respondents did not answer or answers were unclear)

This initial question and the results seem in line with mainstream thinking that 9/11 was perpetrated by terrorists. These dependent variables show no statistical significance when measured against any of the independent variables including age, gender, or exposure to service in the military.

The second set of questions gets at motivation by asking why the 9/11 event occurred. The results in Table 2 are in line with mainstream thinking that excludes any internal motivation on the part of US leadership.

Table 2 - "I believe the 9/11 attacks happened because"

	Terrorists wanted to target the US (2a)	The US government needed an excuse to go to war (2b)	The US President at the time wanted to get re-elected (2c)	Other (2d)
N=Yes	258	51	9	19
N=No	39	246	288	278
Percentage Yes	86.8%	17.2%	3%	6%
Percentage No	13.2%	82.8%	97%	94%

Interestingly, while most respondents did not choose the popular conspiracy theory that President Bush wanted to be elected, we do begin to see a possible eschewing of mainstream beliefs in the selection of the “Other” category. Respondents were given an open answer opportunity at the end of the survey, but the open ended answers predominately reflected questions that were already asked. For example, one respondent wrote, *“I believe it was a combination of President Bush wanting to get reelected and foreign terrorists supported by foreign governments. I think they knew about each other.”* When the variables 2b, 2c, and 2d are combined it reveals that 26.2% of the respondents believed there was an internal influencing factor that led to the 9/11 event.

When asked about the number of death attributed to the 9/11 event students were asked to choose one of the following answers. In some cases multiple answers were selection so N=308 for this DV.

Table 3 - “I believe the direct deaths from 9/11 were”

	2,996 people, as was reported	A higher number than was reported	A lower number than was reported	Zero people	Other
N=Yes	154	135	13	0	6
Percentage Yes	50%	44%	4%		2%

Table 3 reveals that respondents have mistrust about the number of death reported, with 44% indicated they believe there were a higher number of deaths than was reported. Of greatest relevance is that 48% of the respondents don't believe the numbers as reported. This may tie back to the research on distrust in the media (Tang, 2014; Miller, 2015). Is it that Millennials distrust the media reporting, that they feel the government was dishonest about the number of deaths, or something else? This is something the researchers want to try and further understand in future surveys.

The fourth category of dependent variables begins to get at the knowledge or participation by the US on the 9/11 event.

Table 4 - “I believe the US government”

	Had no prior knowledge of 9/11 (4a)	Had some prior knowledge of 9/11 (4b)	Had prior knowledge of 9/11 but did nothing about it (4c)	Had prior knowledge of 9/11, and encouraged it (4d)
N=Yes	47	117	79	10
N=No	250	180	218	287
Percentage Yes	15.8%	39.4%	26.6%	3.4%
Percentage No	84.2%	60.6%	73.4%	96.6%

Table 4 – “I believe the US government” continued

(Frequency)	Conducted the 9/11 event (4e)	Not sure (4f)	Other (4g)
N=Yes	10	23	8
N=No	287	274	289
Percentage Yes	3.3%	7.7%	2.6%
Percentage No	96.7%	92.3%	97.4%

Table 4 begins to reveal perceptions of culpability of the part of the US government. 84.2% of the respondents do not believe the US government was unaware that 9/11 was going to happen. However, when asked the reverse, if they believe the US government had some prior knowledge, only 39.4% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. When asked specifically about knowledge of the attacks before they happened, the respondents had even less support for the idea of the government having prior knowledge. What becomes more interesting is when variables are grouped into larger influence categories. When variables 4a(39.4%), 4b(26.6%), 4c(3.4%), and 4d (3.3%) are combined, we see that 72.7% of the respondents believed the US government had some prior knowledge of the 9/11 event.

The results regarding H1: A majority of college age students believe the US government was involved in the 9/11 attacks in some way, were found to be a positive number. Over 70% of the respondents felt the US government had some role in the 9/11 event. The second hypothesis, H2: College age students that have served in the military will believe the US government had no knowledge of the 9/11 attacks was not proven, because the numbers of prior service member in the survey pool was insignificant.

With regard to H3: Male students are more likely to distrust current facts surrounding the events of 9/11 it turns out there is no statistical difference between the perceptions of male versus the perceptions of females. Both genders indicated a high distrust of facts regarding number of dead, and both genders equally believed the US government had played a role in the 9/11 attacks. Females were just as likely to distrust the facts, like number of reported dead, as males, lending no support to H4: Female Students will be more likely to pick the number of deaths as reported.

The two hypotheses that are designed to evaluate change over time cannot yet be evaluated. The longitudinal data required to examine H5: Over time, age is going to influence the perceived role of the US government and H6: Over time, age is going to influence perception of perpetrators.

## Conclusion

As Millennials grow up further away from the events of 9/11, the disbelief of facts surrounding the event are expected to grow. As the study continues, the researchers expect to see more disconnect between the facts that were released and the perception of those facts by the millennial generation (and eventually Gen Z). This preliminary analysis shows that there is valuable analysis that can be done to understand the distrust of government and media by younger generations.

The data aggregated in this paper is only a small sample of what will eventually be a larger pool of responses. Future analysis will evaluate multi collinear probabilities looking for more significant relationships between variables.

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# TERRORIST PLOTS: FICTIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN FRANCE AND SPAIN

ELIZABETH ZAHND

Immediately following the March 22, 2016 nail bombings at the Brussels Airport and Maalbeek metro station in Belgium, Bernard Henri-Lévy (aka BHL) declared, « Charlie c'était un symbole, Bataclan c'était la guerre et Bruxelles c'est la généralisation de la guerre à l'échelle de l'Europe. » / "Charlie was symbolic, Bataclan was war, and Brussels is the expansion of this war to Europe as a whole." BHL's words echoed those of French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, « Nous sommes en guerre » / "We are at war."\*

While a new wave of terrorism has expanded across Europe in the 21st century, responses to such attacks differ from country to country. In sharp contrast to the January 11, 2015 unity march in Paris, during which an estimated crowd of 3.7 million linked arms under banners of "Je suis Charlie" and "Tous Unis," the march that took place in Barcelona on August 26, 2017, following ISIS attacks on Alcanar, Cambrils, and Barcelona, was disrupted by pro-independence demonstrators who booed King Felipe VI and waved Catalan flags along with signs blaming non-Catalan politicians for the attacks.

My presentation will examine how these different reactions to terror play out in a selection of very recent French and Spanish novels. Specifically, I will compare fictional works in French such as *Écoutez nos défaites* (2016) by Laurent Gaudé, *À la fin le silence* (2016) by Laurent Tardieu, and *Terreur* (2017) by Yann Moix to fictional works in Spanish such as *Todo lo que vino después* (2016) by Gabriel Urza, *Patria* (2016) by Fernando Aramburu and *Terroristas Modernos* (2017) by Cristina Morales.\*\* Of particular interest will be how the influence of armed campaigns by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or the Basque Separatist Movement) and Catalonia's pro-independence movement shape contemporary fictional responses to acts of terror in Spain.

Finally, my presentation will include a brief look at how recent literary responses to European terrorism compare to works of fiction written in French, Spanish, and English shortly after 9/11. Specifically, I will discuss the extent to which the geographical shift in terrorism to Europe has affected the portrayal of terrorism in new literature emerging from France and Spain.

\*Lévy quoted from his appearance in "Vivement Dimanche" on France 2, 24 March 2016. Valls, cited in *Le Figaro* 22 March 2016. All translations are mine.

\*\*The list of novels to be included in this study is subject to change.



# RECONCEIVING THE REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS CRITERION

KIERAN MCINERNEY

## Abstract

The Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is widely considered one of six individually necessary and jointly sufficient requirements that must be satisfied for it to be ethically permissible to resort to war. For evaluations of this criterion success is understood to mean successful achievement of one's Just Cause. Modern Just War Theory narrowly defines Just Cause as self-defence or defence of others. Many contemporary just war theorists interpret this to mean mitigating or averting a perceived imminent threat. Such an understanding has generated a problem that has puzzled many just war theorists. Whilst there are clear moral reasons for requiring that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied, the demands of the contemporary understanding of this principle conflict with widespread, robust intuitions.

One case that elicits such intuitions is Belgium's decision to resist German aggression in 1914. In this case the relevant Belgium decision-makers knew that violent resistance could not mitigate or avert the imminent threat posed by Germany. Despite this they chose to defend themselves regardless. What transpired as a result is commonly referred to as the Rape of Belgium, with an estimated 30,000 casualties over the course of World War I. The resistance only managed to delay the German forces for two days, and Germany maintained control of Belgium until the end of the war. Despite the fact that Belgium's decision clearly violated the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, most commentators intuitively believe that it was ethically permissible for Belgium to resort to force.

This paper will attempt to vindicate these intuitions and solve the puzzle generated by the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. It will argue that despite appearances, the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion may have been satisfied when Belgium resisted German aggression. It will contend that resisting aggression in such circumstances can achieve defence of others. This can be achieved by deterring the aggressor state, or other would-be aggressors, from invading one's own state, or other states, in the future. Crucially, it will be argued that this can be achieved even if the threat that is currently underway is not mitigated or averted. This will be linked to the importance of expressing an affirmation of the values of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. This paper

will conclude by arguing that these consequences of resistance are both more likely to be brought about, and are of much more significance, given the anarchic international state system that exists.

### **Key Words**

Reasonable Probability Of Success; Just War Theory; Political Philosophy; Applied Ethics.

### **Problem For The Reasonable Probability Of Success Criterion**

According to orthodox Just War Theory there are six individually necessary and jointly sufficient criteria that must be satisfied for it to be ethically permissible to wage war. These are: Just Cause, Legitimate Authority, Right Intention, Proportionality, Last Resort, and Reasonable Probability of Success. As the title suggests, the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion stipulates that it is not ethically permissible for a state to wage war unless it has a reasonable probability of achieving a Just Cause. Modern Just War Theory asserts that the only ends that can constitute a Just Cause for war are self-defence or defence of others. Most just war theorists believe that successful realisation of these aims can only be achieved by mitigating or averting a perceived imminent threat. The contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is thus taken to require a state to have a reasonable probability of mitigating or averting a perceived imminent threat for it to be ethically permissible to resort to war.

The moral rationale for requiring that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied is to prevent the likely gratuitous harm that would result from a state waging war when it does not have a reasonable probability of achieving a Just Cause. A state's decision to initiate hostilities typically causes combatants and non-combatants in both belligerent states to suffer harms. According to Just War Theory, realising a Just Cause is the only objective that can justify bringing about such harms. When a decision-making leader elects to subject combatants and non-combatants to likely gratuitous harms these harms constitute wrongs partly attributable to that leader (they may also be partly attributable to the adversary decision-making leader depending on the circumstances). An additional positive effect of including the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion in *jus ad bellum* is to force leaders to acknowledge and reflect on the harms that the decision to wage war will cause. It also provides a useful measure by which leaders can be held to account in the aftermath of a failed war effort.

Whilst there are clear moral reasons for requiring that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied, the contemporary understanding of this principle conflicts with widespread and robust intuitions towards historical cases. One case that elicits such intuitions is Belgium's decision to resist German aggression in 1914. Briefly, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August 1914 the German minister to Belgium delivered an ultimatum to King Albert and the Belgian government demanding unfettered passage through Belgian territory for German troops. German officials claimed that they had no choice other than to violate Belgian territorial integrity as they had purportedly received information that French troops were going to be deployed through Belgium (if this information actually existed it was erroneous). King Albert and the Belgian government promptly refused Germany's demand.

What transpired as a result is commonly referred to as the Rape of Belgium. It included 5,000 non-combatant casualties in August alone, and an estimated 30,000 over the course of World War I. Over 1,000,000 Belgians were also displaced to foreign states, and 20,000 Belgian structures were destroyed. The resistance only managed to delay the German forces for two days, and Germany maintained control of Belgium until the end of the war. Even at the time of the invasion German officials acknowledged that what they were doing was unjust. From the outset the Chancellor of Germany declared: "This is contrary to the prescriptions of international law... We shall repair the injustice we are committing as soon as our military object is attained" (cited by Gerlache, 1915, p.24). Crucially, there is much evidence to suggest both that the Belgium decision-makers knew that violent resistance could not mitigate or avert the German threat, and that resistance had the popular support of the Belgians who would suffer the additional costs of war.

Belgian agents knew that their six divisions were materially incapable of repelling the German threat. It was clear that they were hopelessly outmatched by the might of the German army. During the Crown Council meeting to decide how to respond to the German ultimatum, the Belgian Chief of Staff was asked "can our army fight a defensive battle alone with a chance of halting the enemy?" and "is our army completely ready to meet the attack?" He emphatically responded: "No, the war has caught us in the very act of reorganizing the army; our officer cadres, especially those in the reserve, are still inadequate, our field artillery is still below establishment; we have absolutely no heavy guns" (Steele, 2008, p.110). Belgian decision-makers were also not naïve of the costs that would be incurred by the decision to resist. Although there was widespread misapprehension across Europe prior to World War I concerning what contemporary military technology was capable of achieving, the brutal German policy of *Schrecklichkeit* was well-known and it was anticipated that Belgian non-combatants would suffer.

Evidence also suggests that the decision to violently resist Germany had the popular support of the citizens of Belgium. This is important because these were the people who would suffer most from hostilities. Writing at the time of the conflict, Maxweiler (1916, p.33) claimed that the "man in the street would have found himself in agreement with the Government as to that program, for it came from the very soul of the people." He also wrote that not "for one moment was there in Belgium any hesitation on the part of those who direct the policy of the country or on the part of the people, and nobody imagined that it would be possible to adopt the attitude of the money dealers in the temple" (1915, p.59). This is supported by the testimony of Gerlache (1915, p.27), who was also writing during the conflict. He observed that "it was our sole voice, the voice of an entire people, which rose, vibrating, in a single impulse of patriotism... as one man... its first thought and first care were to make ready for battle." Gerlache also declared that this attitude remained even after hostilities had ceased. He wrote:

"There is not at the present moment a single Belgian family which has not been horribly tried by this war, for which we were not prepared. All are mourning... Ask any Belgian, whether he be a minister or a modest clerk, a manufacturer or an artisan, a wholesale merchant or a small shopkeeper, a great stockbreeder or a poor tenant-farmer: ask the widow, or the orphan, or the parents who have lost one or several sons, ask any Belgian, no matter whom, be he Catholic, Liberal, or

Socialist, if he does not feel to-day that it would have been better to have accepted the bargain which Germany proposed to us on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August, 1914. There is not one who will not reply, without hesitation: 'No, we could not have done otherwise than we did, and if it had to be done again we should do the same'" (1915, p.238).

Despite the fact that Belgium decision-makers knew prior to commencing hostilities that they could not mitigate or avert the German threat, most individuals believe that resistance was ethically permissible (some even claim ethically praiseworthy). For instance, Fabre (2014, p.98) argued that "if any country ever had a case for going to war, Belgium in 1914 certainly did." Employing the broader notion of Just Cause (using the term to refer to the overall headline judgement of a war rather than one criterion of *jus ad bellum*), Ceulemans (2002, p.27) maintained that: "Nobody doubts for instance that Belgium during World War I had a just cause in defending itself militarily against the German invasion." Similarly, Steele (2008, p.15) declared that "even though Belgium's decision contradicts... the just war 'reasonable chance of success' condition, few scholars or theorists would interpret the Belgian decision in normatively negative terms."

This thus generates a tension between the demands of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion and robust intuitions. It is important to note that the problem is not merely that this principle requires action (or inaction) that conflicts with the intuitions of these few academics working in Just War Theory. Rather, it is that the sentiments of these just war theorists seem to be held by almost all individuals who consider whether or not they believe that Belgium acted wrongly by resorting to war when invaded. In light of this, it has been suggested that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion should be amended, or must be removed from *jus ad bellum* altogether. This paper will instead argue that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion may have been satisfied in this historical case that has proved troubling because resistance may have achieved defence of others.

### **Defence Of Others By Inflicting Costs On An Aggressor**

It is widely agreed that there are two key elements to achieve successful military deterrence of a potential aggressor. These work together to influence a state's expectations of what will occur if it pursues invasive policy. The first and most obvious is an assessment of a potential victim state's ability to respond with military force. For a potential aggressor, this takes the form of a comparison between the military hardware at their disposal and the military capabilities of the potential victim state. The second is an assessment of a potential victim state's will to respond with military force if attacked. Miscalculations of this second crucial variable have resulted in a large percentage of conflicts throughout history. It will be argued that states that resist aggression, even when they cannot mitigate or avert the imminent threat they face, can positively alter assessments of both of these variables for states contemplating aggression in the future. For this reason, states that cannot mitigate or avert the imminent threat that they face can still achieve defence of others through violent resistance, and may satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion.

The first way that defence of others can be achieved through waging a war that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat is by deterring one's specific aggressor

from invading one's own state, or other states, in the future. Failed military resistance can deter an aggressor state by damaging its military hardware to such an extent that it will not have the capacity to attempt future aggression. In other words, it will alter future comparative assessments made by one's aggressor of their own military capabilities and those of a potential victim state. The Reasonable Probability of Success criterion can be satisfied if it is believed that resistance will inflict sufficient military costs to prevent one's aggressor from harming others in the future. Crucially, achievement of this outcome through the infliction of these costs does not require the victim state that is currently being invaded to mitigate or avert the present threat that it faces. This thus constitutes one way that the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is mistaken.

This element of deterrence is only worth pursuing if it is likely that an aggressor state will pursue invasive policy again in the future. Sjoberg (2009, p.108) emphasised the importance of this calculation in her discussion of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. She declared that this criterion ought to be concerned with "not only whether or not the opponent will lose the war, but whether or not fighting the war would make it more likely that the opponent will behave in a way more conducive to justice in politics in the future... This part of success is crucial; in a feminist ethic of war, war is... *a way to try and fix a problem.*" Several international relations theorists have maintained that when aggressive states are unopposed, they often continue to act in a hostile manner. According to Fletcher and Ohlin (2008, p.68), frequently an "attack is evidence of a hostile purpose and may be a prelude to a larger campaign against other countries in the region." Schulte (2007, p.137) also stated that it "is of some moral importance that the future behaviour of a 'rogue regime' is unlikely to change for the better if such a regime was assured that no military action would ever be taken against it."

This trend has also been observed by several just war theorists. Writing in the sixteenth-century, Vitoria (cited in Brown, 2008, p.65) noted that "wrongdoers would become readier and bolder for wrongdoing, if they could do wrong with impunity." Similarly, Biggar (2013, p.140) argued that "[l]ong experience and history tell us that wickedness unchecked tends to wax," and McMahan (2014, p.154) has warned that if "the victims of lesser aggression capitulate without resistance, both the successful aggressor and other potential aggressors may be emboldened to engage in further aggression... in the hope of achieving a similar costless success." Lastly, writing specifically on the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, Lee (2012, p.95) warned that it "can lead to appeasement of aggressors, as was shown by the period prior to World War II in Europe, whetting their appetites and making the eventual war more costly."

The rationale behind inflicting costs on one's aggressor when you cannot mitigate or avert the threat that they pose can be discerned from the work of Aumann (cited in Nilsson, 2007, p.412). Drawing from the results of game theory, he explained that "revenge, which in the short term may seem irrational... in the long term, it may be rational, because if you take revenge, then the next time you meet the person, he will not kick you in the stomach... revengeful behaviour... make[s] sense when viewed from the perspective of a repeated game." This is reinforced by the results of Axelrod's (1984) iterated prisoner's dilemma experiment, which demonstrated

the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy. In explaining the findings of this experiment, Moore (2003, p.382) argued that it constituted a “reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations,” and that this effective strategy “is at core simply a basic method of deterrence, influencing behaviour through incentives.” This logic is also discernible from classic Just War Theory. Johnson (2013, p.37), the most influential historian of this field, has declared that in “the historical tradition the idea of just war does not rest on self-defense, but rather... action to set things right after such an attack and to seek to prevent future wrong-doing.”

To summarise this form of deterrence, it has been argued that states can be dissuaded from initiating wars of aggression if their leaders believe that the military capacity at their disposal is insufficient to subdue a potential victim state. Wars of resistance can damage an aggressor’s military capacity even if such resistance fails to mitigate or avert the present threat faced. For this reason, it is possible that a war of resistance can achieve defence of others even when it does not mitigate or avert the present threat faced. The logic behind this is supported by basic game theory and is discernible from the classic just war tradition. This has practical relevance because it has been widely observed that when states pursue invasive policy they tend to continue to act in an aggressive manner. Factoring in the harms that can be averted in the future entails that it is possible that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion can be satisfied by a war of resistance that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat.

### **Defence Of Others Through Demonstrating A Will To Resist**

The second way that defence of others may be achieved through waging a war that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat is by demonstrating a will to inflict retaliatory costs on an aggressor. Historical analysis has demonstrated the importance of this variable in relation to deterring aggression. Discussing the causes of the major conflicts of the twentieth-century, Fearon (1995, p.394) wrote that “Germany miscalculated Russian and/or British willingness to fight in 1914; Hitler miscalculated Britain and France’s willingness to resist his drive to the east; Japanese leaders in 1941 miscalculated U.S. willingness to fight a long war over control in the South Pacific; North Korea miscalculated China’s willingness to defend South Korea; and so on.” Whilst each of these conflicts had many other contributing causes, it has been argued that they would have been prevented if the relevant actors communicated a strong will to resort to military force.

Further, Stranksy’s (2011) detailed analysis of the Falkland’s war revealed that the occurrence of this conflict can be attributed to Great Britain’s inability to effectively communicate their will to respond to aggression with military force. In the months preceding hostilities Argentina engaged in a number of limited probes in the South Atlantic. These did not elicit a firm response from Great Britain. Drawing from this evidence, Stranksy (2011, p.510) argued that the “British government simply did not demonstrate a will to use force to protect the Falklands, which contributed to an escalation of Argentine aggression.” This is supported by the testimony of Galtieri (cited by Stranksy, 2011, p.486), the President of Argentina, who acknowledged that: “though an English [military] reaction was considered a possibility, we did not see it as a probability. Personally, I judged it scarcely possible and totally improbable.”

Stranksy (2011, p.524) summarised that despite the fact that “Great Britain had the ‘ability’ to defeat Argentina with military force, it repeatedly failed to demonstrate the ‘will’ to do so, a key aspect of military deterrence.” In other words, this conflict (that included 907 deaths) could have been avoided if Great Britain broadcasted their incentives for action effectively.

Basic game theory supports these historical interpretations. Game theorists have long employed the surprisingly complex game of *Chicken* to demonstrate that a player can deter their opponent by simply communicating a willingness to suffer costs. Briefly, the basic version of this game involves two players driving a car towards each other, with each of them having the choice to either continue driving straight or swerve out of the way. The three possible outcomes for each player listed in preferential order are to successfully continue driving safely, swerve and be a chicken, or continue driving straight and crash. Schelling (1960) maintained that the best tactic in order to deter your opponent from continuing to drive straight is to signal a strong willingness to accept the costs of not swerving. He suggested feigning irrationality, an effective tactic that does not actually alter the force at one’s disposal. Paraphrasing Jervis (1989) and applying this logic to international conflict, Zagare (1996, p.376) summarised that “a leader could dramatically increase the probability of prevailing in a crises by ‘making a commitment to stand firm.’”

Through violently resisting aggression a state demonstrates its willingness to forgo immediate harm reduction in order to inflict costs on an aggressor. This strengthens the credibility of any deterrent threat that that state makes in the future. Inflicting costs through armed resistance sets a precedent that aggression is costly. States that otherwise may have been tempted to instigate acts of aggression may be dissuaded after observing that the victim state tends to inflict retaliatory costs when attacked. Crucially, a victim state does not have to mitigate or avert the present threat that it faces in order to communicate its willingness to resist. In fact, Fearon (1995) has argued that this rationale actually explains why small states have decided to wage wars historically when they knew that they could not mitigate or avert the threats that they faced. According to Fearon (1995, p.400), this was done “in order to develop a reputation for being hard to subjugate.” He continued by explaining that “states employ war itself as a costly signal of privately known and otherwise unverifiable information about a willingness to fight” (1995, p.400), pointing to Finland’s resistance to the Soviet Union in 1939 as evidence for this assertion.

It is not just one’s current aggressor that may be deterred from resorting to force again in the future after observing a victim state resist aggression. Third-party states that may otherwise have considered invasive policy can also be deterred. Fishback (2016, p279) noted this possibility in his discussion of a domestic case whereby an individual responded to a threat of robbery by shooting some of the assailants. He maintained that by “threatening unjust harm, the four [aggressor] youths probably encouraged others to commit unjust harm, compromising deterrence.” He continued: “Shooting the four youths probably protected others indirectly by generally deterring unjust aggression. Appeasement of conditional threats invites aggression, and standing up to conditional threats prevents aggression” (2016, p.279). The likelihood that any relevant third-party will receive this message is even greater in the international context given the exposure that all acts of war receive.

To summarise this second form of deterrence, it has been argued that a potential aggressor state can be deterred from employing invasive policy if that state's decision-makers believe that a potential victim state has the will to inflict retaliatory harm. Many international relations theorists believe that a large proportion of conflicts throughout history could have been avoided if the existence of such a will was known by the relevant parties. Through resisting aggression a state clearly communicates a will to inflict costs if attacked. Such a communication does not require the victim state to mitigate or avert the threat that it presently faces. Resistance not only communicates a willingness on behalf of the specific victim state that is attacked, it also conveys the broader message the victim states in general will inflict retaliatory costs when invaded. This constitutes a second mechanism by which states can defend others and thus satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion in circumstances when they cannot mitigate or avert the present threat that they face.

### **The Importance Of Deterrence Given The International State System**

Resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat may achieve defence of others by deterring future aggression. This can be achieved by inflicting sufficient costs on an aggressor to prevent them from harming others again in the future, and by demonstrating a willingness to resort to force. Deterrence is both more likely to be brought about, and of much more significance, when states resort to force (rather than individuals in domestic society) given the international state system that exists. Fishback (2016) has recently shone some much-needed light on the necessity of factoring the conditions of the international state system into any discussions concerning the ethics of war. A crucial difference between interactions in domestic society and interactions between states is that the latter occur in a context without reliable security institutions. The international state system can best be described as a self-help anarchic society. By describing the situation as anarchic it is not meant that there exists chaotic disorder. Rather, it is simply meant that there is no security apparatus or effective governing body to resolve disputes and protect vital interests.

In order for the anarchic international system to remain relatively stable and peaceful there must exist balancing principles that buttress this system. These principles help ensure the order that is necessary to sustain elementary social well-being. The most important of these principles is that states will resist aggression and inflict costs on any state that disrupts the existing equilibrium. According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (2001, p.42), this is critical in order to "prevent the establishment of a universal hegemony... ensure stability and mutual security in the international system, and... strengthen and prolong the peace by deterring war." In other words, wars of resistance are prescribed as instruments for maintaining order and the balance of power in international society. According to Blum (2013, p.397), this sentiment was actually at the heart of classical Just War Theory. She explained that "it viewed war as legitimate only if it promoted peace, and peace was largely synonymous with stability... the notion of stability [w]as a cardinal value of the international system." Blum summarised that resistance to aggression was conceived as "a mechanism to restore a disturbed *status quo*, leaving much of the preexisting state order intact" (2013, 392).

Not only do wars of resistance become critically important given the contemporary international state system, but wars of aggression become more damaging than aggression in a context that has a functioning security apparatus. Wars of aggression do not just threaten the individual victim state that is invaded. They also damage the entire international system itself. The precedent of aggression destabilises the balance of power and erodes security. This is especially the case if aggression is costless, and if it is witnessed by a wide range of actors (as any act of aggression on the international stage inevitably will be). Fishback (2016) aptly observed that this social aspect of resistance to aggression would also license a more permissive understanding of when resort to force is justified in domestic society, if it too lacked a reliable policing structure. He suggested that “confronting conditional threats and standing one’s ground can be important to achieving deterrence and maintaining order... [in] anarchic situations, where necessity often permits citizens to inflict severe harm as a means to defeat and deter nonimminent threats because there are no less harmful means of achieving the same defensive end” (2016, p.283). To reiterate, the international state system is such an anarchic society.

To summarise, given the fact that power is decentralised in the anarchic international system it is crucial that states take action to deter aggression. Any such action contributes to the stability of the international landscape. Resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert the imminent threat that a state faces can still have this positive impact. As such, it can achieve defence of others by decreasing the instances of violent aggression in the future. Significantly, this means that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert an imminent threat may still satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. This entails that the contemporary understanding of this criterion is mistaken. In addition, contributing to deterrence is not the only means by which resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat can achieve defence of others. This can also be brought about through expressing a strong affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

### **Defence Of Others Through An Affirmation Of Political Sovereignty And Territorial Integrity**

A third way that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert one’s present threat can achieve defence of others is through expressing an affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. The often-cited benefits of such an affirmation can be linked to the importance of communicating a will to resist aggression, but they are also broader. Lazar (2010) provided a helpful explication of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. He wrote: “Each of these are complex concepts, and I can define them only heuristically and stipulatively. Political sovereignty is, roughly, the ability of a group to exercise primary political authority over itself. Territorial integrity is the territorial expansion of this control. Neither sovereignty nor territorial integrity are binary concepts: each is composed of a range of different powers, and can be realised to a greater or lesser degree” (2010, p.18). It is important to note that both of these values are threatened through state aggression. It can be argued that there are two distinct facets of resistance to aggression; an attempt to mitigate or avert one’s present

threat, and an expression of one's commitment to the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Expressing an affirmation of these values can have the positive effect of stabilising the international system. Walzer (1977, p.59) alluded to this notion when he maintained that the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity "must be vindicated, for it is only by virtue of those rights that there is a society at all... If they cannot be upheld, international society collapses into a state of war or is transformed into a universal tyranny... Resistance is important so that rights can be maintained *and* future aggressors deterred." Through referencing the international state system Walzer is reminding readers of the aforementioned conditions that ought to be factored into considerations concerning the ethics of war. Given that power is decentralised there is no overarching authority capable of enforcing norms. Bull's (1977) work on international relations discusses the importance of formulating norms (or rules) between states. He maintained that if political sovereignty and territorial integrity are to be reckoned as factors when states make decisions then the significance of these values must be clearly communicated. Belief in the significance of these values can only be engendered by states behaving in such a manner that emphatically communicates a commitment to these values. Resistance to aggression can ensure the continued efficacy of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the perception that they are of vital importance.

Expressing a commitment to these values can also achieve defence of others by generating circumstances in which the possibility of invading another state does not exist in a would-be aggressor states' choice-set. In other words, the very inclination to threaten these values will develop less frequently. This may result from states holding these values in high esteem. Further, affirming these values may also encourage victim states in the future to similarly resort to force to defend their political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Such future resistance may actually be capable of mitigating or averting the threat faced, and at the very least it will again assist in promoting deterrence. This possibility was actually noted by Statman (2008, p.666) in his paper on the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. He suggested that by "seeing an example of a victim rising up against evil and wrongdoing, other victims would be empowered to act thus themselves, thereby refusing to submit to domestic or other violence." Linking this idea back to the benefits of deterrence, Statman then noted that "the deterring and empowering aspects of resistance work together to reduce crime and violence" (2008, p.666). This is critical in the context of the anarchic international state system.

Crucially, resistance to aggression can effectively express the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity even if such resistance does not mitigate or avert the threat faced by the victim state. This phenomenon has been highlighted by several prominent just war theorists. For instance, Childress (1978, p.437) argued that: "if a nation has a good reason to think that it will be defeated anyway, its vigorous resistance may preserve significant values beyond the number of lives and retention of territory or sovereignty." Coates' (2016) extended discussion on the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion also reinforced this idea. He stated that: "when military failure or defeat seems certain, just recourse to war is not thereby excluded... A war that is fought to defend fundamental human values can

be successful even though it ends, *predictably*, in defeat... In such a case war is thought to be worthwhile precisely as a vindication of values- a vindication that does not require victory in a military sense, a vindication that may in fact be more complete the greater the certainty of military defeat" (2016, p.198). It is telling that Coates believed that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat actually expresses a stronger affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity than resistance that can.

Whilst not explicitly mentioning the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, some of Walzer's remarks are directly applicable to this discussion. Commenting on states that have practised appeasement, Walzer (1977, p.68) noted that "we feel badly in such cases, not only because we have failed to serve the larger communal purpose of deterrence, but also and more immediately because we have yielded to coercion and injustice... in international society appeasement is hardly possible unless we are willing to surrender value far more important." Concerning the idea that failed military resistance can effectively express the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity, Walzer (1977, p.71) declared that there is "a natural sympathy for the underdog in any competition, including war, and a hope that he can pull off an unexpected victory... But in the case of war, this is specifically a moral sympathy and a moral hope... Our common values are confirmed and enhanced by the struggle, where appeasement, even when it is the better part of wisdom, diminishes those values and leaves us all impoverished." These statements support the claim that the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity are affirmed through resistance to aggression.

### **Applying These Arguments To The Case Of Belgium In 1914**

This paper has argued that resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat can achieve defence of others. This can be achieved through inflicting costs on one's aggressor, through communicating a will to inflict retaliatory costs if attacked, and by expressing an affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was asserted that these outcomes of resistance are both more likely to be brought about, and are of much more significance, when states employ force (rather than any other entity) because of the anarchic international state system. For this reason, resistance to aggression that cannot mitigate or avert a present threat can satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. Recognition of these factors alone constitutes a significant shift in the way that this principle is understood. It will now be suggested that conceiving of this criterion in this manner can alleviate the problems that stem from intuitions towards historical cases. Belgium's decision to resist German aggression in 1914 will now be reconsidered.

There is evidence to suggest that concern for the safety of others constituted part of the Belgium decision-makers' reasoning when deciding to resort to war. At the Crown Council meeting held to determine a response to Germany's ultimatum, Hymans (the Liberal Party leader) described appeasement as "a betrayal of our duty to Europe" (cited by Steele, 2008, p.103) He continued: "The army may be beaten, but we must resist an action that will revolt the world. We must say no and do our duty" (cited by Steele, 2008, p.103). In the same manner, the official reply to Germany referenced Belgium's "international obligations" (cited by Steele,

2008, p.104). King Albert's speech to parliament also maintained the "necessity of [Belgium's] autonomous existence in respect of the equilibrium of Europe" (Steele, 2008, p.104). This theme was also reiterated in a telegram from the Foreign Minister that was sent to all Belgian Ministers who were abroad when Belgium received the ultimatum from Germany. The telegram stated: "All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government... The Belgian army has been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions... They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations" (Maxweiler, 1915, p.31). The Belgium decision-makers seemingly believed that their decision to resist aggression would have broader effects, even though it would not mitigate or avert the physical threat that they faced.

Further, some just war theorists who have considered Belgium's decision believe that it may have achieved defence of others through deterring future aggression. Fotion (2002) contended that Belgium's resistance may have had a deterrent effect not just on Germany, but also on other third-party states. He maintained that "[o]ne good thing in having the Belgians and their allies resist the Germans is to teach them a lesson that aggression is costly... The lesson will even apply to nations not involved in the war, but who are contemplating aggression" (2002, p.94). Significantly, in Fishback's (2016, p.290) discussion of the anarchic international state system, he also declared that "even lost wars can achieve deterrence so long as they inflict harm, such as Belgium's resistance to Germany's invasion in the First World War." This view was also asserted by Maxweiler (1915) who was writing at the time of the resistance. In his appraisal of the policy adopted by Belgium, he summarised that "Permanent Neutrality tends essentially, as has been said, to safeguard small States against the encroachment of powerful neighbours in such a way as to maintain equilibrium between the great countries" (1915, p.42).

It is difficult to assess whether or not Belgium's decision to resist German aggression successfully deterred any instances of aggression. It must be noted that after suppressing the Belgium resistance, Germany immediately continued on with its invasive policy. Further, Germany actually invaded Belgium again 26 years later. However, as with any appraisal of deterrence when it comes to war between states, this does not constitute decisive proof that war was not deterred. An essential problem with appraising the success of deterrence is that when it succeeds nothing happens. Without attempting the fruitless task of analysing counterfactuals, it is impossible to verify whether or not Belgium's resistance did in fact prevent more conflicts breaking out than what actually occurred. However, the evidence presented suggests that Belgian decision-makers believed that resistance could achieve defence of others, and such a belief (if genuinely held) is sufficient to satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion.

The valuable expressive function of Belgium's decision to resist Germany in 1914 must also be considered. Whilst this conflict was still underway, an Italian journalist wrote: "Belgium has defended the sacred patrimony of all civilized peoples; she has fought for a principle which is the basis of life in the modern nation; she has given her blood, not for her individual interests, but for an ideal which is also ours. Defeat ennobles and glorifies her, as martyrdom sanctifies and exalts the victim of his faith. Belgium has set Independence above Existence" (cited in Steele, 2008, p.111). Again, this stresses the fact that futile resistance may be much more

effective in expressing a commitment to the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity than resistance that actually mitigates or averts an aggressive threat. The significant consequences of Belgium's resistance to Germany were also emphasised by Steele (2008). In his discussion of this case he argued that "sacrifice is hardly unjust if it serves to strengthen community-based principles... suffering can be a useful method for demonstrating adherence to principles, especially when it acquires moral significance in the eyes of a community of observers" (2008, p.110).

Steele (2008, p.96) continued on to claim that the "Belgian case demonstrates that small powers possess the ability to influence the social structures of their community, or that, in short, the actions of such small states also have important societal consequences." The societal consequences Steele is alluding to notably includes reducing acts of aggression in the future. He then summarised that the "fact that Belgium was so overmatched by the Germans, the fact that it was so materially incapable of defending territory but its agents chose to do so anyway, strengthened the *principles* of sovereignty and independence even more than if such principles had been ensured by one of Europe's 'great power' states" (2008, p.106). This reinforces the claim that Belgium's resistance may have actually satisfied the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion, entailing that a tension does not arise between this principle and widespread intuitions held towards this case.

### **An Objection To Broadening The Scope Of Ethically Permissible Wars**

A possible objection to the views that have been asserted in this paper is that they are in danger of appearing insensitive to the overall goal of *jus ad bellum*. This paper has proposed a more permissive understanding of when resorting to war is ethically permissible. It has maintained that some of the wars that seemingly violated the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion were in fact ethically permissible because they achieved defence of others. If this view is widely endorsed, this will lead to more instances of war being deemed ethically permissible in the future than would have been if the contemporary understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion remains in force. This is despite the fact that the purpose of *jus ad bellum* is to limit the frequency of war. This field is meant to constrain agents and it advocates a strong presumption against resorting to force. For this reason, it could be argued that the prescriptions of this paper are contrary to the very purpose of Just War Theory.

The proposals of this paper also run counter to the general direction of the just war tradition in the last few centuries. Coady (2008, p.72) has summarised that the "history of just war theory has shown a distinct, though not altogether uniform, tendency to limit the right of war under the pressure of increasing scepticism about the motives of statesmen, the reliability of their calculations and the supposedly beneficial effects of war." In other words, there has been a progressive narrowing of the scope of Just Cause, which in turn has restricted what constitutes success for the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion. Almost all commentators take this trend to represent moral progress and advancement. Conversely, this paper has proposed a more expansive understanding of Just Cause in light of the fact that some wars that cannot mitigate or avert an imminent threat can achieve defence of others. Whilst Just Cause is still interpreted to mean self-defence or defence of

others, this paper has advocated a reunderstanding of when this is achieved. Again, it may seem peculiar that the proposals put forward in this paper are not in line with the general development of Just War Theory throughout history.

In response, firstly it must be reiterated that this paper is not advocating the removal of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion altogether. It is also not advocating a shift in the way that the Just Cause criterion is understood. For it to be ethically permissible to wage war one is still required to have a reasonable probability of achieving a Just Cause, and Just Cause is still narrowly interpreted to mean self-defence or defence of others. This paper is simply attempting to demonstrate that some wars of resistance that have traditionally been taken to violate the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion because they could not mitigate or avert the threat faced may have satisfied this criterion because they could have achieved defence of others. For these reasons, the broadening of the scope of ethically permissible wars may actually be slighter than it seems.

In addition, it is crucial to note that the key variable of probability is still in play. There will be wars that cannot mitigate or avert the present threat whereby resistance will also not have the beneficiary effect of achieving defence of others. Civil wars, wars fought for religious reasons, and humanitarian interventions are some instances of war where the deterrent and expressive value of resistance may not occur, or they may be minimised because hostilities will not impact the international state system. It is also conceivable that some wars of resistance fought between states will not achieve defence of others because they lack a sufficient audience of observers (this is true of many historical wars from the distant past, and will impact ethical appraisals of them), or because the costs that can be inflicted on an aggressor are too small to have a psychological effect on potential aggressors. It is only being asserted that *some* wars can achieve defence of others even when they fail to mitigate or avert the present threat.

It is also important to remember that the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is only one of the individually necessary conditions governing the ethical permissibility of resorting to war. Each of the other criteria must still be satisfied. For instance, a state may find itself in the same situation as Belgium in 1914, but it will not be ethically permissible for it to resort to war unless it satisfies Right Intention. In this case, the intention of those resisting must be to achieve defence of others (rather than some sort of retribution or for punitive reasons). The Proportionality criterion is another requirement that will weigh heavily on a state's decision to resort to war when it cannot mitigate or avert the imminent physical threat that it faces. Although violent resistance may satisfy the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion because it is expected to achieve defence of others, such resistance may still be ruled out because the costs that will be suffered by the victim state will be too great.

It must also be emphasised that wars that satisfy each of the *jus ad bellum* criteria remain only ethically permissible. Actions can be taxonomised into four ethical categories. These are: actions that are ethically forbidden, actions that are ethically permitted, actions that are ethically obligatory, and actions that are ethically supererogatory. Very few just war theorists believe that it can ever be obligatory for a state to wage war. Whilst it has been argued that there can be moral benefits reaped when a state resists aggression even when it cannot mitigate or

avert the present threat it faces, such resistance typically entails significant costs for the victim state. It is too much to demand that any state suffer such devastation. The decision-making leader of a state has an obligation to prioritise their own citizens' well-being. This is why it is important that the decision to resist has the (informed) popular support of the victim population in cases when the present threat cannot be mitigated or averted for the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion to be satisfied. A leader has not acted wrongly if they decide to preserve the lives of their citizens even when this entails that more lives may be threatened in the future through appeasement.

Moreover, although the conditions required for war to be ethically permissible may be less stringent given the understanding of the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion that has been proposed in this paper, if the arguments that have been put forward are valid, then these conditions ought to arise less frequently if some of the newly permissible wars are fought. In other words, the overall instances of war should actually decrease. This idea was succinctly put by Walzer (1977) invoking the domestic analogy. He explained: "When people talk of fighting a war against war, this is usually what they have in mind... The domestic maxim is, punish crime to prevent violence; its international analogue is, punish aggression to prevent war" (1977, pp.62-63). When considered in this light, it should be clear that the proposals put forward in this paper are in fact compatible with the purpose of *jus ad bellum*, and of Just War Theory more generally.

### Summary

It has been argued that granting some states the ethical capacity to inflict costs on an aggressor can decrease the frequency of state aggression and harm that this entails. In other words, resistance to aggression can achieve defence of others. This can be achieved by damaging the aggressors' military hardware, by demonstrating a will to resist aggression, and by expressing an affirmation of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is both likely to be brought about, and is of great significance, given the anarchic nature of the international state system. Crucially, it has been demonstrated that resistance to aggression can successfully defend others even when such resistance cannot mitigate or avert the present threat that is faced. These considerations must be factored into deliberations concerning whether or not the Reasonable Probability of Success criterion is satisfied.

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# **COUNTERING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (C-UAS): CURRENT WIDESPREAD TECHNIQUES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND MOTIVATIONS FROM A PILOT PERSPECTIVE**

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## **Abstract**

As applications of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS, often called drones or autonomous flight systems) expand, so does the need for countering UAS systems. Securitization against unwarranted UAS is a necessary but complex task, with the desired goal to disrupt specific drones and equipment without compromising adjacent systems. Current technologies include geofencing, jamming technologies, and kinetic solutions. Present solutions are innovative but accompanied by unintended consequences and face violation of US laws.

This paper will explore counter UAS (C-UAS) technologies and approaches from an American context, specifically in terms of the 2018 Hurricane Michael storm. The success of these technologies as well as their applicability in countering any unauthorized drone use inside the US, will be assessed. Technologies, protocol, and process improvements will be recommended.

Keywords: unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), counter-UAS, c-UAS

## **Introduction**

Current UAS incidents have highlighted the importance of counter-UAS efforts. The recent alleged drone-sighting incident at Gatwick Airport near London, England raises a number of questions related to counter-UAS, such as, how do officials confirm drone sightings, and how do officials interdict those aircraft when they are sighted? (Slocombe, 2019). This paper serves as a literature review for current counter UAS technologies, as they exist within the United States. This paper will review non-defense applications within the United States, as applied to public, commercial, and industry spheres within the United States. Using the 2018 Hurricane Michael as a case study, this paper will also demonstrate how current C-UAS measures used in the US are insufficient for protecting manned aviation

activities in times of disasters. Unmanned pilots will be separated into current FAA user categories, as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) previously categorized types of registration by those same groups. This paper will offer no prescriptions for counter-UAS operations, as they may be employed by separate entities.

### Counter UAS and Behavioral Economics and Commercial Liability

Within the United States, one of the only barriers to illegal, unapproved, or illegitimate UAS operations is known colloquially as manufacturer-locking. Manufacturer locking is accomplished through the use of pre-identified, geographically defined areas that do not permit the aircraft to fly. Some manufacturers do not allow the aircraft to be armed inside of these No Fly Zones (NFZ). This is primarily available through DJI systems, a cheap and simple type of sUAS to fly. This exists as an example of behavioral economics, as UAS pilots are conditioned to behave in a certain way, through the system, persuaded through an error message within the manufacturer's software application (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Further, this prevention method is predicated on the assumption that sUAS aircraft operators will connect to the internet before flying.




Figure 1. All that is needed for a DJI authorized account is a valid credit card number or mobile phone number capable of accepting sms text messages. This does not pose a sufficient barrier to illegitimate UAS operations, and places the onus of counter-UAS upon the operator (DJI, 2019a).

### Counter UAS as a Technological Innovation

Countering UAS is simply difficult. However, innovative solutions have been utilized to determine whether an unauthorized UAS is in airspace, and if so, its relative location. Radio detection and Acoustic signature measurement are examples detection measures, as the relative sound of UAS propellers are used to determine the location and existence of UAS (Herrera, et al. 2017, p. 1-8; Goppert, et al. 2017;

Kloet, Watkins, & Clothier 2017; Poitevin, Pelletier, & Lamontagne 2017).

## REVIEW OF CURRENT FAA POLICIES

### Types of Operators

Within this paper, we define technological intents by type of user. The Federal Aviation Administration (the FAA) now recognizes four categories of UAS operators: public (governmental), commercial (for-profit), hobbyist (recreational) UAS operators, and educational (student) users (FAA, 2019). Below, a table indicates the impetus for countering each specific type of UAS operator.

Type of User/Actor	Justification	Method
Public (governmental)	Airspace Safety	TFR, COA
Commercial (for-profit)	Airspace Safety, Security	TFR, 14 CFR Part 107 Rules
Hobbyist (recreational)	Airspace Safety, Security	TFR, 14 CFR Part 101 Rules
Educational (student)	Airspace Safety, Security	TFR, COA
Ignorant Actors, Actors with Malintent, or other Illegitimate Actors	Airspace Safety, Security	TFR

Table 1. This table designates types of UAS operator, while examining each actor's tie to counter-UAS measures (FAA, 2019).

### Current C-UAS Technology Types

There exists a myriad of C-UAS detection methods, including interdiction, identification, tracking, and detection (Guvenc, et al., 2017, p. 1-2; Goppert, et al., 2017; Horiuchi, et al. 2016; Looze, Plotnikov & Wicks 2016). The researchers have concentrated this paper on the two types currently available to consumers in the US; 1) Manufacturer specific aircraft identification tools and 2) Remote sensor aggregation tools.

**DJI AeroScope:** The DJI AeroScope is a C-UAS platform capable of detecting, identifying and tracking DJI manufactured drones (DJI, 2019b). The system is designed to intercept the radio communications between DJI aircraft and their controllers. Once an aircraft is detected, the system is able to display the radio controller's location, the aircraft's location, current track/path and provide other identifying information such as device serial numbers. The AeroScope unit is available in two options, a mobile unit capable of detecting drones within a 3-mile radius or a permanent installation with fixed antennas capable of detecting drones from up to 31 miles away. As the creators and holders of the patents for the technology responsible for the encrypted data exchanged between DJI controllers and aircraft, DJI is able to leverage this type of monitoring between devices. As of

this writing, DJI AeroScope is the only C-UAS solution of this type.

**Remote Sensor Aggregation Tools:** Several C-UAS companies have developed systems that combine multiple types of sensors to detect and track potential UAS threats. These systems incorporate radio sensors capable of detecting drone controllers within a specific RF band, audio sensors that are able to detect common drone motor audible frequencies (acoustic signature) and motion detectors integrated with video cameras capable of identifying drone shapes and trajectories from proprietary libraries. As with the DJI AeroScope, these systems are limited by the number and range of the antennas they use. Unlike the DJI solution, these multi-sensor systems are not able to identify make, model or serial numbers from the UAS they detect. Some manufacturers speculate they are able to capture and decipher some of the encrypted information captured from over-the-air transmissions, but doing so outside of a research environment would violate US laws.

### **Constraining Federal Regulations**

Snead, Seibler, and Inerra previously listed a number of US regulations that limit counter-UAS operations, such as federal regulations that prohibit damaging federal aircraft, jamming or hacking aircraft, interfering with radio communications and/or assuming unauthorized control of an aircraft (2018, p. 9-18).

### **Safety**

Ensuring safety and security in terms of continuity of operations is the crux of counter-UAS. While counter-UAS marketing or research often depicts actors with malintent, counter UAS measures must also ensure that ignorant or other illegitimate actors (those who do not know of, understand, or ignore United States UAS regulations) do not have an adverse effect on the National Airspace System (NAS) (Buric and Cubber 2017, p. 9-10). C-UAS methods are utilized to protect citizens and ensure safety of flight within the United States

Within counter-UAS, these users differ. First, the primary concern in counter-UAS is to identify unknown aircraft. This is inherently difficult; it is impossible to see registration numbers on sUAS (small Unmanned Aircraft Systems; those that weigh less than 55 lbs.) from the ground (FAA, 2019). Additionally, sUAS may be flown at a speed that is not conducive to capturing such aircraft, and it is even more difficult to determine who (or which individual) is flying UAS, or from where. There are certain methods by which to identify that an aircraft exists in airspace; however, this technology is not widely available in current, affordable UAS platforms. For example, the DJI M210 currently exhibits ADS-B capabilities that determine when another aircraft (either manned or unmanned) is operating in the same airspace.

### **Hurricane Michael: Case Study**

The Center for Disaster Risk Policy (CDRP) is an applied research center under the Emergency Management and Homeland Security academic program in the College of Social Sciences and Public Policy at Florida State University, in Tallahassee, Florida. As an applied research center, their mandate is to translate cutting edge ideas and policy into practical products and projects for local, state and federal entities. CDRP operates a team of UAS pilots that can be deployed in times of emergencies to provide disaster response activities to public entities that include

aerial image data capture, aerial image processing, search and rescue and other aerial surveillance or overwatch missions. The Center for Disaster Risk Policy UAS team operates under a combination of a nationwide Certificate of Authority (COA) waivers and 14 CFR Part 107 licensed pilots. The information included within this case study extends from our personal experiences as unmanned pilots tasked in the response to Hurricane Michael.

On 08 October 2018, the CDRP UAS team was requested by Walton County Emergency Management to provide aerial damage assessment of critical infrastructure areas to be impacted by Hurricane Michael with an expected landfall on 10 October 2018. CDRP assembled a team of four UAS pilots and traveled from Tallahassee, FL, to Defuniak Springs, FL, on 09 October 2018 where they rode out the storm in the Walton County Emergency Operations Center. Hurricane Michael was originally forecast to make landfall along the Walton County coast, but within hours of the eye wall coming ashore the storm's track shifted and Michael made landfall 50 miles east in Mexico Beach, Bay County, Florida shortly after noon. The Mexico Beach area was subjected to sustained 150 mph winds and 20 feet of storm surge that decimated homes, structures and critical infrastructure (USGS, 2019). The CDRP UAS team was requested by Bay County Emergency Management to survey the areas of impact and capture aerial images. CDRP would spend the next four days capturing 11,612 images from 80 flights over 520 hectares.




Figure 3. The Mexico Beach stretch of the Bay County Coastline. This image outlines (in red) the 520 hectares of impacted area CDRP was requested to survey with sUAS (Google Earth Pro 2019).

The Florida Air Operations Branch (AOB) is a unified command and control structure established to coordinate all federal, state and local air assets operating in declared disaster impact areas in Florida (FDEM 2012). On 09 October 2018 the AOB disseminated the daily Special Instructions (SPINS) for Hurricane Michael Operations. This document specifically classified the Mexico Beach area as ACA (Airspace Coordination Area) 'Region West' and applied specific CTAF radio call instructions to be made on defined VHF and Ground Tactical frequencies for aircraft operating in or transitioning through disaster impacted areas. Within the email, a document specifically included a directive that instructed all aviation assets (manned or unmanned), "4. (U) TO ENSURE FLIGHT SAFETY, REPORT ANY OBSERVED UNMANNED UAS OPERATIONS TO THE FLORIDA AOB AT: AIROPS@EM.MYFLORIDA.COM OR (850) 815-4980." (Florida State Emergency Operations Center during Hurricane Michael (<airops@em.myflorida.com>), personal communication, October 10, 2019). Enroute altitudes for all aircraft in these regions were also designated in this document which allotted surface to 400 feet AGL (Above Ground Level) for the operation of sUAS, however, not exclusively as surface to 500 feet AGL was also shared by rotary wing, SAR, Medical Evacuation and sling load aircraft. As a tasked asset within the state's response efforts, the AOB was aware of CDRP's mission to fly UAS within the Mexico Beach airspace. CDRP coordinated these efforts with the AOB well in advanced of ingress into the impacted areas due to the lack of any (cell, radio or other) communications capabilities within a 30-mile radius of the Mexico Beach area.

The first day of UAS operations on Mexico Beach were like the Wild West. At this time, there had been no issuance of a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) established over the disaster area. It would not be until late in the day on 10 October 2018 that the FAA would establish a TFR for the Mexico Beach area. However, that TFR only defined restrictions for aircraft flying above 200 feet AGL. The lack of TFR inclusion of surface to 200 feet prevented one of the most fundamental ways for preventing DJI aircraft from flying in this area without proper permission. When a TFR is issued for an area, the defined geographical location of the TFR is synchronized to the DJI flight controls application that most DJI pilots use, especially in instances where autonomous flights are being conducted (TFR, n.d.). If a pilot attempts to fly their DJI equipment in a TFR, the ground control application that provides live telemetry from the aircraft will prevent the aircraft from arming or taking off. This method of restricting flights in defined geographical areas works great if two very important actions occur: 1) The aircraft operator is using a mobile device as their ground control station for the aircraft and 2) The mobile device being used as a ground control station for the aircraft is connected to the internet and receives updated geographical data with the defined No Fly Zones (NFZ) information.

The four days of UAS operations on Mexico Beach were poorly coordinated with UAS pilots outside of CDRP members and partner organizations that were monitoring proper non-repeated radio frequencies (the only means of communications at the time) or in direct communications with the local air boss who had been established on 11 October 2019 to coordinate all air activities out of the Florida USAR Task Force 2 Incident Command Post (ICP). Many of the issues observed could have been mitigated through proper channel communications and onsite coordination but all of these measures failed for numerous reasons outlined below:

**News Organizations:** The researchers from CDRP experienced numerous encounters with news organizations that showed up in the operations area with their own sUAS equipment. All of the news outlets flying or attempting to fly were observed using DJI aircraft. With no way of connecting aircraft ground control stations to the internet, none of the mobile devices used for aircraft control were able to receive the recently updated TFR/NFZ geographical information that would have limited flights to 200 feet AGL. Furthermore, without cellular service or internet access, none of the news organization pilots were able to advise the AOB of their flight plans. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that only 1 of the several news affiliates that flew their sUAS were FAA-certified Part 107 pilots. None of the pilots consulted were aware that a TFR had been issued for the area, nor where they in communication with any aircraft monitoring VHF CTAF frequencies or the local air boss that had been established onsite.

**Non-essential Responders:** There were numerous occasions where CDRP team members encountered emergency responders that brought their own (personal) sUAS aircraft into the disaster area and flew them without notification or certification. All of the individuals that were confronted were unaware of the TFR/NFZ that had been established and weren't aware of the legal restrictions for flying in such areas. Some of the individuals were flying non-DJI specific equipment that had no geographical aware software that would even identify the area they were flying in as a TFR/NFZ. Upon investigation, none of the responders flying or attempting to fly were doing so in an official manner and were simply attempting to capture recreation photography and video of the devastation.

**Hobbyists:** There were at least two incidents involving local citizens that were flying their hobbyist aircraft to capture recreational photography and videography. They were unaware of the TFR/NFZ that had been established and did not know that emergency responders were in their area flying for official purposes.

These three use cases present a compelling argument for C-UAS measures in a post-disaster environment to not only ensure the safety of manned aviation assets, but to safeguard against UAS collisions which can result in loss of airframe, injury to those underneath the impact area, or damage to personal property as a result of an aircraft falling from the sky. An ability to properly identify or restrict non-essential UAS from flying within the disaster theater would have reduced the risk to manned and unmanned aviation assets.

### **Within a Disaster Context**

UAS pilots within the Center for Disaster Risk Policy (CDRP) specialize in the deployment of UAS in post-disaster environments, including manned/unmanned aircraft operating environments. Counter-UAS is increasingly useful in a post-disaster environment, as many unskilled or recreational pilots attempt to operate in disaster airspace, with no permission or coordination (with either manned or unmanned aircraft). Manned/unmanned aircraft environments are common in disaster contexts, and present complex environments that require extensive pilot experience and coordination to ensure a safe environment for joint operations.



Figure 4. An unmanned aircraft system operates beneath a helicopter during an unmanned/manned joint aviation exercise in Alachua County, Florida. The UAS is actually located below the manned aircraft in this image, but the distorted relationship between the two airframes is due to visual parallax (Center for Disaster Risk Policy, 2018a).



Figure 5. An image of a DJI M210, taken during the 2018 Kilauea eruption (Center for Disaster Risk Policy, 2018b). The DJI M210 model is an example of UAS equipped with ADS-B, for aircraft tracking and location services.

### **Necessary Skepticism**

As in all nascent technologies, it is critically important to exercise a healthy degree of skepticism, in adopting or accepting certain technologies as relevant

or trustworthy. A number of vendors currently sell C-UAS measures, and some of those are useful.

### Further Research and Limitations

All UAS operators are limited by their relative level of UAS systems expertise, as well as their practical flight hours. Unfortunately, events or accidents may occur that call for additional policies from both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as well as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). As new policies are released in a spirit of safety and security in the NAS (National Airspace System), users must continually adapt to follow those new regulations.

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
# EDGED WEAPONS TERRORISM: FROM CINEMA TO YOUR STREET

John Evans  
Sofia Cardante

## Executive Summary


Contrary to popular opinion and misleading information, the purchase of firearms or explosives are not the weapons of choice by terrorists or sympathizers/radicalized individuals. Unlike firearms, which hold a finite number of rounds and have the potential to misfire, or explosives which require the acquisition of components and its successful construction, edged weapons allow attackers to continue their attacks until they are physically stopped. Additionally, the ability to purchase an edged weapon from any retail location and the lack of any scrutiny or concern over the purchase provides an atmosphere of ease for the attacker(s).

As seen below, you will learn how edged weapons are a rite of passage for youths becoming men, and enlightenment for believers of the Islamic religion. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which produces and disseminates an English language publication found online, “Inspire” magazine, has focused on lone-wolf style of attacks over the last few years. This strategy has carried over into the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known by its Arabic language acronym Daesh, who similarly disseminates its own English language magazine online, “Rumiyah.” Both publications provide the necessary inspiration, concepts and tactics needed to plan an edged weapon terror attack by individuals in any country.



Inspire and Rumiyah





The following graphs contain information collected from over 20 years of combined government and recently private sector experience on terrorism and specifically on edged weapon attacks.

However, the attacks depicted below do not capture edged weapon attacks perpetrated by criminals or attacks that were deemed as hate crimes, domestic disturbances, or of a criminal nature. These attacks are only terrorism related.

### Symbology

The meaning behind the usage of an edged weapon is up for interpretation and can take on numerous connotations as you can find an edged weapon (dagger or saber) in multiple religions such as Islam, Christianity, or Buddhism; dreams; on multiple country flags; or in tattoo designs. The use of an edged weapon varies according to customs, cultures, domestic and foreign policies, previous events or time, and opinion of society.

فَإِذَا لَيْسَ الْمُكْفَرُونَ فَصَرَبَ الرِّقَابَ حَتَّى إِذَا انْخَسَمُوا فَشَدُّوا أَلْوَانَ قِيَامًا مِّنَ بَعْدِ وَإِنَّمَا  
فِدَاءٌ حَتَّى تَضَعَ الْحَرْبُ أَوْزَارَهَا ذَلِكَ وَلَوْ يَشَاءُ اللَّهُ لَانْتَصَرَ مِنْهُمْ وَلَكِنْ لِيَبْلُوَ بَعْضَكُمْ  
بِبَعْضٍ وَالَّذِينَ قُتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ فَلَنْ يُضِلَّ أَعْمَالَهُمْ

This can be seen by terrorist groups using verses from the Qur'an as well as actions in past conflicts to provide its followers a belief that this is based on fact and a spiritual calling. An example is the Sura, chapter 47, verse 4 of the Qur'an, that says:

This verse discusses striking the neck or ransoming prisoners and encourages the belief that anyone killed when fighting disbelievers will be praised and rewarded. This was identified as one of the main verses preached by radicalized Imams and terrorist leaders to rationalize the use of knives in attacks and beheadings as spiritual and a path to enlightenment.



Figure 6: Flag of Jihad

Religious scriptures used to justify a form of hate or attack against someone is not limited to just the Islamic faith, it has also been seen in attacks and hate messages from Right-Wing Christian groups. An example is the book of Judges, chapter 19, verse 29 of the Bible, that says:

This verse was identified as one of the main scriptures that Christian Right members preached to their followers as why it is acceptable to attack abortion clinics and medical personnel.

“When he entered his house, he took a knife and laid hold of his concubine and cut her in twelve pieces, limb by limb, and sent her throughout the territory of Israel.”

- |           |                        |
|-----------|------------------------|
| • Pain    | • Betrayal             |
| • Skill   | • Sacrifice            |
| • Ritual  | • Singularity in Focus |
| • Revenge | • Sacrifice            |
| • Freedom | • Resolve              |

It is not always religious scripture that is used to identify meaning for the use of an edged weapon. Many times, an image of an edged weapon will be utilized on a flag, tattoo or graffiti to express a form of emotion or historical account. Some of the meanings behind an edged weapon depicted as an image can be:

An edged weapon has a symbolic, almost mystical, significance in Islam. So much so, that dreams with a knife or dagger in them have various meanings and interpretations depending on the context of the dream. Some of these interpretations are:

- |            |                 |
|------------|-----------------|
| • Dispute  | • Determination |
| • Struggle | • Resist        |

Muhammad Ibn Sireen publication “The Voluminous Interpretation of Dreams,” discussed his interpretations based on his understanding of the Qur’an. He was considered one of the most spiritual authorities for interpretation of dreams in the Islamic religion. Below you will see that edged weapons in dreams, just as in religious passages and images, have multiple meanings. There are over 6,000 interpretations of an edged weapon in a dream.

A knife in a dream also means acquiring strength and prosperity at the hands of a servant or an employee:

- If one needs a witness for a trial, and if he sees himself carrying a knife in a dream, it means that he will find such a witness
- A knife in a dream also implies a proof
- A knife in a dream also means acquiring strength and prosperity at the hands of a servant or an employee

### Tactics

Terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting an attack are not static but dynamic. While some change based on accessibility and skill set of the perpetrator, most change based on media distribution of a successful prevention of an attack. Although, this information provides the public with a sense of security and trust in the government security measures, it also provides useful information for the adversary on changes they need to make to circumvent those security measures.



Figure 7: Rumiyah, Issue 3

Rumiyah Magazine, in recent publications, specifically discusses knife attacks, rather than firearm or explosive style of attacks. This is particularly useful for those operating in Western Europe, where firearms are not readily available. The possession of even a large knife is legal in all but a few locations in the United States and tends to draw less law enforcement attention. Additionally, knives or edged weapons can be purchased in almost every store, gas station, supermarket, etc. Terrorists generally view the ideal knife to be a straight, non-folding blade with

a cross guard. This is a weapon that can be purchased relatively inexpensively, and without a license or background check from any number of retail locations worldwide. Its thin shape allows the knife to be concealed with minimal notice. Many knives or edged weapons, are constructed from non-metallic material, further minimizing their detectability by either x-ray or metal detector.



Figure 8: Rumiyah, Issue 3

In an atmosphere of increased security measures, knives or edged weapon concealability, ease of acquisition, and skill required to use, are the three greatest attributes that will continue to make it a weapon of choice by terrorists. Concealing an edged weapon until the moment of the attack, provides the attacker(s) a higher degree of success. This is achieved primarily through two methods:

1. The first method of hiding an edged weapon from view of the public is either on their body or concealed in a container. Some of these body concealment methods are:

- a. Between the shoulder blades
- b. Between female breasts
- c. Taped to a thigh
- d. Inside the upper arm
- e. In the armpit
- f. Under the soles of the feet

Containers have been used for decades to circumvent security measures as many security officers will not look diligently at these containers to see if they are hiding anything. Many of these measures are used by drug traffickers and incarcerated individuals to hide contraband. Some of these container concealment methods are seen below:

a. Hollow Books – They are mainly designed for keeping valuables hidden in plain sight on a bookshelf. Books are convenient for school campuses or business offices and public buildings without X-ray or metal detectors. Two 6.5-inch throwing knives were hidden in this book



Figure 9: Hollow Books (Amazon)

b. Hollow Cans – A potato chip can will provide space and concealment for short and long knives



Figure 10: Hollow Cans (Amazon)

c. Accessories – Everyday items have been produced with a hidden knife between 1 ¼' to 3 ¾' long when extended, normally of non-metallic material

- Belts
- Personal Grooming
- Jewelry



Figure 11: Hidden Knife Inside Belt Buckle



Figure 12: Hidden Knife Inside Handle of Comb (Amazon)



Figure 13: Hidden Knife Inside Lipstick Twist Case (Defense)



Figure 14: Hidden Knife Inside Pendant



Figure 15: Folding Credit Card Knife (Supreme Defense)



Figure 16: Hidden Knife Inside Hollow 50-cent Coin (Amazon)

2. The second method of concealment is through the selection of edged weapons made of composite materials, such as ceramics; or from organic materials, such as wood or bone. These items will traditionally not set off basic metal detectors. The primary technology used for weapon detection are the Metal Detector, X-ray Scanner and Millimeter Wave Scanner. The metal detector adds up all the metal that you are carrying (from metal buttons to zippers on clothes to coins in pockets). When a certain mass is reached, an alarm will go off, and in most cases, a strip of LED's will show the operator where the largest metal mass is on the person. Recently, the use of composite or organic materials used in making edged weapons

has become popular. These will not set off traditional metal detectors; however, there may be metal in the handle or screws that could trigger a metal alert.

Many locations still use traditional metal detectors. These security devices are configured to randomly select people for additional security. For example, in the United States, a random number of people will be selected for additional security measures and they will either go through the Millimeter Wave scanner or receive a pat-down check. While this will not detect every person attempting to smuggle something like a composite or organic edged weapon through the security checkpoint, it is believed to be a great enough risk to someone attempting to do so that they will not do it.

New security measures that are in place at some airports, but not currently found in the private sector, are the X-ray scanners. These devices can make a radiographic image through fabric, plastic, rubber, and other non-metallic objects. These images will identify the anomaly with a colored box on the display and trigger a manual check of the container. On average, X-ray operators have only five seconds to clear an object when it passes through the scanner and displays on the control screen. This limited time can be taken advantage of when trying to pass the checkpoint with a non-metallic knife in a container. If an item is placed in a bag so that the edge of say, a knife, is “up” when it goes through the scanner, it will show up as only a line.



Figure 17: TSA X-ray Training Image for Screeners

The basics of image interpretation is understanding the color code:

- Blue equals hard materials. Metal (blue/black), hard plastics, alloys etc. For example, a gun or metal knife will show up as blue or black or a mix, as will wires, sunglass case, batteries, etc.
- Orange is biological material. Rubber, leather, food, dynamite and other explosives (except plastic – which will turn slightly blueish in color), all liquids and gels and organic powders (like flour for example).




Figure 18: TSA X-Ray Training for Screeners

- Green is for plastics and alloys, where the density is not great enough to make it blue or black in color. These can also be ceramics, though only the densest of them. However, composite or organic edged weapons will show up as orange in color.

The colors in airport security x-ray images will vary a little depending on the version of the machine, and most of all depending on the manufacturer. But all metal will be Blue, all dense plastics and some light metals will be Green, while everything organic will show up as Orange.

In general, edged weapons made of composite or organic material will not be detected by standard metal detectors. This is one of the main reasons why more countries are starting to use various forms of Millimeter Wave scanning devices for official and transportation facilities. The Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) Systems enable security personnel to effectively detect contraband concealed under clothing without a physical contact search.

The two types of full-body scanners used in the United States and around the world are Backscatter X-ray technology units and the Millimeter Wave technology units. Both AIT's systems produce anatomically correct images. Although these enhanced screening systems were deployed to further public safety efforts, they generated public concern for potential health related issues over the continued exposure to full-body scanner radiation and privacy issues.




Figure 19: (EASA) Training Images for Screeners of both types of AIT's - Millimeter wave scans (left panels) create images that resemble a fuzzy photo negative. Backscatter scans (right panels) resemble chalk etchings.

To adhere to privacy concerns, Millimeter Wave images are now converted to a cartoon-like display with any suspicious object highlighted. The individual is then flagged for additional screening and search. The images to the right depict what the technology display used to be prior to privacy issues and lawsuits.

While the changes made to the display screens eased the concerns raised over privacy, this restricted technology increases the potential for mis-classification of items flagged and false readings.




Figure 20: TSA Millimeter Wave Conversion Display Training Image for Screeners



Figure 21: TSA Security Incident Image

### Case Studies

1. A 7.5" ceramic pocket knife was discovered during a secondary security check (physical pat-down) on a passenger after the Millimeter Wave body scanner detected an anomaly. Although, this incidents' outcome was successful in detecting the anomaly, the secondary check only discovered the edged weapon when the supervisor arrived to assist in it. AIT units can be spoofed with relatively low-tech and low-cost measures. An inexperienced security screener may not readily identify a detected anomaly or invest the time required to inspect or question the person. Furthermore, current AIT technology use unsecure and unreliable software that can be manipulated in cyberattacks.

2. In 2014, a group of researchers from the University of California at San Diego, University of Michigan and the Johns Hopkins University at the Applied Physics Laboratory published findings regarding the Rapiscan Secure 1000, a backscatter scanner that was used at hundreds of U.S. airports. During their research at numerous airports throughout the United States, they successfully were able to conceal and bring edged weapons, explosives and detonators through the security check-point. The findings showed not only the technologies susceptibility to malware attacks, both in-person and virtual, and through practiced answers to security questions and concealment of items. Both measures successfully fooled not only the technology but also the security screeners.




Figure 22: DHS OIG Findings Report and Images of ProVision Millimeter Wave Displays of a Concealed Edged Weapon

3. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), during annual security inspections identified that over 90% of security check-point screenings failed. These failures led to the removal of the




Assistant Administrator for the Office of Security Operations at Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The findings illustrated failures in technology, training, other human factors, and the removal of all the ProVision Millimeter Wave scanners.

The blurry picture produced by Millimeter Wave scanners also contains large areas, described as dead regions. In these areas, concealed items can be missed by security. The three images to the right demonstrate this concern.

- Image A - No concealed weapon
- Image B - Concealed edged weapon (18 cm length) taped to spine
- Image C - Concealed edged weapon (18 cm length) taped to spine and covered by a piece of plastic

Additionally, errors are amplified when you combine issues with the technology after being altered due to privacy issues raised by passengers, the media and members of U.S. Congress, as well as human error made by security screeners.



### Recommended Security Measures

It is impossible to check every person or make public areas (soft-targets) impenetrable from all hazards or threats. This is due to manpower, training, financial constraints, media and public opinion, time to conduct search on each person, and U.S. Congressional inquiry. All the previously mentioned issues result in the inability to provide 100% security against edged weapons and active-stabber scenarios. Currently, the best mechanisms against an active-stabber scenario are:

- Indications and Warnings
- Tiered Security
  - o Passive
  - o Active
- Direct Action

### Indications and Warnings

Although a single indicator may not be suspicious, one or more indicators can show that an edged weapon attack is being planned, based on the specific warning signs. Potential indicators and warnings based on categories and potential timing are:

- Manifesto/Video/Statement – Message created by attacker(s) explaining why and an association with religious scripture to justify action. This is one of the last things done immediately prior to attack
- Responsibility Claimed – Traditionally a message from group of affiliation announcing action was conducted with intention or justification regardless of veracity
- Surveillance – Attacker(s) conducting visits to location to identify penetration points and security measures. Ranges from loitering, taking pictures of security, or standing at locations not normal for onlookers
- Altercations – Attacker(s) causing physical disturbance to identify security measures and timeliness

- Training – Attacker(s) practicing physical movements and techniques
- Assistance – Attacker(s) seeking help from others, to include family, friends, or others in the community
  - Travel – Attacker(s) selection of location is normally based on their geographic location. Normally near their home or near enclave of similar backgrounds. As this provides them a comfort and strengthens their will to conduct the attack
  - Justification for Attack – Attacker(s) will provide traditionally a political reason for their attack. Traditionally through a manifesto, video, or statement. This also provides credibility for their action, so it achieves international media attention. This is normally one of the last things done immediately prior to attack
  - Recruitment – Attacker(s) attempt to gain support for their intention to conduct attack or motivate others by their intention to support their cause
  - Social Media – Attacker(s) will comment on or follow others with similar beliefs. Traditionally, these sites are more radical and promote violence or separation from non-believers
  - Purchase – Unlike other types of attacks using firearms or explosives, edged weapon attacks are typically conducted with items already in their possession
  - Affiliations – Attacker(s) will join or begin to show signs of support for radical groups or spiritual leaders
  - Behavior – Attacker(s) will become more emotional and become more isolated. Their communication or expressions will reflect a more extreme position on subjects and more apt to aggression

### **Tiered Security (Passive and Active)**

The best attack countermeasures are Situational Awareness and Training. Technology allows attacker(s) to become individual terror promoters (lone-wolfs) who provide a motivational path to terror and instruction to others in tradecraft and tactics. Additionally, some attacker(s) have been allowed to migrate into Western societies for politically or humanitarian reasons. These migrations have taken place without any real means to investigate and assess their backgrounds. The modern terrorist is, therefore, hard to detect. They will hide in closed communities, use personal resources, strike in an unexpected way, and then may try to disappear into society. They are radicalized and motivated to the extent that they will be willing to die in martyrdom. This potentially puts every citizen on the frontlines of a war that has come to them.

1. Passive: This countermeasure is further broken down into awareness programs, information sharing, situational awareness monitoring, and training.
  - a. Awareness – To protect against this new paradigm, the public must have a basic understanding of the psychological mindset of a dedicated attacker, who is willing to die. These awareness programs must supplement government programs such as “See something, say something.” These programs must bring awareness to the public and/or workers that they need to look for people or objects that do not seem to fit into the environment. Examples are:
    - Someone walking around a corporate office without a badge or without an escort if wearing a badge is required
    - Individual(s) dressed inappropriately for the weather

- Someone photographing entrances and exits
- Individual(s) watching security patrols and then leaving when security appears to be coming to question them

b. Information Sharing – Information sharing between businesses and first responders is critical. The amount of security cameras and suspicious activity reporting by business security offices needs to be shared to all businesses and the State Fusion Center. This information sharing will allow suspicious activity and surveillance to be identified, tracked and analysis conducted on the behaviors. This coordination will also allow security officials in the private sector to receive information that will provide them with insight to ongoing concerns or actual threats.

c. Monitoring – Active monitoring of recently terminated employees and social forums or blogs identifying negative comments; focusing on ones that appear more aggressive or make actual threats is critical. This monitoring can provide you with information that can be used to identify security threats and address issues before they arise to an incident.

d. Training – Emergency security plans and training are a necessary business investment for employee safety which will in turn be conducive to reducing insurance costs and litigation exposure. Existing Active Shooter plans can be used as a baseline. This includes an approach to the violent nature of edged weapon attacks, to reduce shock and “normalcy bias.” Training in rapid and simple Incident Reporting and basic First Aid will empower individuals and help conquer fear and panic. Additionally, training on how to alert people of an attack and where are the protected (safe) areas for them to immediately move to during an incident is recommended.

2. Active: This countermeasure is further broken down into security presence and technical measures. These measures provide an opportunity to observe and assess individual behavior for suspicious cues.

a. Security Presence – A physical appearance of security or an increased presence will traditionally deter many incidents. Likewise, the watchful presence of a plain clothes security component for public areas or events will provide discrete surveillance and a ready response to an attack.

b. Technical – The use of technical means to assist physical security can minimize or eliminate gaps. Gaps in coverage should be identified well in advance to acquire needed technical assets and plan other mitigating actions. These measures to eliminate Gaps can be:

- Door locks
- Window locks
- Access Control
- Cameras
- Motion Sensors
- Metal Detectors/Wands

3. Direct Action: Edged weapon attacks are almost impossible to stop in a traditional hands-off approach. Once the attack is initiated, security personnel should plan for stopping the attacker(s) by any means available to them. Planning should integrate target area emergency plans and the possibility of civilian actions to engage and subdue the attacker, such as group “swarm” techniques. An additional

planning factor is that the attacker may wear a fake explosive vest to threaten mass casualties and to slow the response of security forces. A live explosive device is ALWAYS a possibility. After an attacker is stopped, security forces should plan for a possible secondary attack, if the attacker is not using live explosives to maximize casualties in final martyrdom. Further, a secondary attack could be planned especially if committed by an operational cell.

### **Security Recommendations**

The shape of terrorism has changed since September 11, 2001. Al-Qaida, ISIL and other terrorist affiliated groups have adapted their tactics because of publicly available security mitigation strategies. Not only can they recruit, train and conduct operations in conflict areas of the Middle East and North Africa, now they are able to recruit and have those radicalized individuals conduct attacks anywhere. Within the context of global Islamic radicalism, terrorism is now becoming more individual in nature.

To protect against this new paradigm the following basic security measures are recommended for consideration:

- The public must have a basic understanding of the psychological mindset of a dedicated attacker. Especially with radical Islam, the attacker is prepared for or looks forward to dying. "See something, say something"
- Through orientation and security awareness notifications, employees must assess the daily work environment based on the geographic location and developing events
  - Businesses should review emergency and security plans
  - Businesses should coordinate information sharing and local safety/security measures with public safety agencies to prepare for events and guard against criminal and suspicious activity
  - Businesses need to ensure that all individuals entering a facility go through an access control and through metal detectors, regardless if they are a current employee or visitor
  - Employees that are terminated or placed on administrative/paid leave should be passively monitored as they pose a possible security risk
  - Businesses should include situational awareness monitoring as a part of their security program
  - All workers should pass through access control checkpoints and have independent background checks completed as they pose the highest security risk based on the items they will have in their possession to conduct their daily work
  - Create a mechanism for anonymous calls to be placed into security to address concerns or report persons of interest
  - Ensure human resources, legal, communications and security departments are collaborating/sharing information on employees terminated or placed on leave
  - Conduct exercises or training for all employees to ensure everyone knows what to do

If present during a knife or edged weapon attack:

- Give immediate warning through email, SMS, and alerts to all employees
- Give immediate warnings through audio notifications to general public in the area

## TERRORISM '19

- Notify law enforcement immediately
- Employees should move immediately to pre-designated safe rooms or areas identified by law enforcement. Try to put objects such as furniture, trees, lampposts and garbage bins between yourself and the attacker
  - Stay in large groups. Attackers intend to target individuals and small groups of two or three. If capable, a large group can “swarm” the attacker and subdue him. NOTE: The attacker may indicate he has an explosive device to prevent being “swarmed.” This may or may NOT be true
  - Security personnel/guards should immediately lock all outside doors and elevators to ensure attacker(s) cannot enter or if inside already become isolated in an area
  - If near attacker(s) or an ongoing incident, immediately depart area; if unable to depart area, enter the first building you can and notify management of the incident
  - If faced with an attacker(s) mentally prepare yourself to fight without hesitation
  - Provide emergency medical care, if possible



## ON CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION WARS

NATALIIA KRASOVSKAIA

Modern interpretations and various classifications of information wars are considered in the article . As a result of comparing different classifications of information wars by Russian and Western, primarily American, experts, the following conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, the information wars classifications have numerous disadvantages, and, on the other hand, they have common points that unite these so different classifications. As a result of the carried out research, it was possible to identify the most typical grounds for classifying information wars and the basic types of the information war. The addition of the classification of information wars from the standpoint of political psychology is offered, which can serve a deeper understanding of the studied phenomenon. In the article cases of information confrontation are investigated; the question of the necessity to make psychological research is raised which is aimed at minimizing the harmful consequences of information impact on the population.



# **DETERRENCE AT THE GULF OF ADEN: INCREASING NEED FOR CYBER AWARENESS**

## **CASE STUDIES: CYBER TERRORISM AT THE GULF OF ADEN AND THE ARCTIC SEA**

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### **Abstract**

Cyber terrorism, modern pirates and unmanned vessels are stirring hot and icy cold waters at the Gulf of Aden and the Arctic Sea. Attacks at sea against vessels is a worldwide problem and causes damages to maritime trade, international economy and provides an income for pirates in unstable regimes such as Somalia. Cyber deterrence strategy is important in order to detect and prepare for the unknown threat; strategy to deter cyber-attacks has to have credibility and effective punishment. As the ancient old form of piracy keeps adjusting to the environmental conditions, it will develop a new ship to sail on the cyber waves.

“Power depends on context, and cyber power depends on the resources that characterize the domain of cyberspace.” (Nye, 2010, p. 3)

### **Introduction**

Increasing need for cyber awareness is necessary since maritime environment is sailing towards unmanned vessels and therefore creating new challenges to the future of the international waters. Cyberspace is evolving its limits to space; it is changing its shape of water. Sinking of the ship by bombing is in the past, future conflicts are fought in the international cyberspace of maritime trade. The international customary law against piracy is not enough to battle the next

generation of cyber pirates. This paper argues that taking the fight against piracy to the cyber world does not save resources, vessel crew or stabilise unstable governments related to piracy.

In our digital era, emerging cyber threats at sea are affecting not only private and state owned ships but also ports and offshore operations. Demand for cyber deterrence strategy indicates there is a lack of cyber awareness at sea. Currently the protection of vessels is provided by using uniformed military personnel Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs). This research paper aims to answer to unknown cyberspace problem and evaluate why the future cyberspace at sea matters. Deterrence in cyberspace is linked to the geopolitics of the physical world (Goodman, 2010, p. 105), therefore piracy and robbery at sea is taken to the next level. Research question is related to the evolution of piracy, why switch to cyber and will the current actors diminish due time? As case studies, two areas infected by terrorism in cyberspace, at the Gulf of Aden and at the Arctic Sea, is used to demonstrate vastness of cyber piracy in the world.

First chapter sets the framework for piracy according to the international customary law and deterrence, second chapter utilises optimal deterrence to compare current countermeasures against piracy at sea and those needed in the cyberspace, the conclusion is that fight against piracy to the cyber world does not save resources, vessel crew or stabilise unstable governments related to piracy. And finally, in the third chapter with conclusions emphasis is on a raising new cyber actor Kenya, the black horse of cyber dominance ready for 'cyberwar', a strong actor having an impact to African and international security.

### **Chapter 1. Vessel protection to reduce violence at sea**

In first chapter, geographical position and unstable political environment at the Gulf of Aden is introduced. The vessel protection has changed from unarmed personnel to armed additional protection to insure a safe passage at the sea. It is important to understand the scale of modern piracy and robbery at sea in order to analyse the future maritime trade related issues. Current challenges at sea from vessel protection's point of view are the threat of kidnapping and violence against vessel crew by pirates.

First, in order to understand the starting point, background information about deterrence and piracy according to the international customary rule of law will help to create the framework. Denial is the defensive aspect of deterrence and consists of prevention and futility. Deterrence by prevention means that if an attack is launched, defensive measures will disrupt the attack to keep it from succeeding. (Goodman, 2010, p. 106) What is attacker's tactical goal? To be credible, a defender must also have the intent to use the capabilities to carry out the deterrent declaration. (Goodman, 2010, p. 107)

Recognizing the role of humans in all domains of warfare is essential to understanding deterrence. Deterrence is fundamentally about influencing the decisions and actions (or inactions) taken by human beings, not nature. It is highly dependent on human agreements, both nationally and internationally. (Denning, 2015, p.9) Next, to piracy as it is according to the international customary rule of law.

In this paper, the definition of piracy is according to Article 101, United Nations

Convention of the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). The international legal definition of piracy is that piracy consist of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft:

(c) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

The modern law definition of piracy contains four elements:

1. The use of unlawful violence, detention or depredation
2. Committed for private ends
3. Committed on high seas
4. By the crew of a private vessel against another vessel, its crew, or cargo.

(Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2012, p. 11-12).

### **Absence of stability**

Geographical position and unstable political environment at the Gulf of Aden provides a breeding ground for pirates. With absence of stability in Somalia and at Gulf of Aden, piracy has become a 'piracy taboo' such as one much-discussed example in deterrence, the 'nuclear taboo'. (Stevens, 2012) In some cases, states provide protection from armed military personnel on privately owned and operated vessels as only authorized military personnel is allowed to carry weapons.

Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) are uniformed military personnel, equipment, activities including military-specific command and control hierarchies embarked on a vessel with an explicit approval of the Flag State. Italian and Dutch governments conduct most prominent VPD activities, although other countries such as Estonia, Finland and Ukraine deployed VPDs on their own vessels or as a part of coalition operations like in the World Food programme to Somalia (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017 and EU NAVFOR Somalia, 2013). However, the deployed VPDs are prepared to defend the crew and cargo, not to jump to the cyberspace for a fight. According to Oceans Beyond Piracy (2017), additional challenges faced by VPD personnel are related for example to immigration and customs clearances, timely and consistent transportation and communication.

Above the current VPDs challenges are compared to the situation with a crewless vessel.

<b>Current VPDs challenges:</b> Immigration and customs clearances for personnel, firearms, ammunition, and other security equipment entering and exiting national territory. Communication with local government and military authorities in order to ensure safe transportation to/from Vessel RV point and landing site. Coordination with the protected vessel to meet at the pre-selected RV point on schedule. Ensuring timely and consistent transportation to and from the protected vessels to the host vessel or seaport. (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2017)	Unmanned vessels do not have crew, however customs clearances for security equipment is still needed.  Need for communication is still needed.  Coordination still needed.  How is transportation possible without crew?
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**Optimal deterrence?**

How long will it take the conflicts at sea to transfer to cyberspace? Defining cost and lost, since continuous conflict in Somalia is causing the ideal conditions for piracy and armed robberies at Gulf of Aden. Jumping to cyberspace does not wipe the existing international conflicts between Somali pirates and vessels at the international sea. Ideally, piracy’s hotspots at the Somali coast and Gulf of Aden would see a peaceful maritime trade; therefore, the international trade route would become less dangerous. Preparing the next battlefield, the cyberspace offers other actors an opportunity to attack armed or unarmed private vessels because they are lacking cyber protection.

In my opinion, unmanned vessels and vessels with crew (with or without protection from the VPDs) are as equally powerless when facing a cyberattack. In this research, deterrence is used as a possible approach to prevent or defend against a conflict in cyberspace. Conflict avoidance has potential effectiveness, is cheaper than continuous conflict, therefore, deterrence offers possibilities to minimize human and material costs. As Goodman mentions, “The possibility of securing cyberspace without the costs of conflict keeps scholars interested in cyber deterrence.” (Goodman, 2010, p. 103) However, securing vessels’ cyberspace and the conflict avoidance is not a cheaper option if vessels are still under attack at the sea by weapons and explosions. Vessels are facing a double attack on sea and on cyberspace creating an unbearable situation; distantly located crew will face constant pressure of attacks.

Next, fight against piracy to the cyber world does not save resources, vessel crew or stabilise unstable governments related to piracy.

**Chapter 2. Cyber power**

In this chapter, the cycle of piracy is moving on from traditional piracy to piratical terrorism to cyber pirates. Utilising optimal deterrence to compare current countermeasures against piracy at sea and those needed in the cyberspace, the conclusion is that fight against piracy to the cyber world does not save resources,

vessel crew or stabilise unstable governments related to piracy.

As mentioned earlier, piratical attacks against vessels include the use of force. When jumping to cyberspace, the definitions of piracy and armed robbery at the international sea makes the current definition of piratical act outdated. Therefore, the focus should be less on the current forms of piracy and more on technological advances at maritime trade.

Pirates, real and virtual ones, are after money and other means of profiting from vessel's cargo, crew and reputation. There are several problems with the customary law in piracy, for example the persecution of criminals for crimes at the international sea. According to Bahar (2007), "...a regime of optimal deterrence, a determined point between the poles of maximum military pursuit and neglect. International law will support robust high seas military presence coupled with domestic prosecutions, helping to protect the seas from the disastrous economic, political, environmental, and humanitarian consequences of piratical terrorism." Unlike Bahar makes it sound, the customary international law is not strong enough to diminish piracy and piratical terrorism in short period of time. Different states have also their own internal regulations regarding for example human rights. Current customary law does not mention the possibility of cyberspace conflicts how the cyber waves would rock the vessels. Disastrous economic, political, environmental and humanitarian consequences are unchangeable problems when reflecting the cyberspace issues to the current situation in the international waters.

Piracy is a lucrative form of crime and provides new opportunities when states are testing unmanned vessels. Attacking crewless so-called ghost ships at the Gulf of Aden will create a conflict with the terminology used to define piracy. Let us presume that vessels will be unarmed, crewless and therefore difficult to penetrate at the open sea. "Optimal deterrence argues that too aggressive military and investigatory response will actually increase both the costs and the dangers of piracy, since it will diminish the prospects of effective prosecution". (Bahar, 2007, p. 6) Therefore, if similar outcome is expected to happen in the cyber environment, aggressive approach to cyber piracy is not the correct approach. Moving to cyberspace actors, the maritime trade should face less piracy and armed attacks.

According to Nye (2010), cyber power affects many other domains from war to commerce. We can distinguish "intra cyberspace power" and "extra cyberspace power" just as with sea power, we can distinguish naval power on the oceans from naval power projection onto land. For example, carrier based aircraft can participate in land battles; trade and commerce may grow because of the efficiency of a new generation of container ships; and the soft power of a country may be increased by the visit of naval hospital ships in humanitarian missions. (Nye, 2010, p. 5) Argument is that taking the fight against piracy to the cyber world does not save resources, vessel crew or stabilise unstable governments related to piracy.

### **Attacking in the cyberspace**

In our digital era, modern pirates of the sea are attacking the world trade by phishing, using honey pots and hacking into weakly protected accounts. Emerging cyber threats at sea are affecting not only private and state owned ships but also ports and offshore operations. Demand for cyber deterrence strategy indicates there is a lack of cyber awareness at sea.

In no other domain of warfare do we address the topic of deterrence across an entire domain. There is no notion of “land deterrence,” “sea deterrence,” “air deterrence,” or “space deterrence.” tied to specific domains of warfare and even geographic areas, such as deterrence of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, but others are not, such as deterrence of state-level aggression generally. (Denning, 2015, p. 11)

“Cyber power can be used to produce preferred outcomes within cyberspace or it can use cyber instruments to produce preferred outcomes in other domains outside cyberspace.” (Nye, 2010, p. 4) As Nye (2010) points out, it is cheaper and quicker to move electrons across the globe than to move large ships long distances through the friction of salt water. The costs of developing multiple carrier task forces and submarine fleets create enormous barriers to entry and make it still possible to speak of American naval dominance. While piracy remains a local option for non-state actors in areas like Somalia or the Malacca Straits, sea control remains out of the reach of non-state actors. Similarly, while there are many private and governmental actors in the air domain, a country can still seek to achieve air superiority through costly investments in 5th generation fighters and satellite support systems. (Nye, 2010, p. 4)

The dominance in cyberspace related to the sea power or air power. As Nye (2010) points out, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China are powerful actors in the sea power or air power. If anything, dependence on complex cyber systems for support of military and economic activities creates new vulnerabilities in large states that can be exploited by non-state actors. (Nye, 2010, p. 4) Changing attackers can and will create a new pecking order in cyber space. For example, the current Somali pirates are utilising the vacuum space of geographical opportunity in East Africa’s coastline. In Somalia, the lack of other job opportunities and resources to move away from piracy is keeping Somalia captured in its current position. As a case study, the development of the Arctic sea is attracting cyberterrorism.

### **Case study: Dynamics and challenges in the Arctic sea**

When talking about dynamics between the main players on the world stage and in the Arctic: Russia and the US, it is difficult to ignore the tensions between leaders. World is changing rapidly, does geographical borders mean anything anymore? Yes, borders still matter when it comes to world politics and politics in counterterrorism.

In general, challenges in creating a counterterrorism initiative are for example lack of communication between states, state actors and other relevant parties. Crucial strategic information is not shared among all participants, lack of transparency and unwillingness to cooperate with all states. Geographic presence is different when comparing the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Sea area, because two different areas should be treated as separate waters. Highly utilized Baltic Sea offers direct link for energy routes, vessels and other information flow. Terrorism in the Arctic sea is mainly cyberterrorism related attacks against vessels at sea and harbour. Therefore, counterterrorism challenges in the Arctic Sea is focused on combating cyberterrorism.

Other challenges in the Nordic-Baltic counterterrorism initiative, and especially on its counterterrorism, are that Nordic and Baltic countries have different economic, strategic and security structure. Baltic countries and Nordic countries

are divided by the Baltic Sea. Utilizing the experience same problems on Baltic Sea security reflect those on the Arctic Sea. Geographically the sea area is smaller and can be better utilized in energy transportation than the Arctic area. Logistics on the Northern side create new opportunities for attackers since geographically the area is vast, cold and response time is most likely longer.

Norwegian perspectives on Baltic Sea security are focused on two main issues: Russia's violations against air space and maritime boundaries and Trump's America's willingness to follow through on NATO's collective defence commitment. Are Baltic countries small players or just victims of their small geographical sizes? Scandinavian countries have long prestigious histories, and an open access to the Arctic waters. For example, Sweden is investing heavily on international cooperation. It is involved in 20 conventions on combating terrorism. Sweden's legislation criminalizes the enticement of terrorist acts, recruiting on behalf of terrorist organizations, travel to support terrorist organizations and providing terrorism training.

### **What is the role of an individual state?**

Together we are stronger, saying goes. When it comes to counterterrorism and environmentally vulnerable Arctic waters, combination requires cooperation between Arctic states. How to defend waterlines and underwater resources when there are several key players with different intentions?

Different Arctic countries have different point-of-views when it comes to the Arctic region; those views are influenced by the historical and geographical memories. It is difficult to ignore the role of Russia, since it is pursuing its ambitions to the Arctic areas. On an individual level, Nordic and Baltic states have their own Arctic policies connected with environmental questions, security related issues and energy related intentions. Is it realistic to presume that a small Nordic or Baltic state could influence the wellbeing of the Arctic region and its biggest ruler, Russia? Scandinavian countries Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Island are on the same icebreaker tackling Russia's expanding intentions in the Arctic waters. Uncertainty to the power play brings America with Trumps' changing intentions and sayings.

Shipping as an industry is complex and offers opportunities for cyber attackers to hack into ship's systems. Since vessels are required to use the same navigational equipment, it is vulnerable and slow to detect any attack. All states will face the same challenges and especially Russia, since it has strategically important industry in the Arctic area. Vessels are not safe at sea and by paralyzing the shipping industry, the cyber attacker can control the world trade. Commercial ships carry 90 % of the world's trade. (Baraniuk, 2017)

Vulnerability of infrastructure and possibility of cyberattacks are connected, since the social and economic infrastructure of Scandinavian and Baltic countries depend highly on the harbour traffic. Not only building such as Russia's nuclear plants in the Arctic area, require special protection and attention, but also cargo ships. Ships worldwide are vulnerable to cyber attackers since the Maritime sector has not been able to keep up with the changing cyber world. Cyberterrorism is a threat to a state security in the Arctic region; attackers influence the relationship between Arctic states by trolling, causing cyber-attacks and mistrust between states. When it comes to vulnerable targets in the Arctic, two of Russia's active nuclear

plants are in the Arctic area, in Murmansk region (Kola NPP) and in Chukotka region (Bilibino NPP). Therefore, at least for Russia, cyberterrorism is a relative threat to state security in the Arctic region.

### **Cooperation among known associates**

Cyber-attacks are tempting since army of few can cause wide destruction on industry, population and reputation of state or business. When talking about individual states, it is important to add countries' businesses and reputations to the discussion. Perhaps on a state level discussion, the shame factor does not play such a significant role than it would in the business world. Having a transparent and open dialogue about cyber-attacks on state level among neighbours, it could soften the path for Nordic and Baltic businesses of different sizes.

Cyber-attacks, such as 2017's WannaCry and NotPetya, influenced not only governments but also private businesses. The volume of cyber-attacks last year has increased focus on security in the Nordic region. WannaCry and NotPetya were the most visible and famous cyber-attacks, for example, NotPetya attacked Danish shipping giant Maersk lost revenue was up to 300 million euros. (Haaramo, 2018) We have shared responsibility to keep civilians safe during peacetime. How does information flow on Internet help terrorists target people like during NotPetya attack?

When cyber-attack is targeted without a specific geographical location limiting it, attack's potential is limitless. Cyber-attacks from China, the US, Turkey or from some other geographical location towards Nordic and Baltic countries, means there are several potential attackers capable of striking several targets simultaneously. Cooperation on state level nearly always excludes private sectors (such as shipping industry); therefore, it would be strategically important to include businesses influenced by cyber-attacks into the dialogue. Maybe it is too ambitious to join private sectors together with Baltic and Nordic countries.

Another theme dominating Nordic headlines was cyber espionage. In January 2017, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven publicly stated the country could not rule out the potential of Russia trying to interfere with its elections, and in April, Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen accused Russia of hacking its government emails. (Haaramo, 2017) There is a strong need for transparency and active listening when possible cyber threats are evaluated in the public.

Soon after Sweden's elections, a global cyber espionage campaign, dubbed Cloud Hopper, was discovered. China-based hacker group APT10 is suspected as being behind the attack, which targeted businesses and government agencies through IT service providers. Among the targeted countries were Sweden, Norway and Finland. (Haaramo, 2017)

### **Vessels targeted**

When considering the risks vessels face in the open sea and in harbours; utilizing technological advances in other cargo related fields and risk assessments are a good way to start. Cyber-piracy with complex juridical definition of armed robbery at sea and piracy creates threat to vessels. Since Baltic and Nordic countries are dependent on sea trade, all focus should be on securing the vessels in cyberspace. Targeting unmanned vessels is as easy as vessels with crew and armed security.

In media, from technology's point-of-view, cyberattacks against the shipping industry are a well-known phenomenon. For example, as news outlets such as the BBC and Independent, have brought to the public, vulnerability and proven cyberattacks on vessels prove that the threat is real. According to BBC (Baraniuk, 2017), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have both recently launched guidelines designed to help ship owners protect themselves from hackers. Awareness is growing; however, it is not enough since hacker's route to vessels' is clear. More money and resources should be targeted to cybersecurity measures and take notice the growing need for unmanned vessels.

Arctic Counterterrorism matter because as a region it is vital for all states involved in economically and strategically. Having a joint cyberterrorism initiative, Nordic and Baltic states could offer cybersecurity protection to Russian vessels in the Arctic sea in order to avoid a domino effect. No matter how unpleasant leader Russia has, importance of the Arctic area is greater since it is under attack. Having an initiative is not enough, maintaining the security level and upgrading it takes leadership. How to maintain Maritime Cybersecurity?

There are three big players in the Arctic; actual players in the Arctic sea are Russia, the United States and Norway. Can Norway be trusted if it has hegemony goals in the Arctic? Is Norway as a state confident enough to take the role of securing the Arctic cyberspace? As a rich oil country, it wants to secure its own wellbeing and alliances without jeopardizing its reputation and oil business. Balance of trust among Baltic and Nordic states, private vessel owners and other parties is at stake. Role of cyber is in transition; therefore, a corruption-sensitive initiative is needed to control the communication between Nordic and Baltic states and other actors.

Communication is important and therefore the initiative's first working level is among states, since there is already functioning information exchange among neighbouring countries. A strong cooperation among Nordic and Baltic countries restores an atmosphere of mutual understanding that cyberterrorism is possible to defeat. Tackling problems caused by Arctic terrorism is important to Russia. The Arctic's role for Russia's military security is linked to its geographic location and the military capabilities located in the Arctic. The Russian Arctic is home to the largest fleet in the Russian Navy, the Northern Fleet. (Elgsaas, 2017)

### **Suggestions for a Nordic-Baltic counterterrorism initiative**

Several factors from Russia's ageing population to indigenous people in the Arctic area are influencing overall picture of counterterrorism. Terror is born among fearful people with little to lose. Multi-level system with transparent cooperation is needed to balance the cyber world's unbalanced situation.

These four suggestions reflect the Russian army's problems with drug use, healthcare and lack of healthy soldiers. Since several players are involved with the Nordic-Baltic initiative, problems could rise from lack of space and movement in the discussion and decision-making. However, there is space for non-state actors as well since terrorist acts are targeted at private businesses and groups. Terrorism is not limited to state level.

1. **Birthrate** Low birth rates affect populations in Russia, Nordic countries and Baltic countries. Especially indigenous people are vulnerable for demographic

changes. Lack of future soldiers is pushing the warfare into cyber space and clearly, Russia is facing problems of its ageing army personnel. Demographic question becomes a security question when vast Northern areas are left in the hands of ageing population or youth with degrading health.

2. **Russian youths' health** Initiative would support Russia's demographic situation and trends by 2100 are that conflicts appear in the cyber sphere since Russian youths' health is weak à Russian army's reserve is ageing (Svyrarensko, 2018)

3. **Players involved** Combination of Traditional diplomacy (state-state) and new era diplomacy (individuals-organizations) create functioning, multi-level system that commits all parties in counterterrorism acts.

4. **Human aspect** Counterterrorism needs people and cooperation in conflict situations. Economic power is more powerful than military power: Transparency of funding, corruption and project management. In cyber defence, attacking corruption and distributing funds equally are crucial.

In order to fight against terrorism, political will and willingness to face challenges together are key factors for success. In the last chapter, Kenya is entering the cyberspace and challenging the political and military actors.

### **Chapter 3 "New safe harbour for cybercriminals"**

In this last chapter, I conclude by estimating the ability of the future of cyber deterrence. Cyberspace is offering a new role for Somalia and cybercriminals are enjoying the undiscovered safe haven in Somalia. What will happen in the future of East Africa, cyberspace and maritime trade off the coast of Somalia? Is Kenya the rising global hyper power next to the pirate state Somalia?

It is not possible to secure the cyberspace without the costs of conflict because new forms of attacks, for example phishing, using honey pots and hacking into weakly protected accounts are still usable with crewless vessels. Geographical position and unstable political environment at the Gulf of Aden is different from the geographical and political situation at the Arctic Sea. Both geographical areas offer moving space in the cyber world, therefore maritime trade is affected in both areas. In both geographical areas, as mentioned in the previous chapter, usable scenarios to fight against cyber piracy and cyber terrorism exist when more emphasis is put on cooperation.

### **Multi-layered cyber deterrence strategy**

As McKenzie says about US's cyber threats, "an effective cyber deterrence strategy must be multi-layered." (McKenzie, 2017) Passive cyber deterrence was previously mentioned in this paper; however, deterrence by denial is not enough to build a successful cyber deterrence strategy. My argument is that Kenya will impose a credible threat and therefore there should be a successful and effective strategy to utilise active deterrence.

The pointing finger should be moved from Russia, US, China and North Korea to East Africa. New technologically capable actors are rising in the African continent. Changes in the African cyberspace should not be underestimated. In my opinion, Somalia's role in modern piracy is undoubtedly dominant, however in the cyber age its power will change to adjust to the changing role. Changes will happen in East Africa because of Kenya, one of Africa's largest economies and East Africa's

central tech hub (Gagliardone and Sambuli, 2015) because Kenya will influence the continent making cyber-attacks technologically possible. In addition, Somalia will become a “new safe harbour for cybercriminals” and as mentioned by Gagliardone and Sambuli (2015), and the cyber security is characterised an inherently political challenge.

Is it possible for the current actors to move to cyberspace and continue as cyber pirates? Emerging cyber threats in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia are serious concern and indicate that the changes in cyber security are already happening in the region. (Gagliardone and Sambuli, 2015) Are the Somalian pirates switch to cyber or will the current actors diminish due time? It seems unlikely that piracy or armed robbery at sea would diminish due to radical changes in the cyber world. I argue that the technological development in East Africa has already started and Kenya will become a leading African state affected by the cybercrime.

### **Struggle for power position**

Fight against piracy in the cyber world does not save resources, vessel crew or stabilise unstable governments related to piracy. It will have two forms next to each other. Main actor Kenya could be the black horse of cyber dominance ready for ‘cyberwar’, therefore should not be underestimated since its geographical position is keeping the real world piracy close.

In my opinion Kenya is the ideal power taker in the cyber world of piracy since it already possess the technological knowledge, vast Internet using population and has unexpected position among other strong power players. Kenya is not a failed state as so of its surrounding states, it is a strong actor having an impact to African and international security. In order to gain power position in the East Africa region, state such as Kenya and other actors such as criminal organisations will switch to cyber; they will take the leading position from the current actors such as Somali pirates.

In conclusion, current penalty measures against modern piracy are not controlling the problem. Penalty for piracy in international court ruling is not efficient enough to be certain, severe and immediate. In order for cyber deterrence to be believable, the strategy has to have credibility and be part of nations’ national and international maritime security. Penalty measures against unwanted cyber activity such as corporate espionage should be a state level discussion. In this paper, modern piracy and possible political and economic cyber activity against vessels at the Gulf of Aden indicate the need for an offensive aspect of deterrence. Moving towards crewless vessels, the human aspect and vulnerability is still present since machines need human connection in order to learn. Cyber pirates use different penetration tools of phishing, using honey pots and hacking into weakly protected accounts to gain control of the vessel.

### **Conclusions**

Is the choice always between war and peace? In the nature of a cyber conflict, there are several parties involved (state-state, private-state, private-private and state-private). Businesses affected by cyber terror should have a voice in an initiative between the Baltic and Nordic states. International security and safety in the Arctic sea is vulnerable since vessels are under cyber danger.

Conflict and cooperation among states against cyber terror has a political purpose. Lithuania and Latvia trying to stay away from Arctic dilemmas and focus their cooperation with Central-European countries. Even though there would be an initiative, joining it does not mean that Lithuania and Latvia would have interests in the Arctic area. Arctic border countries with strong interests in the area such as Finland, Sweden and Norway would be the beneficiaries in Nordic-Baltic level cooperation. Leader of the suggested initiative between Nordic and Baltic countries would be Norway. It is rising to fight stronger against terrorism by having Scandinavia's strictest laws against terrorism. Laws are getting stricter in Scandinavia and in Russia; Norway has the existing strategic assets and legislation against terrorism. However, when comparing Norway's terrorism laws to even stricter one, Russia's Federal Law no.35 on combating terrorism; it is still reasonable moderate in sentencing terrorists.

Importance is in open and transparent dialogue, spreading cyber knowhow widely among states and for example businesses, social movements and other groups. Emphasis in this essay has mainly been in the cyber terrorism, since hostile actions in cyberspace rarely leave traces of perpetrator, also cyberattacks affect states on political and security levels. Ideas and notions of cyber shape preferences. Russia is a country of contradictions, Russia has cyber tools available; has proven its cyber power through its misinformation campaigns. In addition, at the same time its vessels, Arctic equipment and technology are weak against attackers.

Main issue is counterterrorism is accountability. In cyber-space, it is possible to avoid responsibility. How to create pressure on it to change anonymity and create norms? Formation of common norms in order to have a social construction, common beliefs and ideas are reached having a common power position. Working together as one colourful power against grey cyberspace, more states and other actors will participate and fragmentation of the cyber defence system is no longer a problem. As long as robots are not acting as terrorists, fight against unknown attackers in the cyberspace needs humanity. Human aspect is always involved influencing the development of cyber weapons and means of attack. If a new cyber-attack (similar to WannaCry or NotPetya) would target Russia's Arctic interests, how that would reflect on its neighbouring countries. Being aggressive and having hegemonic goals, Russia attracts attention to the Arctic with its energy seeking methods and is well aware of Arctic terrorism. Alone Russia is not prepared to fight against cyber-attacks, those attacks will reflect on Scandinavia and Baltic countries.

For future research, worthwhile topics are related with improvements in living conditions in the Arctic area, climate changes in the environment and future alliances. Cyber-attacks are evolving and finding new ways to adjust to the changing environment, therefore vessels navigation systems and open harbours are good targets for future attacks. Maritime technology is rapidly developing; in the near future crewless vessels have their own security related problems. Topic of building an initiative for cyber-attack preparedness is relevant also in ten years' time. Perhaps by then there will be an initiative among businesses and social communities instead of states.

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